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International comity is one of the principal foundations of U.S. foreign relations law. The doctrines of American law that mediate the relationship between the U.S. legal system and those of other nations are nearly all manifestations of international comity—from the conflict of laws to the presumption against extraterritoriality; from the recognition of foreign judgments to the doctrines limiting adjudicative jurisdiction in international cases; and from a foreign government's privilege of bringing suit in the U.S. courts to the doctrines of foreign sovereign immunity. Yet international comity remains poorly understood. This Article provides the first comprehensive account of international comity in American law. It has three goals: (1) to offer a better definition of international comity and a framework for analyzing its manifestations in American law; (2) to explain the relationship between international comity and international law; and (3) to challenge the myths that international comity doctrines must take the form of standards rather than rules and that international comity determinations should be left to the executive branch.

One of the most dramatic exercises of a court's equitable authority is the nationwide injunction. Although this phenomenon has become more prominent in recent years, it is a routine fixture of the jurisprudence of federal courts. Despite the frequency with which these cases arise, there has been no systematic scholarly or judicial analysis of when courts issue nationwide injunctions and little discussion of when they should issue such relief. This Article presents the first comprehensive account of when nationwide injunctions issue. Earlier attempts to answer this question have focused exclusively on challenges to federal regulatory action and have concluded that the domain is one of unconstrained judicial discretion. By contrast, this Article considers not only cases involving the federal government but also those exclusively between private parties. The conclusion from this expanded focus is that courts determining the geographic scope of injunctions in disputes between private parties are largely guided by a single principle: The injunction should be no broader than \"necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.\" While the \"complete relief\" idea has echoes throughout equitable jurisprudence, it proves particularly robust at organizing the conditions under which nationwide injunctions issue. The Article then examines the body of cases involving the federal government to test the explanatory power of the complete relief principle. Although there is more variation, here too complete relief provides a useful tool for categorizing seemingly disparate cases under a common classification scheme. The Article concludes by arguing not only that the complete relief principle is descriptively useful for focusing debates about nationwide injunctions but also that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 should be amended to codify the principle as a formal limit on the appropriate geographic scope of an injunction.

We provide an improvement over Meshulam’s bound on cap sets in F3NF_3^N. We show that there exist universal ϵ>0\\epsilon >0 and C>0C>0 so that any cap set in F3NF_3^N has size at most C3NN1+ϵC {3^N \\over N^{1+\\epsilon }}. We do this by obtaining quite strong information about the additive combinatorial properties of the large spectrum.

Because the internet is so thoroughly global, nearly every aspect of internet governance has an extraterritorial effect. This is evident in a number of high-profile cases that cover a wide range of subjects, including law enforcement access to digital evidence; speech disputes, such as requests to remove offensive or hateful web content; intellectual property disputes; and much more. Although substantively distinct, these issues present courts with the same jurisdictional challenge: how to ensure one state's sovereign interest in regulating the internet's local effects without infringing on other states' interests. The answer, for better or for worse, is comity, the foreign affairs principle that informs a number of sovereign-deference doctrines. Sovereignty arguments have pervaded a number of recent consequential cases, including Google's challenge to the \"right to be forgotten\" in Europe and Microsoft's challenge to a court order to produce foreign-held emails under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. These arguments will continue to play a significant role in future cases. Yet the proper application of foreign affairs law to cross-border internet disputes is not what many litigants and courts have claimed. Crucially, no sovereign-deference doctrine prohibits global takedown requests, foreign production orders, or other forms of extraterritorial exercises of jurisdiction over the internet. To the contrary, one of the key lessons of the sovereign-deference jurisprudence is that in order to avoid tensions between sovereigns, courts often enable, rather than inhibit, extraterritorial exercises of authority. This Article has three goals. First, it seeks to identify and characterize an emerging body of case law, which we might call data-sovereignty litigation: a diverse set of cases pitting national sovereigns against large internet firms. Second, the Article aims to show how the doctrinal rules of sovereign deference ought to apply to these disputes. Finally, it makes the case for a policy of sovereign deference beyond courts. The stakes are considerable. If we do not find ways to accommodate legitimate sovereign claims over global cloud activity, states will forcefully assert those interests — typically by taking physical control over local network infrastructure — imposing significant costs on entrepreneurship, privacy, and speech.

A number of judge-made doctrines attempt to promote international comity by reducing possible tensions between the United States and foreign sovereigns. For example, courts usually interpret ambiguous statutes to conform to international law and understand them not to apply outside of the nation's territorial boundaries. The international comity doctrines are best understood as a product of a judicial judgment that in particular contexts the costs of deference to foreign interests are lower than the benefits to American interests. Sometimes Congress balances these considerations and incorporates its judgment in a statute, but usually it does not. In such cases, executive interpretations should be permitted to trump the comity doctrines, as long as those interpretations are reasonable. This conclusion is supported both by considerations of institutional competence and by the distinctive position of the President in the domain of foreign affairs. If follows that if the executive wants to interpret ambiguous statutes to conflict with international law or to apply extraterritorially, it should be permitted to do so. The analysis of the interpretive power of the executive can be justified by reference to the Chevron doctrine in administrative law, which similarly calls for deference to executive interpretation of statutory ambiguities. Sometimes the Chevron doctrine literally applies to executive interpretations; sometimes it operates as a valuable analogy. At the same time, the Chevron principle is qualified by doctrines requiring a clear congressional statement, especially when constitutionally sensitive rights are involved. These claims have many implications for legal issues raised by the war on terror, including those explored in the Hamdi and Hamdan cases.

Picking up a smartphone to contact someone across the globe is facilitated by technical standards like 5G. These standards allow for technological compatibility worldwide. For instance, a 5G capable device can connect to 5G networks anywhere in the world because the same 5G standard is used globally. Standards, particularly those integral to the telecommunications industry, are also highly complex and contain many patents that are necessarily infringed when the standard is implemented. To avoid rampant patent infringement, owners of these standard-essential patents (\"SEPs\") are required to license them to standard implementers at fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (\"FRAND\") rates when their patents are incorporated into a standard. Apart from that, standard setting organizations (\"SSOs\") provide minimal guidance about what rates are FRAND. As a result, SEP litigation over whether a rate is FRAND has spiked.

Will international law colonize the last bastion of sovereign discretion? As a matter of traditional doctrine, international law has had little to say about the citizenship practices of states and the terms on which states determine the boundaries of their memberships. Through much of the Westphalian era, states have been essentially unconstrained with respect to who gets citizenship and on what terms. Historically, citizenship status has been considered a matter of national self-definition, jealously insulated more as a matter of reflex than justification. Nationality has been equated with identity, in most cases coinciding with ethnic, religious, or other sociocultural community markers, which, in turn, have more or less mapped onto territorial spaces.

The Supreme Court's habeas corpus retroactivity jurisprudence has never been a model of clarity or fairness. Ordinarily, if a case is on direct review, a court is bound to apply constitutional law as it currently stands, not the law as it stood at the time of trial, conviction, or sentencing. This rule derives from 'Griffith v. Kentucky', in which the Supreme Court held that the Constitution requires that all new constitutional rules apply to cases on direct review. However, in 'Teague v. Lane', the Court distinguished direct and collateral review, holding that new constitutional rules do not apply to cases on collateral review unless they fall within one of two exceptions. The Court has justified this approach to retroactivity by emphasizing 'comity', respect for the judicial process of the state courts, and 'finality', the closure a judgment of conviction is supposed to bring. This retroactivity test is not only complex but also produces disparate impacts on similarly situated individuals. For this reason and many others, legal scholars have long criticized the 'Teague' doctrine; as Justice Gorsuch recently acknowledged, the 'Teague' doctrine has been \"mystifying... from its inception.\" And in May 2021, the Court walked back the thirtyyear- old doctrine in 'Edwards v. Vannoy', recognizing that one of the two 'Teague' exceptions is \"moribund\" and \"retain[s] no vitality.\" Though scholars have previously criticized the 'Teague' doctrine and offered alternatives, this Note is the first to provide a substantial critique of the 'Teague' doctrine's underlying assumptions regarding finality and comity interests. After comparing related finality and comity doctrines, this Note argues that the current 'Teague' doctrine overvalues both interests, and a reimagining of the retroactivity framework should begin with reconsidering the foundational roles of those interests. This Note proposes one such framework-one that is more generous about granting the retroactivity remedy for violations of constitutional rights. Under this proposed framework, new constitutional rules should always apply retroactively on state collateral review and federal habeas review of federal convictions. The proposed framework also revises the 'Teague' new-rule doctrine and suggests that a state's discrimination against a federal right vitiates its comity interest, weighing in favor of the retroactivity remedy. This Note concludes with a discussion of 'Edwards v. Vannoy', suggesting that the case highlights the flaws of the 'Teague' doctrine and the need to rethink the foundations of retroactivity and to reground the doctrine in first principles.