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In the process of forest ecological benefit compensation, there are problems of information asymmetry and “misaligned incentives”, which will reduce the compensation efficiency. In order to improve the compensation efficiency, based on principal–agent theory, this study constructs incentive contract models for governmental forest ecological benefit compensation under three different scenarios, namely, information symmetry, single-sided information asymmetry, and double-sided information asymmetry. The study finds that the government can design different incentive contracts to motivate forest farmers with high and low forestry capabilities. And the government’s expected utility is influenced by the proportion of forest farmers with high and low forestry capabilities in reality. Due to the information gap between the government and forest farmers, it is inevitable that high-capability forest farmers will obtain an information rent. Under double-sided information asymmetry, the incentive coefficient for lower-capability forest farmers and their optimal actual public welfare forest conservation area decrease as the proportion of high-capability forest farmers increases. Furthermore, when the proportion of high-capability forest farmers exceeds a certain threshold, signing compensation contracts with low-capability forest farmers can harm the government’s interests. The research conclusions provide a scientific basis for the government to formulate differentiated incentive contracts for forest ecological benefits. This can effectively align forest farmers’ conservation behaviors with the improvement of public forest ecological benefits. As a result, it contributes to improving the efficiency of forest ecological benefit compensation.

Both theory and empirical evidence suggest that managers’ career concerns can serve as an important source of implicit economic incentives. We examine how incentives for political promotion are related to compensation policy and firm performance in Chinese state-owned enterprises. We find that the likelihood that the CEO receives a political promotion is positively related to firm performance. We also find that CEOs with a higher likelihood of political promotion have lower pay levels and lower pay–performance sensitivity. Overall, the evidence suggests that competition in the political job market helps mitigate weak monetary incentives for CEOs in China. Data are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2966 . This paper was accepted by Lauren Cohen, finance.

We study how parent liability for subsidiaries' environmental cleanup costs affects industrial pollution and production. Our empirical setting exploits a Supreme Court decision that strengthened parent limited liability protection for some subsidiaries. Using a difference-in-differences framework, we find that stronger liability protection for parents leads to a 5% to 9% increase in toxic emissions by subsidiaries. Evidence suggests the increase in pollution is driven by lower investment in abatement technologies rather than increased production. Cross-sectional tests suggest convexities associated with insolvency and executive compensation drive heterogeneous effects. Overall, our findings highlight the moral hazard problem associated with limited liability.

This paper examines the effects of employer social responsibility on the wages workers demand through randomized field experiments in two online labor marketplaces. Workers were recruited for short-term jobs and I manipulated whether or not they received information about the employer’s social responsibility. I then observed the payment workers were willing to accept for the job. In the first experiment, information about the employer’s social responsibility marginally reduced prospective workers’ wage requirements on average and had a significant effect on the highest performers, who were willing to give up the wage differential they would otherwise demand. In the second, prospective workers submitted 44% lower wage bids for the same job after learning about the employer’s social responsibility. This paper provides causal empirical evidence of a revealed preference for social responsibility in the workplace, and of a greater preference among the highest performers. More broadly, it provides evidence that workers value purpose and meaningfulness at work, and it demonstrates that workers are willing to give up pecuniary benefits for nonpecuniary benefits. It furthermore highlights heterogeneity in worker preferences for nonpecuniary benefits by worker performance type.

Genetic variability in the dopaminergic system could contribute to age-related impairments in executive control. In this study, we examined whether genetic polymorphism for catechol-O-methyltransferase (COMT Val.sup.158 Met) is related to performance on updating, shifting and inhibition tasks. We administered a battery of executive tasks assessing updating, shifting and inhibition functions to 45 older and 55 younger healthy participants, and created composite z-scores associated to each function. Six groups were created based on genetic alleles (Val/Val, Val/Met, Met/Met) derived from the COMT gene and age (younger, older). Age and genotype effects were assessed with t-test and ANOVA (p<0.05). A lower performance was observed in the older group for the three executive processes, and more particularly for inhibition. Moreover, older participants homozygous for the Val allele have a lower performance on the inhibition composite in comparison to younger Val/Val. These results confirm presence of executive performance decrease in healthy aging. With regard to genetic effect, older participants seem particularly disadvantaged when they have a lower baseline dopamine level (i.e., Val/Val homozygous) that is magnified by aging, and when the executive measure emphasize the need of stable representations (as in inhibition task requiring to maintain active the instruction to not perform an automated process).

We draw on the signaling and infomediary literature to examine how media evaluations of CEO overcompensation (a negative cue associated with selfishness and greed) are affected by the presence of corporate philanthropy (a positive cue associated with altruism and generosity). In line with our theory on signal incongruence, we find that firms engaged in philanthropy receive more media disapproval when they overcompensate their CEO, but they are also more likely to decrease CEO overcompensation as a response. Our study contributes to the signaling literature by theorizing about signal incongruence and to infomediary and corporate governance research by showing that media disapproval can lead to lower executive compensation. We also reconcile two conflicting views on firm prosocial behavior by showing that, in the presence of incongruent cues, philanthropy can simultaneously enhance and damage media evaluations of firms and CEOs. Taken together, these findings shed new light on the media as agents of external corporate governance for firms and open new avenues for research on executive compensation. The online appendices are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2018.1209 .