Explore the vast range of titles available.

Insurance Law for Common Interest Communities: Condominiums, Cooperatives and Homeowners Associations  is an exhaustive insurance primer for both those who are new to insurance coverage law or seasoned professionals seeking new guidance.It offers comprehensive coverage of insurance-related topics involving common interest communities.

We develop a tractable general equilibrium framework in which firms are large and have market power with respect to both products and labor, and in which a firm’s decisions are affected by its ownership structure. We characterize the Cournot–Walras equilibrium of an economy where each firm maximizes a share-weighted average of shareholder utilities—rendering the equilibrium independent of price normalization. In a one-sector economy, if returns to scale are non-increasing, then an increase in “effective” market concentration (which accounts for common ownership) leads to declines in employment, real wages, and the labor share. Yet when there are multiple sectors, due to an intersectoral pecuniary externality, an increase in common ownership could stimulate the economy when the elasticity of labor supply is high relative to the elasticity of substitution in product markets. We characterize for which ownership structures the monopolistically competitive limit or an oligopolistic one is attained as the number of sectors in the economy increases. When firms have heterogeneous constant returns to scale technologies, we find that an increase in common ownership leads to markets that are more concentrated.

We connect stocks through their common active mutual fund owners. We show that the degree of shared ownership forecasts cross-sectional variation in return correlation, controlling for exposure to systematic return factors, style and sector similarity, and many other pair characteristics. We argue that shared ownership causes this excess comovement based on evidence from a natural experiment—the 2003 mutual fund trading scandal. These results motivate a novel cross-stock-reversal trading strategy exploiting information contained in ownership connections. We show that long-short hedge fund index returns covary negatively with this strategy, suggesting these funds may exacerbate this excess comovement.

We hypothesize that a source of commonality in a stock's liquidity arises from the correlated liquidity demand of the stock's investors. Focusing on correlated trading of mutual funds, we find that stocks with high mutual fund ownership have comovements in liquidity about twice as large as those for stocks with low mutual fund ownership. Further analysis shows that the channels for these comovements derive from both common ownership across funds and funds' correlated liquidity shocks. We obtain inferences supporting causality from an exogenous flow shock for mutual funds in the aftermath of the 2003 mutual fund scandal.

This study focuses on learning effects between firms connected by common ownership. We explore the learning effects in a certain setting that how decision-makers in focal firms learn from punishments for fraudulent disclosure in their co-owned firms. Baseline results show that punishments for fraudulent disclosure in co-owned firms reduce information disclosure fraud in focal firms. The effects still exist after excluding other potential channels of learning. In mechanism analyses, similarities between focal firms and their co-owned firms and influential common shareholders enhance the learning effects. Further, after the events in co-owned firms, there is improvement in internal control in focal firms, which contributes to the reduction of fraudulent disclosure. Additionally, empirical results mitigate the concern that the reduction of fraud is not driven by the learning argued in this paper but decision-makers alternatively conducting more other unethical behaviors such as real earnings management. In sum, empirical results support the existence of learning effects. As common ownership is an important but highly underexplored linkage between firms, future research can study learning effects between firms connected by common ownership in other suitable settings.

Financial investment in the food and agriculture sector has grown in recent decades, including investment in equity-related funds that invest in or track the performance of a range of publicly traded transnational agrifood companies. At their height in recent years, equity-related investment funds accounted for around one third of financial investment in the sector. Despite their significance, investment in the agrifood sector via these types of investment funds has received much less academic and policy attention than other types of financial investment, such as farmland acquisition and commodity speculation. This paper examines the rise of equity-related investment in the agricultural sector and analyzes its implications for the food system. It provides an overview and analysis of the available data on these investment vehicles, including their holdings (i.e. the companies in which they invest) and ownership (i.e. the investors who own shares in those companies). This data shows a rise in common ownership of large agrifood firms by large asset management companies. The paper makes the case that this new pattern of investment in agrifood firms by large asset management firms has the potential to contribute to the already concentrated market power in the agrifood system.

This article merges theoretical literature on non-controlling minority shareholdings (NCMS) in a coherent model to study the effects of NCMS on competition and collusion. The model encompasses both the case of a common owner holding shares of rival firms as well as the case of cross ownership among rivals. We find that by softening competition, NCMS weaken the sustainability of collusion under a greater variety of situations than was indicated by earlier literature. Such effects exist, in particular, in the presence of an effective competition authority.

This paper aims, first, to investigate the effect of EPU and institutional ownership characteristics on capital structure decisions and, second, to examine the role of institutional investors characteristics during the periods of uncertainty. Based on a sample of 2100 firm-year observations from the French non-financial companies over the period of 2006–2019, this study uses panel data regressions, two stage least squares and propensity score matching. We find that firms tend to lower their leverage ratios when policy uncertainty increases. Furthermore, we show that capital structure decisions depend on institutional ownership characteristics. Our results, also, indicate that the presence of active investors, such as long-term institutional ownership and institutional common ownership, helps to mitigate the financing frictions in uncertainty periods.

Intergenerational succession often leads to insufficient innovation in family firms, but there is still no consensus on how common ownership affects this situation. Therefore, from the perspective of value cocreation, this study explores the mechanisms through which common ownership influences the innovation of family firms after succession, focusing on two aspects: motivation and behavior. Using unbalanced panel data of 167 Chinese listed family firms that underwent succession between 2004 and 2021, we empirically investigate the way in which common ownership impacts corporate innovation and the mediating role of value proposition motivation and value flow behavior. Our findings indicate that common ownership contributes positively to corporate innovation and that its influence is exerted through value proposition optimization and value flow intervention, providing empirical evidence for the study of the economic consequences of common ownership. Furthermore, we explore the mediating role of specific value proposition motivations and value flow behaviors in the impact of common ownership on corporate innovation. This research suggests that family business succession activities should be examined in the context of a more complete network of corporate relationships and provides insights into how common ownership influences corporate behavior in value cocreation.