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We introduce and evaluate the effectiveness of temptation bundling-a method for simultaneously tackling two types of self-control problems by harnessing consumption complementarities. We describe a field experiment measuring the impact of bundling instantly gratifying but guilt-inducing \"want\" experiences (enjoying page-turner audiobooks) with valuable \"should\" behaviors providing delayed rewards (exercising). We explore whether such bundles increase should behaviors and whether people would pay to create these restrictive bundles. Participants were randomly assigned to a full treatment condition with gym-only access to tempting audio novels, an intermediate treatment involving encouragement to restrict audiobook enjoyment to the gym, or a control condition. Initially, full and intermediate treatment participants visited the gym 51% and 29% more frequently, respectively, than control participants, but treatment effects declined over time (particularly following Thanksgiving). After the study, 61% of participants opted to pay to have gym-only access to iPods containing tempting audiobooks, suggesting demand for this commitment device. This paper was accepted by Uri Gneezy, behavioral economics.

We review the recent evidence on commitment devices and discuss how this evidence relates to theoretical questions about the demand for, and effectiveness of, commitment. Several important distinctions emerge. First, we distinguish between what we call hard and soft commitments and identify how soft commitments, in particular, can help with various dilemmas, both in explaining empirical behavior and in designing effective commitment devices. Second, we highlight the importance of certain modeling assumptions in predicting when commitment devices will be demanded and examine the laboratory and field evidence on the demand for commitment devices. Third, we present the evidence on both informal and formal commitment devices, and we conclude with a discussion of policy implications, including sin taxes, consumer protection, and commitment device design.

We argue that poverty can perpetuate itself by undermining the capacity for self-control. In line with a distinguished psychological literature, we consider modes of selfcontrol that involve the self-imposed use of contingent punishments and rewards. We study settings in which consumers with quasi-hyperbolic preferences confront an otherwise standard intertemporal allocation problem with credit constraints. Our main result demonstrates that low initial assets can limit self-control, trapping people in poverty, while individuals with high initial assets can accumulate indefinitely. Thus, even temporary policies that initiate accumulation among the poor may be effective. We examine implications concerning the effect of access to credit on saving, the demand for commitment devices, the design of financial accounts to promote accumulation, and the variation of the marginal propensity to consume across income from different sources. We also explore the nature of optimal self-control, demonstrating that it has a simple and behaviorally plausible structure that is immune to self-renegotiation.

We tested a voluntary self-control commitment device to help grocery shoppers make healthier food purchases. Participants, who were already enrolled in a large-scale incentive program that discounts the price of eligible groceries by 25%, were offered the chance to put their discount on the line. Agreeing households pledged that they would increase their purchases of healthy food by 5 percentage points above their household baseline for each of 6 months. If they reached that goal, their discount was awarded as usual; otherwise, their discount was forfeited for that month. Thirty-six percent of households that were offered the binding commitment agreed; they subsequently showed an average 3.5-percentage-point increase in healthy grocery items purchased in each of the 6 months; households that declined the commitment and control-group households that were given a hypothetical option to precommit did not show such an increase. These results suggest that self-aware consumers will seize opportunities to create restrictive choice environments for themselves, even at some risk of financial loss.

Background Smoking is the largest behavioral risk factor for loss of healthy life years. Many smokers intend and try to quit, but have trouble realizing their behavioral health goals. When workplace cessation-support is accompanied by incentives, this can increase its effectiveness. Based on principles from behavioral economics and psychology, regret lotteries have supported the realization of other health behaviors. Regret lotteries capitalize regret aversion by always informing winners at the deadline, but withholding prizes if they smoked. This study builds on previous applications of regret lotteries to test its potential, using a novel combination of incentives, the workplace as a context and smoking as the target behavior. Methods We compared a workplace group cessation training (control arm) to the same training plus regret lotteries (intervention arm). To test its effect on smoking cessation, we performed a cluster randomized trial with 13 organizations and 111 participants, followed for 52 weeks. Participants in the intervention arm additionally participated in 13 weekly lotteries, followed by a long-term lottery after 26 weeks. In each lottery, winners were drawn from all participants in a group. Winners were promised to always learn the outcome of the lotteries. However, the winners could only claim their prize if they did not smoke. The primary outcome of interest was continuous smoking abstinence at 52 weeks from the quit date, self-reported and biochemically validated with a carbon monoxide measurement and a cut-off point of ≤ 9 parts per million. A multi-level logistic regression analysis was performed to estimate the treatment effects after 52 weeks, while accounting for the clustered data pattern within organizations. We adjusted for Fagerström nicotine dependence score, education level, income, age and gender. Secondary outcomes were abstinence at weeks 13 and 26 after the quit-date. Results At the 52-week primary outcome point of this trial, in the control arm, 23.9% of participants were continuously abstinent opposed to 43.2% in the intervention arm (OR = 3.25; 95% CI, 0.99–10.70). Thirteen weeks after the quit date, in the control arm, 35.8% of participants were continuously abstinent opposed to 68.2% in the intervention arm (OR = 3.66; 95% CI, 1.47–9.16). After 26 weeks, in the control arm, 25.4% of participants were continuously abstinent opposed to 54.6% in the intervention arm (OR = 3.24; 95% CI, 1.27–8.22). Conclusions Although differences were only statistically significant up to 26 weeks, we found meaningful and practically relevant increases in smoking cessation due to the lottery intervention at the main outcome point. The intervention design was rooted in behavioral economics and builds on previous successful applications. Therefore, the results show enough potential to theorize and further apply this method in a field setting, that can benefit from the theoretical, methodological and practical lessons learned in this trial. Trial registration The trial protocol and materials were reviewed and approved by the Radboud University Ethical Review Board (ECSW-2019–114). The study was registered in the Dutch Trial Register (trial registration number: NTR NL84632, 17 March 2020) and lottery drawings were performed by an independent notary.

Although observers of human behavior have long been aware that people regularly struggle with internal conflict when deciding whether to behave responsibly or indulge in impulsivity, psychologists and economists did not begin to empirically investigate this type of want/ should conflict until recently. In this article, we review and synthesize the latest research on want/ should conflict, focusing our attention on the findings from an empirical literature on the topic that has blossomed over the last 15 years. We then turn to a discussion of how individuals and policy makers can use what has been learned about want/should conflict to help decision makers select far-sighted options.

BackgroundDespite significant investment in colorectal cancer (CRC) screening, 40% of US adults are not up-to-date. Commitment devices, which are psychologically tailored approaches to enforce health goals, may be an effective method to increase CRC screening.ObjectiveCompare the effectiveness of a commitment device (patient self-ordering fecal immunochemical test (FIT) kits) to standard CRC screening outreach.DesignA retrospective observational study.ParticipantsParticipants were > 49 years and < 75 years, had no history of CRC, and were eligible for CRC screening.InterventionAn electronic screening reminder with an embedded order button allowed participants to order FIT kits directly from a patient portal. Those who used the order button were promptly sent a kit; those who did not were later mailed kits.Main MeasuresPrimary outcome was completion of FIT kits. Secondary outcomes included number of days to completion, completion of follow-up for positive results, and CRC diagnosis; we also examined prior use of FIT kit. We used inverse probability of treatment weights to control for pretreatment imbalances.Key ResultsThe cohort comprised 176,231 participants: 53% female; median age was 59; 11% were Asian, 21% Hispanic/Latino, 7% black, 51% White, 3% other/mixed race. Approximately 10% (N = 16,918) used the button. Using inverse probability of treatment weights, we found that those who used the button had 3.8 times the odds of completing a kit compared to participants who did not (odds ratio, 3.77; 95% confidence interval, 3.57–3.98). Within the button group, 63% of those eligible completed a FIT kit in the year prior to the button compared to 87% in the year after the button became available (p < 0.0001).ConclusionThe ability to self-order screening kits may act as a commitment device that increases CRC screening. Scalable tools leveraging existing patient portals such as this can complement existing CRC outreach strategies.

Background Smoking is the leading behavioral risk factor for the loss of healthy life years. Many smokers want to quit, but have trouble doing so. Financial incentives in workplace settings have shown promising results in supporting smokers and their design influences their impact. Lotteries that leverage behavioral economic insights might improve the effectiveness of workplace cessation support. Methods and design We examine in a cluster randomized trial if a workplace cessation group training paired with lottery deadlines will increase continuous abstinence rates over and above the cessation training alone. Organizations are randomized to either the control arm or lottery arm. The lotteries capitalize regret aversion by always informing winners at the deadline, but withholding prizes if they smoked. In the lottery-arm, winners are drawn out of all participants within a training group, regardless of their smoking status. In weeks 1-13 there are weekly lotteries. Winners are informed about their prize (€50), but can only claim it if they did not smoke that week, validated biochemically. After 26 weeks, there is a long-term lottery where the winners are informed about their prize (vacation voucher worth €400), but can only claim it if they were abstinent between weeks 13 and 26. The primary outcome is continuous abstinence 52 weeks after the quit date. Discussion There is a quest for incentives to support smoking cessation that are considered fair, affordable and effective across different socioeconomic groups. Previous use of behavioral economics in the design of lotteries have shown promising results in changing health behavior. This cluster randomized trial aims to demonstrate if these lotteries are also effective for supporting smoking cessation. Therefore the study design and protocol are described in detail in this paper. Findings might contribute to the application and development of effective cessation support at the workplace. Trial registration Netherlands Trial Register Identifier: NL8463 . Date of registration: 17-03-2020.

This paper develops a theory of optimal provision of commitment devices to people who value both commitment and flexibility and whose preferences differ in the degree of time inconsistency. If time inconsistency is observable, both a planner and a monopolist provide devices that help each person commit to the efficient level of flexibility. However, the combination of unobservable time inconsistency and preference for flexibility causes an adverse-selection problem. To solve this problem, the monopolist and (possibly) the planner curtail flexibility in the device for a more inconsistent person at both ends of the efficient choice range; moreover, they may have to add unused options to the device for a less inconsistent person and also distort his actual choices. This theory has normative and positive implications for private and public provision of commitment devices.

We study the optimal trade-off between commitment and flexibility in a consumption-savings model. Individuals expect to receive relevant information regarding tastes and thus they value the flexibility provided by larger choice sets. On the other hand, they also expect to suffer from temptation, with or without self-control, and thus they value the commitment afforded by smaller choice sets. The optimal commitment problem we study is to find the best subset of the individual's budget set. This problem leads to a principal-agent formulation. We find that imposing a minimum level of savings is always a feature of the solution. Necessary and sufficient conditions are derived for minimum-savings policies to completely characterize the solution. We also discuss other applications, such as the design of fiscal constitutions, the problem faced by a paternalist, and externalities.