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Despite the frequent participation of women in armed groups, few studies have sought to explain the variation in their roles across different rebellions. Herein, we investigate this variation. We argue that the political ideology a group adopts plays a central role in determining the extent of women’s participation, particularly their deployment in combat roles. Specifically, we link variations in women’s roles in armed groups to differences in beliefs about gender hierarchies and gender-based divisions of labor inherent in the specific ideologies the groups adopt. We evaluate hypotheses drawn from these arguments using a novel cross-sectional dataset on female combatants in a global sample of rebel organizations active between 1979 and 2009. We find that the presence of a Marxist-oriented ‘leftist’ ideology increases the prevalence of female fighters while Islamist ideologies exert the opposite effect. However, we find little evidence that nationalism exerts an independent influence on women’s combat roles. We also note a general inverse relationship between group religiosity and the prevalence of female fighters. Our analysis demonstrates that political ideology plays a central role in determining whether and to what extent resistance movements incorporate female fighters into their armed wings.

The ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine has led many Ukrainians to fight for their country, either in the regular army or as civilian members of voluntary territorial defense forces. There is, however, a dearth of knowledge on the mental health of combatants in this conflict. Prior research on the mental health of combatants is unlikely to translate to the situation at hand because such research is focused on combatants fighting abroad and neglects civilian combatants. This study provides the first attempt to investigate the mental health of Ukrainian combatants in the regular army and voluntary territorial defense forces by analyzing the prevalence rates of common mental health issues, as well as their demographic and socioeconomic predictors. Between March 19 and 31, 2022, the initial period of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, a sample of 178 Ukrainian combatants (104 in the regular army and 74 civilian combatants) participated in a survey on symptoms of anxiety (GAD-2), depression (PHQ-2), and insomnia (ISI). A sizable portion of Ukrainian combatants reached cut-off levels for clinical symptoms of anxiety (44·4%), depression (43·3%), and insomnia (12·4%). Importantly, the mental health of Ukrainian combatants varied between professional soldiers and civilian combatants, as well as by gender, marital status, by whether or not they were located in Russian-occupied/active-combat areas, and dependent on whether they were personally involved in combat. This study provides early evidence on the mental health of Ukrainian combatants, pointing to their urgent need for mental health assistance in the ongoing war.

The ability of ex-combatants to engage in sustainable income-generating activities is a central pillar of successful demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration processes, even though full reintegration also requires progress in social, political, and psychological dimensions. However, there is limited quantitative evidence on which strategies effectively support economic reintegration. In 2011, Colombia introduced a one-time cash transfer aimed at helping ex-combatants access employment or start a business. Using administrative and survey data on labor market outcomes and socio-economic characteristics, we evaluate the impact of this policy using the Propensity Score Matching method. We find that the cash transfer significantly increases the probability of employment. The effect is particularly strong among young and female ex-combatants, highlighting the need for targeted support for these groups. Our findings underscore the positive role that financial assistance can play in reintegration efforts and offer useful insights for the design of future DDR programs.

Belligerents increasingly rely on media manipulation, propaganda, and communication to attain strategic advantages in conflict. Given the civilian propagandists’ clear role in creating tactical or strategic advantages for one side in the conflict, should these propagandists be considered combatants, and can they therefore be legitimately targeted because of their activities? This article overcomes traditional binary frameworks of distinction to argue that propagandists are indirectly participating civilians, i.e. participants who cannot be intentionally or directly killed in conflict. Because of their activities, propagandists, it argues, are liable to less-than-lethal harm, of which it identifies three types (destruction of property, privation of liberty, isolation). The article then proposes a necessary criterion – necessity – to decide if less-than-lethal harm is warranted against propagandists. It then creates four new criteria – denial of agency, falsehood, influence, gratification – to serve as assessment criteria able to decide what degree of harm a propagandist may maximally face. In making this argument, the article contributes to just war literature by proposing a novel way to evaluate the ethical status of a highly diverse, yet undoubtedly influential, category of war participants: those who undertake the ‘media battle’, outside of the military.

In December 2014, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) released a 500+ page executive summary of a 6,000 page study of the CIA's detention and interrogation of al Qa'ida terrorists. In early 2015 publishers released the study in book form and called it \"the report\" on \"torture.\" Rebuttal presents the \"rest of the story.\" In addition to reprinting the official responses from the SSCI minority and CIA, this publication also includes eight essays from senior former CIA officials who all are deeply knowledgeable about the program and yet none of whom were interviewed by the SSCI staff during the more than four years the report was in preparation. These authors of the eight essays are George Tenet, Porter Goss, Gen. Michael V. Hayden, USAF (Ret.), John McLaughlin, Michael Morrell, J. Philip Mudd, John Rizzo, and Jose A. Rodriguez, Jr.

Hydrodynamic optimization is an effective and robust design method that is indispensable in ship hull form performance. Marine engineering and naval architecture have displayed significant interest in integrating bulbous bows on combatant ships. This review aims to gather and assess the existing knowledge regarding the effects of bulbous bow shapes on the hydrodynamic characteristics of combatant ships in terms of historical background, design principles, and impacts of bulbous bow shapes on ship resistance, ship motion in seaways, squat, and seakeeping performance. The review evaluates the effects of bulbous bow shapes on hull hydrodynamics using computational fluid dynamics (CFD), model testing, and full-scale experiments. The text delves into the complexities of improving hull shape and how the bulbous bow design interacts with many operational factors like draft, speed, and sea conditions. This research offers scholars, naval architects, and marine engineers a comprehensive insight into the intricate effects of bulbous bow shapes on combatant ship performance. It aims to consolidate current material to enhance our comprehension of ship design and operation by identifying knowledge gaps and suggesting future research areas.

There appears to be a rift between the theoretical and normative understandings of what reconciliation means and offers, and what people expect to happen in postconflict scenarios. Here we present a conceptual framework that captures the definitional diversity surrounding the concept of reconciliation and then operationalizes it in order to analyze responses from postconflict populations. The illustrative application of our framework to responses from a representative survey of 1,843 Colombian citizens reveals that people’s convictions are just as diverse as scholars’. Nevertheless, significant proportions of respondents seem to understand reconciliation to be primarily a psychological and political process which aims to achieve the re-establishment of quotidian or day-to-day relations and cooperation; which should be preceded by the cessation of violence, dialogue, goodwill, and attitudinal and emotional change; and which should be accompanied by social welfare and security. It is noteworthy that understandings of reconciliation as a process mediated by justice, truth, and memory are scarce. The application of this framework will help to reveal differences between hopes and promises, and inform scholarly work and policymaking that is more realistically rooted.

Significance The human propensity to sacrifice one’s life for genetic strangers has puzzled scientists since Darwin. Here, we sought answers to this puzzle by embedding ourselves within groups of individuals prepared to die for one another—Libyan revolutionary battalion members who fought against Gaddafi’s regime in 2011. We found striking evidence of extraordinarily tight, familial-like bonds among those who put themselves directly in harm’s way (i.e., frontline combatants). In fact, for nearly half of combatants, their bonds to each other were stronger than bonds to their own families. Moreover, these kin-like bonds to one another predispose them to extreme self-sacrifice. What motivates ordinary civilians to sacrifice their lives for revolutionary causes? We surveyed 179 Libyan revolutionaries during the 2011 conflict in Libya. These civilians-turned-fighters rejected Gaddafi’s jamahiriyya (state of the masses) and formed highly cohesive fighting units typical of intense conflicts. Fighters reported high levels of “identity fusion”—visceral, family-like bonds between fighters and their battalions. Fusion of revolutionaries with their local battalions and their own families were extremely high, especially relative to Libyans who favored the revolution but did not join battalions. Additionally, frontline combatants were as strongly bonded to their battalion as they were to their own families, but battalion members who provided logistical support were more fused with their families than battalions. Together, these findings help illuminate the social bonds that seem to motivate combatants to risk their lives for the group during wartime.

What determines the recidivism of ex-combatants from armed conflicts? In postconflict settings around the world, there has been growing interest in reintegration programs to prevent ex-combatants from returning to illegal activities or to armed groups, yet little is known about who decides to “go bad.” We evaluate explanations for recidivism related to combatant experiences and common criminal motives by combining data from a representative survey of ex-combatants of various armed groups in Colombia with police records of observed behaviors that indicate which among the respondents returned to belligerent or illegal activities. Consistent with a theory of recidivism being shaped by driving and restraining factors, the results suggest that factors such as antisocial personality traits, weak family ties, lack of educational attainment, and the presence of criminal groups are most highly correlated with various kinds of recidivism and hold implications for programs and policies to successfully reintegrate ex-combatants into society.