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As is well known, Franz Brentano claimed that “the true method of philosophy is none other than that of the science of nature.” The claim is striking for a number of reasons. For one, philosophy has traditionally dealt with questions that science tends to avoid, such as the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, the problem of evil. Brentano himself insisted both that philosophy’s method should be scientific in the sense of empirical science, and that philosophy should pursue those questions that empirical science typically shuns. Thus he agreed with Auguste Comte in pressing for positive science but disagreed when Comte evicted metaphysics and theology from the positive realm. Among philosophers inspired by work done in the 19th century taking a scientific approach to philosophy, there are to be included not only some of Brentano’s students, such as Husserl, but also the Bertrand Russell of logical atomism, and his student/colleague Ludwig Wittgenstein. In this paper, I propose to examine the question of whether philosophy can be an empirical science, by contrasting Brentano’s view with Wittgenstein’s. The Viennese engineer-turned-philosopher devised a way of thinking about philosophical questions which retained the precision of a science but limited the scope of such questions to the examination of certain grammatical puzzles. By contrast, although he shunned the system-building of Kant, Schelling, and Hegel, Brentano remained mindful of the big picture in a way that Wittgenstein seems to rule out. I first present Brentano’s view that philosophy is a science, as it is contained in his early lecture, “Auguste Comte and Positive Philosophy.” Then I present a reply in the spirit of Wittgenstein. In conclusion I attempt to sort out the truth of the matter.

Human society is entering a transformative epoch shaped by artificial intelligence (AI), where algorithms act not as neutral devices but as institutions that structure identity, justice, sovereignty, and temporality. While classical sociology—Marx’s capital, Durkheim’s solidarity, Weber’s rationalization, Castells’s networks—remains foundational, it cannot fully account for hybrid societies of humans and codes. This study advances a new disciplinary foundation: AI Sociology, crystallized in the Socio–Algorithmic Theory. The framework rests on four pillars—algorithmic identity, justice, sovereignty, and temporality—translated into operational indicators: Value of Presence (VP), Explainability Level (EL), Control of Weights (CW), and Velocity Equity (VE), with complementary rights of Public Iterative Review (PIR) and Procedural Disclosure (PD). These indicators transform values into variables, meeting the criteria of measurability, applicability, and replicability. A comparative analysis reveals the limitations of dominant models: the American model commodifies identity, the Chinese model enforces obedience, and the European model relies on legal safeguards that lag behind technological speed. In contrast, the Emirati pathway inaugurates a fourth trajectory. Through initiatives such as the Ministry of AI (2017), the Mohamed bin Zayed University of Artificial Intelligence (MBZUAI), and the Centennial 2071 vision, the UAE positions itself as a living laboratory where socio–algorithmic principles are institutionalized. The study’s contribution lies not in adding a subfield but in redefining sociology itself. Emirati in origin yet globally portable, the socio–algorithmic paradigm equips sociology with a new lexicon, methodological protocol, and institutional anchor, marking the birth of the Sociology of Artificial Intelligence as a discipline for the algorithmic age.  

This paper focused on a comprehensive review of sociology's intellectual output. The genesis of this article takes an exploration of sociology's foundations and its breadth throughout history, providing an overview of its conceptual content. By shedding light on the historical development of the sociology and the social intellectual factors that have influenced its evolution, this paper offered valuable insights into the field's trajectory. This article employed qualitative systematic review methodology, drawing on secondary data from reputable sources. By critically analysing sociology's intellectual output, this study highlighted the field's role in encouraging individuals to know and shape their social environments. It also emphasised sociology's fascination with the nature of social activity, offering a new lens for understanding and simplifying the study of sociology from its early beginnings. By contributing to the ongoing discourse in sociology, this review provided valuable insights into the field's historical trajectory and the key concepts and theories that have shaped it over time.

Logo no início do século XIX, em meio a uma profusão de ideias e pensamentos revolucionários resultantes do Iluminismo, é que ocorre o nascimento do fundador do Espiritismo o pedagogo francês Hippolyte Léon Denizard Rivail, o nome civil de Allan Kardec. O objetivo desse artigo é demonstrar a influência do Iluminismo francês e da ciência do século XIX na sua vida e obra, e por consequência, compreender o ambiente em que foi formado o Espiritismo. Este intento será alcançado através de uma pesquisa bibliográfica junto a registros históricos e a própria obra de Kardec. Para alcançar tal objetivo, pretendemos pontuar as influências de pensadores como Franz Anton Mesmer, Augusto Comte, Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi, Jean Jacques Rousseau e Francis Bacon nessa religião. Com isso pretendemos demonstrar que apesar do próprio Kardec atribuir sua obra aos espíritos, sua bagagem intelectual foi fundamental na organização do conhecimento que estava segundo seus fiéis sendo oferecido pelos espíritos e o quanto que essa bagagem acadêmica facilitou a sua recepção entre aqueles que o receberam.

How can you know something that cannot be seen, heard, tasted, touched or smelled? The question applies most obviously to things like rights, justice or freedom because they do not seem be as easy to locate or describe as things that can be known by the senses. Part of the point of positivism was that under certain conditions they can. To Auguste Comte (1798–1857), the movement's founder, it was possible to have as positive a knowledge of rights, justice or freedom as whatever was needed to know a cat or a mat. Positivism could, therefore, have as much to do with morality as with epistemology and as strong a concern with values and beliefs as with facts and certainty. The resulting capacity to move seamlessly between the external and the internal and from the physical to the moral was one reason why, together with the word “sociology,” the other word that came to be associated most widely and durably with positivism was another of Comte's coinages, “altruism.” Positivism, in short, was the science—or knowledge—of altruism.

This article explores the dynamic interplay between theological and secular paradigms in shaping contemporary political movements and social justice discourse, with a particular focus on the Culture War surrounding reproductive rights and gender identity. It examines the historical transition from the Judeo–Christian tradition to modern secular frameworks, highlighting how core theological concepts—such as imago Dei, the sanctity of life, and divine sovereignty—have been reinterpreted and secularized. In the context of an increasingly secular world and the resurgence of religion in a post-secular society, the article leverages Eric Voegelin’s philosophical framework to deepen the dialogue on the Culture War and secularization. The analysis argues that modern social justice movements and ideology can be seen as immanentizing the eschaton and moral order, where transcendent values are reconfigured as temporal, political, and cultural constructs for ultimate justice and redemption. By tracing modern concepts of social justice back to their theological roots, this article aims to enrich debates on secularization and the ideological divisions fueling the Culture War, fostering pathways toward a more cohesive and less polarized political landscape.

The great legacy of the theology professor, the cardinal prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, and Pope Benedict XVI is instead his theological work, which characteristically insists on the unity of faith and reason-a unity his interlocutor, the critical theorist Jürgen Habermas, acknowledged as the essence of Western culture. [...]Ratzinger dealt as gently as possible with the liberation theologians, in light of his carefully reasoned conclusions about their writings. [...]we reject Auguste Comte's positivism as a doctrine of salvation because he fails to recognize the supernatural goal. Faith is the complete surrender of the mind to God, and the union with him in the love that he himself is in the communion of Father and Son and Holy Spirit.

Recent theories concerning the origins of the idea of “the West” have missed the most important link in the story, the writings and tireless propagandizing efforts of Auguste Comte. It was Comte who first developed an explicit and elaborate idea of “the West” as a sociopolitical concept, basing it on a historical analysis of the development of the “vanguard” of humanity and proposing a detailed plan for the reorganization of that portion of the world, before it could serve the rest of humanity to achieve the same “positive” state of development. Previous authors who had used “the West” did not go beyond employing it casually and interchangeably with “Europe.” Thus the modern political idea of “the West” was anything but an imperialistic project in its inception, despite widespread arguments in the literature that attribute its emergence to the needs of high imperialism. Comte's West was meant to abolish empires of conquest and establish world peace.

Auguste Comte is ostensibly the world’s most famous classifier of the sciences in modern history. His whole life was dedicated to establishing a classification that conformed to the ‘positivist’ (non-theological and non-metaphysical) principles he settled on after working with early nineteenth-century French social reformer Henri de Saint-Simon. This article first probes the background to Comte’s classifying of the sciences, discussing French and German influences, and the effect of the phrenological movement on his special attitude to psychology and social life. Central sections of the article concern the basic and most mature ordering of the sciences according to his fundamental Course of lectures on classification (1830-42), the development of a tableau to cover psychological issues, and attempts at tables to synthesize his ordering and draw out their implications for socio-political reform and the Church of Humanity he founded. Concluding sections cover key binding principles of his classificatory work, as well as matters of reception, influence, and critical response.

Gaston Richard was not only among the first to be informed of the ‘revelation’ that Durkheim announced about his reading of William Robertson Smith in 1895. Among all the Durkheimians, Richard was alone in publicly declaring himself on the matter. The radical nature of his witness went far beyond the fact of calling into question the date as well as the subject of this ‘revelation’. For Richard, the constitution of Durkheim's religious sociology was ultimately ‘only a moment from a more ample study’ about obligation. The originality of his analysis derives as much from the fact of having seen the main source of Durkheim's inspiration in the neo-criticism of Charles Renouvier (parts 1 and 2) as from having criticized Durkheim's state-sociology, which was, if not the conclusion, then at least its political translation (part 3).