Explore the vast range of titles available.

This paper develops grounded theory to understand how and when experts in lower-power peripheral roles can develop influential relationships with higher-power line managers in core functions to regularly elicit their cooperation. I use data from an ethnographic study of experts in peripheral roles—mental health professionals hired by the U.S. Army to provide rehabilitative services to activeduty soldiers suffering from conditions such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)—and the line managers in core functions they depended on for their soldier-care recommendations to be followed—their soldiers’ direct commanders. I analyze relational histories of 56 commander–provider dyads and detail a three-phase process model I refer to as “rapid relationality.” Through the process of rapid relationality, mental health professionals capitalized on short windows of opportunity to quickly develop influential relationships with commanders, despite lacking formal authority over them, before a series of minor conflicts or a major conflict threatened their burgeoning influence. My analysis suggests it is not only what peripheral experts do that allows them to elicit cooperation from line managers but also when and how quickly they do it that matters. Speed and taking early action are important because experts cannot predict when conflict will occur and hence may have short initial windows of opportunity for establishing an influential relationship. I further find that some experts have fewer tactics available to them or must use more time-consuming and energy-intensive tactics than others to achieve the same relational influence based on their personal characteristics (e.g., gender). As a result, it may be harder for some experts to achieve relational influence before their window of opportunity closes.

Organizational life is rife with conflict between groups that pursue different goals, particularly when groups have strong commitments to professional identities developed outside the organization. I use data from a 30-month comparative ethnographic field study of four U.S. Army combat brigades to examine conflict between commanders who had a goal of fielding a mission-ready force and mental health providers who had a goal of providing rehabilitative mental health care to soldiers. All commanders and providers faced goal and identity conflict and had access to similar integrative mechanisms. Yet only those associated with two brigades addressed these conflicts in ways that accomplished the army’s superordinate goal of having both mission-ready and mentally healthy soldiers. Both successful brigades used what I call “anchored personalization” practices, which included developing personalized relations across groups, anchoring members in their home group identity, and co-constructing integrative solutions to conflict. These practices were supported by an organizational structure in which professionals were assigned to work with specific members of the other group, while remaining embedded within their home group. In contrast, an organizational structure promoting only anchoring in one’s home group identity led to failure when each group pursued its own goals at the expense of the other group’s goals. A structure promoting only personalization across groups without anchoring in one’s home group identity led to failure from cooptation by the dominant group. This study contributes to our understanding of how groups with strong professional identities can work together in service of their organization’s superordinate goals when traditional mechanisms fail.

The ability of the Joint Force to anticipate, recognize, and adapt to change -- and to innovate within a rapidly changing environment -- is absolutely critical to mission success. New technologies are fielded faster than ever before. Leaders at lower and lower levels utilize enabling capabilities once reserved for the highest echelons of command. Tactics, techniques, and procedures are adapted from one deployment cycle to the next. This accelerated pace of change is inextricably linked to the speed of war today. Proliferation of advanced technologies that transcend geographic boundaries and span multiple domains makes the character of conflict extraordinarily dynamic. The Joint Force is full of the most talented men and women in the world, and it is their responsibility as leaders to unleash their initiative to adapt and innovate to meet tomorrow's challenges.

This Note makes the case for congressional authority to regulate military operations through the formal adoption of statutory rules of engagement. Authority over the conduct of hostilities is traditionally thought to be within the exclusive province of the Commander in Chief. The constitutional text and historical evidence from the early republic, however, confirm that Congress may regulate in this space. Yet the practical exercise of such congressional power must be weighed against the President s independent duty to interpret and implement the law and Constitution. While often discussed in relation to judicial supremacy and broader questions of constitutional interpretation, this Note borrows the doctrine of presidential departmentalism and sketches how it constrains, but does not entirely hamstring, Congress s ability to legislate in this domain. Past Presidents have interpreted their Commander in Chief authority expansively, treating it as extending beyond battlefield command and implementation discretion (arguably the President s core, preclusive authority) to include broader governance of military operations. Historically, such interpretations have prevailed notwithstanding Congress s concurrent authority. This persistent pattern may suggest the Framers envisioned a constitutional structure that permits executive primacy in operational control within a system of shared war powers. Still, Congress retains meaningful constitutional mechanisms (including by the enactment of standing rules of engagement) through which it can influence the conduct of military operations.

How do former armed militants exercise local political power after civil wars end? Building on recent advances in the study of \"rebel rulers\" and local goods provision by armed groups, this article offers a typology of ex-rebel commander authority that emphasizes two dimensions of former militants' power: local-level ties to civilian populations ruled during civil war and national-level ties to post-conflict state elites. Put together, these dimensions produce four trajectories of ex-rebel authority. These trajectories shape whether and how ex-rebel commanders provide social goods within post-conflict communities and the durability of ex-rebels' local authority over time. We illustrate this typology with qualitative evidence from northern Côte d'Ivoire. The framework yields theoretical insights about local orders after civil war, as well as implications for peacebuilding policies.