Explore the vast range of titles available.

Since its inception in 1960, the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC) has been responsible for organizing and coordinating the scientific investigation of ocean carbon. Roger Revelle (Scripps Institution of Oceanography) first articulated the principal need for international and intergovernmental coordination to address global-scale problems such as climate change when IOC was first developed. Regional to global-scale carbon studies started in earnest with the International Decade of Ocean Exploration (IDOE) and Geochemical Ocean Sections Study (GEOSECS) programs in the 1970s, but they were hampered by technological barriers that limited both the precision of carbon system measurements and the greater sampling frequency needed for a comprehensive global view. In 1979, IOC established the Committee on Climate Change and the Ocean (CCCO) with Revelle as Chair. CCCO called for a carbon observation program and sampling strategy that could determine the global oceanic CO₂ inventory to an accuracy of 10–20 petagrams of carbon (Pg C). Perfection of the coulometric analysis technique of total dissolved inorganic carbon (DIC) in seawater by Ken Johnson (University of Rhode Island) and introduction of certified reference materials for DIC and alkalinity by Andrew Dickson (Scripps Institution of Oceanography) made such a study possible. The first global survey of ocean CO₂ was carried out under the joint sponsorship of IOC and the Scientific Committee on Oceanic Research (SCOR) in the Joint Global Ocean Flux Study (JGOFS) and the World Ocean Circulation Experiment (WOCE) in the 1990s. With these programs and underwaypCO₂ measuring systems on research vessels and ships of opportunity, ocean carbon data grew exponentially, reaching about a million total measurements by 2002 when Taro Takahashi (Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory) and others provided the first robust mapping of surface ocean CO₂. Using a new approach developed by Nicolas Gruber (ETH Zurich) and colleagues with JGOFS-WOCE and other synthesized data sets, one of this article's authors (Sabine) with a host of coauthors estimated that the total accumulation of anthropogenic CO₂ between 1800 and 1994 was 118 ± 19 Pg C, just within the uncertainty goals set by JGOFS and IOC prior to the global survey. Today, ocean carbon activities are coordinated through the International Ocean Carbon Coordination Project (IOCCP). Ocean carbon measurements now accumulate at a rate of over a million measurements per year—matching the total number achieved over the first three decades of ocean carbon studies. IOCCP is actively working to combine these data into uniform data sets that the community can use to better understand ocean carbon uptake and storage. The problem of ocean acidification caused by uptake of anthropogenic CO₂ is now a major target of IOC and IOCCP.

During the recent four decades since 1980, a series of modern climate satellites were launched, allowing for the measurement and record-keeping of multiple climate parameters, especially over the polar regions where traditional observations are difficult to obtain. China has been actively engaging in polar expeditions. Many observations were conducted during this period, accompanied by improved Earth climate models, leading to a series of insightful understandings concerning Arctic and Antarctic climate changes. Here, we review the recent progress China has made concerning Arctic and Antarctic climate change research over the past decade. The Arctic temperature increase is much higher than the global-mean warming rate, associated with a rapid decline in sea ice, a phenomenon called the Arctic Amplification. The Antarctic climate changes showed a zonally asymmetric pattern over the past four decades, with most of the fastest changes occurring over West Antarctica and the Antarctic Peninsula. The Arctic and Antarctic climate changes were driven by anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions and ozone loss, while tropical-polar teleconnections play important roles in driving the regional climate changes and extreme events over the polar regions. Polar climate changes may also feedback to the entire Earth climate system. The adjustment of the circulation in both the troposphere and the stratosphere contributed to the interactions between the polar climate changes and lower latitudes. Climate change has also driven rapid Arctic and Southern ocean acidification. Chinese researchers have made a series of advances in understanding these processes, as reviewed in this paper.

Expand the remit of the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research to coordinate the influx of infrastructure, says its president, Steven L. Chown. Expand the remit of the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research to coordinate the influx of infrastructure, says its president, Steven L. Chown.

Intensive human exploitation of the Antarctic fur seal (Arctocephalus gazella) in its primary population centre on sub-Antarctic South Georgia, as well as on other sub-Antarctic islands and parts of the South Shetland Islands, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries rapidly brought populations to the brink of extinction. The species has now recovered throughout its original distribution. Non-breeding and yearling seals, almost entirely males, from the South Georgia population now disperse in the summer months far more widely and in higher numbers than there is evidence for taking place in the pre-exploitation era. Large numbers now haul out in coastal terrestrial habitats in the South Orkney Islands and also along the north-east and west coast of the Antarctic Peninsula to at least Marguerite Bay. In these previously less- or non-visited areas, the seals cause levels of damage likely never to have been experienced previously to fragile terrestrial habitats through trampling and over-fertilisation, as well as eutrophication of sensitive freshwater ecosystems. This increased area of summer impact is likely to have further synergies with aspects of regional climate change, including reduction in extent and duration of sea ice permitting seals access farther south, and changes in krill abundance and distribution. The extent and conservation value of terrestrial habitats and biodiversity now threatened by fur seal distribution expansion, and the multiple anthropogenic factors acting in synergy both historically and to the present day, present a new and as yet unaddressed challenge to the agencies charged with ensuring the protection and conservation of Antarctica’s unique ecosystems.

Earth observation data can help us understand and address some of the grand challenges and threats facing us today as a species and as a planet, for example climate change and its impacts and sustainable use of the Earth’s resources. However, in order to have confidence in earth observation data, measurements made at the surface of the Earth, with the intention of providing verification or validation of satellite-mounted sensor measurements, should be trustworthy and at least of the same high quality as those taken with the satellite sensors themselves. Metrology tells us that in order to be trustworthy, measurements should include an unbroken chain of SI-traceable calibrations and comparisons and full uncertainty budgets for each of the in situ sensors. Until now, this has not been the case for most satellite validation measurements. Therefore, within this context, the European Space Agency (ESA) funded a series of Fiducial Reference Measurements (FRM) projects targeting the validation of satellite data products of the atmosphere, land, and ocean, and setting the framework, standards, and protocols for future satellite validation efforts. The FRM4SOC project was structured to provide this support for evaluating and improving the state of the art in ocean colour radiometry (OCR) and satellite ocean colour validation through a series of comparisons under the auspices of the Committee on Earth Observation Satellites (CEOS). This followed the recommendations from the International Ocean Colour Coordinating Group’s white paper and supports the CEOS ocean colour virtual constellation. The main objective was to establish and maintain SI traceable ground-based FRM for satellite ocean colour and thus make a fundamental contribution to the European system for monitoring the Earth (Copernicus). This paper outlines the FRM4SOC project structure, objectives and methodology and highlights the main results and achievements of the project: (1) An international SI-traceable comparison of irradiance and radiance sources used for OCR calibration that set measurement, calibration and uncertainty estimation protocols and indicated good agreement between the participating calibration laboratories from around the world; (2) An international SI-traceable laboratory and outdoor comparison of radiometers used for satellite ocean colour validation that set OCR calibration and comparison protocols; (3) A major review and update to the protocols for taking irradiance and radiance field measurements for satellite ocean colour validation, with particular focus on aspects of data acquisition and processing that must be considered in the estimation of measurement uncertainty and guidelines for good practice; (4) A technical comparison of the main radiometers used globally for satellite ocean colour validation bringing radiometer manufacturers together around the same table for the first time to discuss instrument characterisation and its documentation, as needed for measurement uncertainty estimation; (5) Two major international side-by-side field intercomparisons of multiple ocean colour radiometers, one on the Atlantic Meridional Transect (AMT) oceanographic cruise, and the other on the Acqua Alta oceanographic tower in the Gulf of Venice; (6) Impact and promotion of FRM within the ocean colour community, including a scientific road map for the FRM-based future of satellite ocean colour validation and vicarious calibration (based on the findings of the FRM4SOC project, the consensus from two major international FRM4SOC workshops and previous literature, including the IOCCG white paper on in situ ocean colour radiometry).

Antarctica is recognized as being geopolitically and scientifically important, and as one of the regions with the greatest potential to affect and be affected by global climate change. Still, little is known in practice about how climate change will be handled within the main governance framework of the continent: the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS). Using qualitative interviews, participant observations and policy document analysis, this paper explores the perspectives of Chilean scientific, political and non-governmental actors regarding the implications of climate change for the current Antarctic governance framework. Results corroborate a misalignment of the climate change agenda and the ATS, stemming from the divergent views displayed by a wide network of actors. From the interviews, two predominant visions emerge: (i) climate change as an opportunity, where actors recognize the role of Antarctica in regulating global climate and stress greater opportunities to conduct Antarctic-based climate change research, the need for strategic international collaboration, and the reinforcement of Chile's position in Antarctica through science; (ii) climate change as a burden where actors acknowledge climate change as a global problem, largely external to Antarctica, express disbelief regarding the effectiveness of local actions to tackle climate change and do not associate with climate change governance. The study concludes that climate change may become a dividing, rather than a unifying, field of action in Chilean Antarctic governance, reinforcing previously existing geopolitical tendencies.

Drawing primarily on the UK experience, five practical lessons are identified for policy makers who seek to decarbonize their economies. First, decarbonization needs a solid legal basis to give it credibility and overcome time inconsistency problems. Second, putting a price on carbon is essential, but low-carbon policies also have to address wider market, investment, and behavioural failures. This in turn raises issues of policy complexity and coordination. Third, the low-carbon economy is likely to be highly electrified. Clean electricity could be a cost-effective way of decarbonizing many parts of the economy, including transport, heating, and parts of industry. Decarbonization therefore starts in the power sector. Fourth, the low-carbon transition is primarily a revolution of production and not consumption. Both supply-side innovation and demand-side adjustments in lifestyle and behaviour are needed, though the former should dominate. Fifth, the transition to a low-carbon economy is economically and technologically feasible. Achieving it is a question of policy competence and having the political will to drive economic and social change. Policy relevance Practically all major GHG emitters now have climate change legislation on their statute books. Given what is at stake, and the complexity of the task at hand, it is important that policy makers learn from each other and establish a code of good low-carbon practice. The main lessons from the UK are distilled and presented. Carbon policy is considered for key sectors, such as electricity, buildings, and transport, and possible decarbonization paths are also outlined. It is shown that the transition to a low-carbon economy is economically and technologically feasible. Achieving it is primarily a question of policy competence and political will. This in turn means that climate change action needs a strong legislative basis to give the reforms statutory legitimacy. Low-carbon policies will have to address a wide range of market, investment and behavioural failures. Putting a price on carbon is an essential starting point, but only one of many policy reforms.

Safety valves, discretionary advisory boards, and other cost containment mechanisms enhance the political feasibility of stringent climate policy by limiting firms' and households' exposures to higher than anticipated costs associated with reducing greenhouse-gas emissions. However, cost containment comes at a price; it increases the risk of climate-related damages and simultaneously discourages investments to develop low-carbon technologies. A stylized model of the cost of climate policy is used to estimate that proposed cost containment mechanisms will increase emissions by 11-70% by 2030. Because these clauses limit the payoffs to innovation, they reduce our societal capacity to affordably mitigate climate change through technology improvement. If cost containment measures are to be employed at levels discussed in recent policy debates, then complementary policies to fund technology development will be needed; crucially, the two also need to be linked. One way to resolve the impasse between increased climatic damages and reduced incentives for innovation is to create a technology development fund with contributions indexed to the amount by which the market price for carbon exceeds the price cap.

Governance institutions of the polar regions, as well as global oceans, may hold room for improvement in terms of effectiveness but, on the whole, their existence can be regarded as a success story. The arrangements managed to pool responsibility for regional resources amid Cold War geopolitics, mostly by delegating discussions to science committees. Changing global climate, however, provides considerable challenges to these governance arrangements. It begs the question of how the success story can be continued into the future. After sketching the emergence of polar and ocean governance and their core organizational principles during the 20th century, this article identifies some of the challenges linked to global warming that have been altering the context of governance fundamentally. The article discusses emerging issues that warrant attention, but which may be difficult to accommodate in present governance networks. Ultimately, the article argues that anchoring principles of “responsibility” that take into account the relational quality of polar and ocean spaces is key to any institutional design that seeks to take governance arrangements into the 21st century and beyond.