Explore the vast range of titles available.

Bioterrorism policy discussions and response planning efforts have tended to discount the capacity of the public to participate in the response to an act of bioterrorism, or they have assumed that local populations would impede an effective response. Fears of mass panic and social disorder underlie this bias. Although it is not known how the population will react to an unprecedented act of bioterrorism, experience with natural and technological disasters and disease outbreaks indicates a pattern of generally effective and adaptive collective action. Failure to involve the public as a key partner in the medical and public-health response could hamper effective management of an epidemic and increase the likelihood of social disruption. Ultimately, actions taken by nonprofessional individuals and groups could have the greatest influence on the outcome of a bioterrorism event. Five guidelines for integrating the public into bioterrorism response planning are proposed: (1) treat the public as a capable ally in the response to an epidemic, (2) enlist civic organizations in practical public health activities, (3) anticipate the need for home-based patient care and infection control, (4) invest in public outreach and communication strategies, and (5) ensure that planning reflects the values and priorities of affected populations.

Smallpox vaccination of health care workers, military personnel, and some first responders has begun in the United States in 2002-2003 as one aspect of biopreparedness. Full understanding of the spectrum of adverse events and of their cause, frequency, identification, prevention, and treatment is imperative. This article describes known and suspected adverse events occurring after smallpox vaccination.

On 22-23 June 2001, the Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense Strategies, in collaboration with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Analytic Services Institute for Homeland Security, and the Oklahoma National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, held a senior-level exercise entitled \"Dark Winter\" that simulated a covert smallpox attack on the United States. The first such exercise of its kind, Dark Winter was constructed to examine the challenges that senior-level policy makers would face if confronted with a bioterrorist attack that initiated outbreaks of highly contagious disease. The exercise was intended to increase awareness of the scope and character of the threat posed by biological weapons among senior national security experts and to bring about actions that would improve prevention and response strategies.

From 3 October 2001 through 16 November 2001, in the United States, there were 18 confirmed cases of inhalational and cutaneous anthrax, an additional 4 suspected cases of cutaneous anthrax, and 5 deaths due to inhalational anthrax. Although the number of cases was relatively small, this experience brought bioterrorism and its potential to sharp focus as thousands of people began receiving prophylactic antibiotics after possible exposure to anthrax spores. These events have resulted in a substantial impact on the health care system, including the rewriting of pneumonia guidelines, new emphasis on identification of microbial etiology, substantial infusion of funds for bioterrorism-related research, and a sudden mandate for regional disaster and public health planning. This article provides clinicians with clinically relevant information about the diagnosis and management of anthrax.

Because smallpox could be a factor in bioterrorism, the United States has provided guidelines for smallpox vaccination of certain members of the population, including health care workers and first responders, as well as military personnel. A plan for more extensive vaccination, if it is needed in the event of a bioterrorist attack, is being developed under the aegis of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The characteristics of smallpox vaccine, the technique of administration, and the expected reactions to primary vaccination and revaccination are outlined in this article.

The United States Congress directed the Department of Justice to conduct an exercise engaging key personnel in the management of mock chemical, biological, or cyberterrorist attacks. The resulting exercise was called “TOPOFF,” named for its engagement of top officials of the United States government. This article offers a number of medical and public health observations and lessons discovered during the bioterrorism component of the exercise. The TOPOFF exercise illuminated problematic issues of leadership and decision-making; the difficulties of prioritization and distribution of scarce resources; the crisis that contagious epidemics would cause in health care facilities; and the critical need to formulate sound principles of disease containment. These lessons should provoke consideration of future directions for bioterrorism planning and preparedness at all levels of government and among the many communities and practitioners with responsibilities for national security and public health.

What can be achieved by the vaccination of individuals exposed to smallpox virus after release of the virus by bioterrorists? There exist several past sources of information on postexposure vaccination failures from which it may be inferred that prompt vaccination of contacts (i.e., individuals exposed to smallpox) often prevented smallpox altogether, that revaccination of previously vaccinated individuals at any time during the first week of the incubation period was largely protective, and that revaccination done even as late as the second week of the incubation period attenuated disease and prevented most deaths. Primary vaccination done within 4 days of exposure was also usually protective at least from serious illness. Modern contingency planning against the release of smallpox virus during a bioterrorist attack should therefore include the capacity for prompt tracing and (re)vaccination of all contacts. Because a growing majority of the population has never before been vaccinated against smallpox and, so, may be unreachable within 4 days, anticipatory vaccination of sections of the populations of potential target countries should be considered if the bioterrorist threat intensifies.

Smallpox apparently arose through transfer of variola virus to humans from another animal species. By causing a brief infection that required close contact for transmission and engendered solid immunity, the agent was always vulnerable to simple isolation measures. The high replicative fidelity of the viral DNA polymerase limited variola's ability to adapt to humans and preserved orthopoxviral antigenic cross-reactivity, so that vaccinia vaccination protected against smallpox. Host-derived genes encoding immunomodulatory proteins helped shelter viral replication from innate immune responses. Examination of clinical variants suggests that severity of illness was usually determined by host responses during the incubation period. Control of viral replication was aided by early postexposure vaccination and might be strengthened by additional immunological interventions. Massive inflammatory responses were responsible for major features of illness. Some patients with high levels of circulating virus developed hemorrhagic disease resembling septic shock. Continued study of virus-host interactions is needed to defend against genetically modified agents.

The New World was ravaged by smallpox for several centuries after the Spanish conquest. Jenner's discovery of the smallpox vaccine made possible the prevention and control of smallpox epidemics. In response to a large outbreak of smallpox in the Spanish colonies, King Charles IV appointed Francisco Xavier de Balmis to lead an expedition that would introduce Jenner's vaccine to these colonies. During the journey, the vaccine was kept viable by passing it from arm to arm in orphaned children, who were brought along expressly for that purpose and remained under the care of the orphanage's director. This expedition was the first large scale mass vaccination of its kind. The historic legacy of this pioneering event in international health should be revisited in the current era of persistent inequalities in global health.

Generalized vaccinia (GV), progressive vaccinia (PV), and eczema vaccinatum (EV) are adverse reactions following smallpox vaccination. We investigated all reports suggestive of GV, PV, or EV among United States civilian smallpox vaccinees during 2003 and applied standard case definitions. We identified 29 reports of possible GV among 38,440 vaccinees; 2 (7%) of the reports met the case definition. One case of GV was confirmed by identifying vaccinia from a lesion distant from the vaccine site using polymerase chain reaction. The other case was classified as probable GV, because confirmatory testing was not done. We identified 3 potential EV cases and 7 potential PV cases, none of which met the standard case definition. GV, PV, and EV were rare or absent following smallpox vaccination after careful screening of potential vaccinees. GV may be difficult to distinguish from other rashes, and confirmatory testing is recommended. Careful prevaccination screening probably contributed to the low incidence of these adverse reactions following smallpox vaccination.