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Debates over wolf policy are driven by an underlying attitudinal divide between people from urban and rural areas. This study explores how the power relationship between urban and rural groups interact with individual attitude formation in relation to wolf policy, in order to understand why dissatisfaction with wolf policy tends to result in group level conflict patterns. Using Swedish survey data, I analyze attitudes to wolf policy, in relation to collective level effects and rural political alienation. Findings indicate that individual level attitudes towards the Swedish wolf policy are in part determined by collective attitude patterns: effects that could be contingent on political alienation. This highlights the possibility of reducing attitude polarization with respect to the wolf policy, by addressing political alienation among the rural population.

The study examines change over time in sentiments toward out-group populations in European societies. For this purpose data were compiled from four waves of the Eurobarometer surveys for 12 countries that provided detailed and comparable information on attitudes toward foreigners between 1988 and 2000. A series of multilevel hierarchical linear models were estimated to examine change in the effects of individual - and country-level sources of threat on anti-foreigner sentiment. The analysis shows a substantial rise in anti-foreigner sentiment between 1988 and 2000 in all 12 countries. The rise in anti-foreigner sentiment was steep in the early period (between 1988 and 1994), then leveled off after that. Although anti-foreigner sentiment tends to be more pronounced in places with a large proportion of foreign populations and where economic conditions are less prosperous, the effects of both factors on anti-foreigner sentiment have not changed over time. The analysis also shows that anti-foreigner sentiment is more pronounced in places with greater support for right-wing extreme parties. The impact of individual-level socioeconomic characteristics such as education has remained stable over the years, but the effect of political ideology has increased. The meaning and significance of the findings are discussed within the context of European societies.

Abstract The vast majority of interventions during organizational change tend to focus on individually-held attitudes toward change. However, groups often form collective attitudes that are distinct from those held by its individual members, and organizational change often necessitates collective attitude change within teams, work units, or even the entire organization. We challenge the dominant view that collective attitudes to organizational change merely reflect an aggregation of individual attitudes by considering how and why collectively-held change attitudes are formed and activated. Drawing on social network theory, we propose an alternative approach toward an understanding of change. Acknowledging and detailing attitude formation as a social response to change – a social system of interaction among change recipients – we explain how collective attitudes to organizational change emerge. With this stance, individuals may hold broad and differing attitudes, but as a group can come together to share a collective attitude toward change. Using this approach, we explain how collective attitudes and individual attitudes are linked through top-down or bottom-up processes, or a combination of both. Developing this alternative perspective improves our understanding of how collective attitudes to change develop and evolve and enables both scholars and practitioners to better manage and influence the formation of change-supportive collective attitudes.

Psychological-epistemic accounts take scientific progress to consist in the development of some psychological-epistemic attitude. Disagreements over what the relevant attitude is – true belief, knowledge, or understanding – divide proponents of the semantic, epistemic, and noetic accounts of scientific progress, respectively. Proponents of all such accounts face a common challenge. On the face of it, only individuals have psychological attitudes. However, as I argue in what follows, increases in individual true belief, knowledge, and understanding are neither necessary nor sufficient for scientific progress. Rather than being fatal to the semantic, epistemic, and noetic accounts, this objection shows that these accounts are most plausible when they take the psychological states relevant to scientific progress to be states of communities, rather than individuals. I draw on recent work in social epistemology to develop two ways in which communities can be the bearers of irreducible psychological-epistemic states. Each way yields a strategy by which proponents of one of the psychological-epistemic accounts might attempt to account for the social dimensions of scientific progress. While I present serious reasons for concern about the first strategy, I argue that the second strategy, at least, offers a promising path forward for a psychological-epistemic account of scientific progress.

Are American attitudes toward economic inequality different from those in other countries? One tradition in sociology suggests American \"exceptionalism,\" while another argues for convergence across nations in social norms, such as attitudes toward inequality. This article uses International Social Survey Program (ISSP) microdata to compare attitudes in different countries toward what individuals in specific occupations \"do earn \" and what they \"should earn,\" and to distinguish value preferences for more egalitarian outcomes from other confounding attitudes and perceptions. The authors suggest a method for summarizing individual preferences for the leveling of earnings and use kernel density estimates to describe and compare the distribution of individual preferences over time and cross-nationally. They find that subjective estimates of inequality in pay diverge substantially from actual data, and that although Americans do not, on the average, have different preferences for aggregate (in)equality, there is evidence for: 1. Less awareness concerning the extent of inequality at the top of the income distribution in America, 2. More polarization in attitudes among Americans, 3. Similar preferences for \"leveling down\" at the top of the earnings distribution in the United States, but also 4. Less concern for reducing differentials at the bottom of the distribution.

A sense of self-perceived collective victimhood emerges as a major theme in the ethos of conflict of societies involved in intractable conflict and is a fundamental part of the collective memory of the conflict. This sense is defined as a mindset shared by group members that results from a perceived intentional harm with severe consequences, inflicted on the collective by another group. This harm is viewed as undeserved, unjust and immoral, and one that the group could not prevent. The article analyses the nature of the self-perceived collective sense of victimhood in the conflict, its antecedents, the functions that it fulfils for the society and the consequences that result from this view.

This study analyzes aspects of place attachment in rural areas, as an element of social stability that determines attitudinal and behavioral patterns within a harmonious relationship between human beings and the environment. A higher level of place attachment generates efficient behavior patterns for the improvement of the problems caused by pollution and the degradation of natural environments. In the second section, we set out to measure the forms of manifestation of place attachment in rural areas and to identify effective strategies that can contribute to increasing the intensity of this phenomenon. We set out a study of the causality between environmental perception and place attachment. We carried out an investigation based on a questionnaire to determine the forms of manifestation of place attachment and environmental perception. We tested a statistical model to confirm or not the determining relationship between the two social phenomena. Our study also offers an original interpretation of environmental perception and explains the degree of intensity with which this phenomenon is felt at the individual level. The practical importance of this study lies in the fact that it offers a strategy proven by sociological analysis, which can be applied to stimulate an increase in intensity of the manifestation of feelings of place attachment, which ultimately leads to the spread of pro-environmental attitudinal and behavioral patterns.

This study examines important distinctions in sexual orientation identities by exploring the relationships among sexual identity, activism, and collective self-esteem. Past research has revealed that individuals who label themselves as belonging to certain minority sexual identities may experience different types of outcomes; for instance, bisexual individuals have been shown to experience more psychological hardships (Brewster & Moradi, 2010; Browne & Lim, 2010), whereas Queer individuals' politicization may buffer against some of these negative experiences and increase their psychological well-being (Galinsky et al., 2013; Klar and Kasser, 2009; Riggs, 2010). We explored whether these important differences could be attributed to a person's choice of a sexual identity description. An online survey was distributed to Facebook groups affiliated with 33 universities across Canada, which yielded responses from 265 participants. Four distinct sexual identity categories were created and compared in two multiple regression models that controlled for measures of personal and social identity. In the first model, we tested group differences in collective self-esteem and, in the second model, we assessed group differences in political activism. As predicted, collective self-esteem was significantly lower for those who identified as bisexual, and activism was most likely among those who identified as Queer. Our research highlights the need for caution when either measuring or studying aspects of sexual orientation, since these identity categories reflect different personal and political points of reference.

We examine the consequences of threat to the ingroup for emotional reactions to ingroup harm doing. It was hypothesized that reminders of a past threat to the ingroup would induce collective angst, and this emotional reaction would increase forgiveness of the ingroup for its harmful actions toward another group. In Experiment 1, Americans read an article about the war in Iraq that implied Americans would soon experience another attack or one where such implied future threat to the ingroup was absent. When the ingroup's future was threatened, forgiveness for the harm Americans have committed in Iraq was increased, to the extent that collective angst was induced. In Experiment 2, Americans experienced more collective angst and were more willing to forgive their ingroup for their group's present harm doing in Iraq following reminders of either the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, or the 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor compared to when the victimization reminder was irrelevant to the ingroup. We discuss why ingroup threat encourages ingroup forgiveness for current harm doing.

This article investigates collective denial and willful blindness in groups, organizations, and markets. Agents with anticipatory preferences, linked through an interaction structure, choose how to interpret and recall public signals about future prospects. Wishful thinking (denial of bad news) is shown to be contagious when it is harmful to others, and self-limiting when it is beneficial. Similarly, with Kreps-Porteus preferences, willful blindness (information avoidance) spreads when it increases the risks borne by others. This general mechanism can generate multiple social cognitions of reality, and in hierarchies it implies that realism and delusion will trickle down from the leaders. The welfare analysis differentiates group morale from groupthink and identifies a fundamental tension in organizations' attitudes towards dissent. Contagious exuberance can also seize asset markets, generating investment frenzies and crashes. Reprinted by permission of Blackwell Publishers