Search Results Heading

MBRLSearchResults

mbrl.module.common.modules.added.book.to.shelf
Title added to your shelf!
View what I already have on My Shelf.
Oops! Something went wrong.
Oops! Something went wrong.
While trying to add the title to your shelf something went wrong :( Kindly try again later!
Are you sure you want to remove the book from the shelf?
Oops! Something went wrong.
Oops! Something went wrong.
While trying to remove the title from your shelf something went wrong :( Kindly try again later!
    Done
    Filters
    Reset
  • Discipline
      Discipline
      Clear All
      Discipline
  • Is Peer Reviewed
      Is Peer Reviewed
      Clear All
      Is Peer Reviewed
  • Series Title
      Series Title
      Clear All
      Series Title
  • Reading Level
      Reading Level
      Clear All
      Reading Level
  • Year
      Year
      Clear All
      From:
      -
      To:
  • More Filters
      More Filters
      Clear All
      More Filters
      Content Type
    • Item Type
    • Is Full-Text Available
    • Subject
    • Publisher
    • Source
    • Donor
    • Language
    • Place of Publication
    • Contributors
    • Location
1,000 result(s) for "Conscientious objection"
Sort by:
Conscientious objection and human rights : a systematic analysis
To which extent is it legitimate, in view of freedom of conscience and religion, to sanction individuals for refusing to take part in an activity they claim to be incompatible with their moral or religious convictions? To answer this question, this study first clarifies some of the concepts of conscientious objection. Then it examines the case law of international bodies and draws distinctions in order to differentiate several types of objections, hence identifying the evaluation criteria applicable to the respect that each one deserves. Finally, this study proposes indications as to the rights and obligations of the State in front of those different types of objections. -- Source other than Library of Congress.
Conscientious Objectors in Israel
InConscientious Objectors in Israel, Erica Weiss examines the lives of Israelis who have refused to perform military service for reasons of conscience. Based on long-term fieldwork, this ethnography chronicles the personal experiences of two generations of Jewish conscientious objectors as they grapple with the pressure of justifying their actions to the Israeli state and society-often suffering severe social and legal consequences, including imprisonment.While most scholarly work has considered the causes of animosity and violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,Conscientious Objectors in Israelexamines how and under what circumstances one is able to refuse to commit acts of violence in the midst of that conflict. By exploring the social life of conscientious dissent, Weiss exposes the tension within liberal citizenship between the protection of individual rights and obligations of self-sacrifice. While conscience is a strong cultural claim, military refusal directly challenges Israeli state sovereignty. Weiss explores conscience as a political entity that sits precariously outside the jurisdictional bounds of state power. Through the lens of Israeli conscientious objection, Weiss looks at the nature of contemporary citizenship, examining how the expectations of sacrifice shape the politics of both consent and dissent. In doing so, she exposes the sacrificial logic of the modern nation-state and demonstrates how personal crises of conscience can play out on the geopolitical stage.
Abortion and conscientious objection: rethinking conflicting rights in the Mexican context
Since 2007, when Mexico City decriminalized abortion during the first trimester, a debate has been taking place regarding abortion and the right to conscientious objection (CO). Many people argue that, since the provision of abortions (or \"legal terminations of pregnancy\" as they are called under Mexico City's law) is now a statutory duty of healthcare personnel there can be no place for \"conscientious objection.\" Others claim that, even if such an objection were to be allowed, it should not be seen as a right, since talk about a right to CO may lead to a slippery slope where we may end up recognizing a right to disobey the law. In this paper, I argue that there is a right to CO and that this may be justified through the notions of autonomy and integrity, which a liberal democracy should respect. However, it cannot be an absolute right, and in the case of abortion, it conflicts with women's reproductive rights. Therefore, CO should be carefully regulated so that it does not obstruct the exercise of women's reproductive rights. Regulation should address questions about who is entitled to object, how such objection should take place, and what can legitimately be objected to.
The Inevitability of Assessing Reasons in Debates about Conscientious Objection in Medicine
This article first critically reviews the major philosophical positions in the literature on conscientious objection and finds that they possess significant flaws. A substantial number of these problems stem from the fact that these views fail to assess the reasons offered by medical professionals in support of their objections. This observation is used to motivate the reasonability view, one part of which states: A practitioner who lodges a conscientious refusal must publicly state his or her objection as well as the reasoned basis for the objection and have these subjected to critical evaluation before a conscientious exemption can be granted (the reason-giving requirement). It is then argued that when defenders of the other philosophical views attempt to avoid granting an accommodation to spurious objections based on discrimination, empirically mistaken beliefs, or other unjustified biases, they are implicitly committed to the reason-giving requirement. This article concludes that based on these considerations, a reason-giving position such as the reasonability view possesses a decisive advantage in this debate.
Conscientious Non-objection in Intensive Care
Discussions of conscientious objection (CO) in healthcare often concentrate on objections to interventions that relate to reproduction, such as termination of pregnancy or contraception. Nevertheless, questions of conscience can arise in other areas of medicine. For example, the intensive care unit is a locus of ethically complex and contested decisions. Ethical debate about CO usually concentrates on the issue of whether physicians should be permitted to object to particular courses of treatment; whether CO should be accommodated. In this article, I focus on the question of how clinicians ought to act: should they provide or support a course of action that is contrary to their deeply held moral beliefs? I discuss two secular examples of potential CO in intensive care, and propose that clinicians should adopt a norm of conscientious non-objection (CNO). In the face of divergent values and practice, physicians should set aside their personal moral beliefs and not object to treatment that is legally and professionally accepted and provided by their peers. Although there may be reason to permit conscientious objections in healthcare, conscientious non-objection should be encouraged, taught, and supported.
Conscientious Objection in Healthcare and Moral Integrity
There are several reasons for accommodating health professionals’ conscientious objections. However, several authors have argued that among the most important and compelling reasons is to enable health professionals to maintain their moral integrity. Accommodation is said to provide “moral space” in which health professionals can practice without compromising their moral integrity. There are, however, alternative conceptions of moral integrity and corresponding different criteria for moral-integrity-based claims. It is argued that one conception of moral integrity, the identity conception, is sound and suitable in the specific context of responding to health professionals’ conscientious objections and their requests for accommodation. According to the identity conception, one maintains one’s moral integrity if and only if one’s actions are consistent with one’s core moral convictions. The identity conception has been subject to a number of criticisms that might call into question its suitability as a standard for determining whether health professionals have genuine moral-integrity-based accommodation claims. The following five objections to the identity conception are critically examined: (1) it does not include a social component, (2) it is a conception of subjective rather than objective integrity, (3) it does not include a reasonableness condition, (4) it does not include any substantive moral constraints, and (5) it does not include any intellectual integrity requirement. In response to these objections, it is argued that none establishes the unsuitability of the identity conception in the specific context of responding to health professionals’ conscientious objections and their requests for accommodation.