Explore the vast range of titles available.

This article examines the right to commercial speech that has been read into the right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. Restrictions on this right are only permitted if they come within the ambit of the exhaustive list of reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2), under which public health is notably absent. Nevertheless, through the doctrine of harmonious construction, the Indian judiciary have adopted a purposive interpretation to circumvent the omission of public health by carving up freedom of commercial speech into two parts: protected speech which furthers public interest and unprotected speech which is purely commercial. Moreover, the Indian courts have construed these provisions in light of the right to life under Article 21 and the health-related Directive Principles of State Policy under Part IV of the Constitution. This article concludes that judicial creativity in India has consistently been used in favor of protecting public health.

Marriage is an institution that varies from religion to religion. For Hindus, it is an indissoluble union; for Muslims, a civil contract; and for Christians, a holy union. However, individual autonomy has entered the forefront through the Indian Constitution and the revolution in Indian family law. The Constitution of India specifies that the people can decide who they should marry, who they should not, and with whom they want and don't want to continue their marital bond. The remedy of the restitution of conjugal rights (RCR), available under personal law, applies to those who are legally married but withdraw from marital ties without a reasonable excuse. This study found that RCR is one-sided and used against the other spouse's will. However, the Supreme Court of India has decided that individual autonomy is needed to protect individual liberty and promote national interest, but it has also upheld the validity of RCR, creating a genuine controversy. The object of this paper is twofold-to analyze the individual autonomy enshrined under article 21 of the Indian Constitution, which is contrary to the right to RCR, and to explore this topic through a comparative law technique.

In discussions about religious freedom in India, the country’s conflict regarding conversion plays a central role. The Constitution’s freedom of religion clause, Article 25, grants the right “freely to profess, practise and propagate religion,” but this has generated a dispute about the meaning of the right ‘to propagate’ and its relation to the freedom to convert. The recognition of this right is said to be the result of a key debate in the Constituent Assembly of India. To find out which ideas and arguments gave shape to this debate and the resulting religious freedom clause, we turn to the Assembly’s deliberations and come to a surprising conclusion: indeed, there was disagreement about conversion among the Assembly members, but this never took the form of a debate. Instead, there was a disconnect between the member’s concerns, objections, and comments concerning the draft article on the one hand, and the Assembly’s decision about the religious freedom clause on the other. If a key ‘debate’ took this form, what then could the ongoing dispute concerning conversion in India be about? We first examine some recent historiographical accounts of the Indian conflicts about conversion and proselytization. Then we develop a hypothesis that aims to make sense of this enduring conflict by identifying a blindness at its core: people reasoning against the background of Indian traditions see ‘propagation of religion’ as the human dissemination of tradition; this is incompatible with a religious conception where conversion and propagation of faith are seen in terms of God’s intervention. These two ways of seeing ‘propagation’ generate two conflicting experiences of the Indian dispute about religious freedom and conversion.

Property rights are contentious in any jurisdiction. But the right to property in India, adopted as a fundamental right in Article 31 of the Constitution of the India, 1950 (“Article”), has had a particularly tumultuous legal and political history. It holds the distinction of being the second most debated Article in the Constituent Assembly, the most amended provision of the Constitution and the only fundamental right to ever be deleted. The history of the Article is commonly understood as arising from an ideological institutional conflict between a Parliament in pursuit of socialism and a judiciary safeguarding individual freedoms. However, looking at the Article and its initial amendments from a “law and development” perspective provides a critique of the current narrative of “conflict” and offers an alternative interpretation of the history of Article 31. The paper argues that rather than arising from the pursuit of either authoritarian socialist planning or an egalitarian social revolution, the travails of the Article came in the context of India’s quest for economic modernity through a process of “passive revolution”. The powers of eminent domain reinforced in the Article empowered the state to modernise economic relations in industry and agriculture by restructuring a semi-feudal pre-capitalist property rights regime established during colonialism along productive capitalist lines. In this process, the Article helped to consolidate the powers of the developmental state in the domain of economic policy; forged the relationship between state, market and the individual; and helped shape the regime of private property rights in India. Understanding the evolution of the fundamental right to property in India therefore, not only tells a key part of India’s development story but also contributes to the “law and development” literature by assimilating diverse historical experiences within its framework, which, as critics have long argued, tends to have a strong Eurocentric bias.

Hindu nationalism came to world attention in 1998, when the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) won national elections in India. Although the BJP was defeated nationally in 2004, it continues to govern large Indian states, and the movement it represents remains a major force in the world's largest democracy. This book presents the thought of the founding fathers and key intellectual leaders of Hindu nationalism from the time of the British Raj, through the independence period, to the present. Spanning more than 130 years of Indian history and including the writings of both famous and unknown ideologues, this reader reveals how the \"Hindutuva\" movement approaches key issues of Indian politics. Covering such important topics as secularism, religious conversion, relations with Muslims, education, and Hindu identity in the growing diaspora, this reader will be indispensable for anyone wishing to understand contemporary Indian politics, society, culture, or history.

Constitutional law studies have predominantly focused on legal experiences covering only part of the phenomenon of constitutionalism, in spite of an increasing interest in Asian legal systems, no longer considered ‘younger sisters’ or mere ‘carbon copies’ of Western law. This essay introduces the federal setup as provided by the Indian Constitution, emphasizing a few relevant aspects which seem necessary to understand the territorial organization of power, i.e. the system of government and the judiciary. The third part of the text deals with the main political historical events that have influenced the Nepalese legal system and its contemporary evolution. The conclusion explains why South Asian constitutionalism and its vibrant legal systems offer, now, useful instruments for the construction of general legal theory as well as an attractive toolkit for the management of social conflicts.

Traditional separation of powers theory does not apply neatly to India. The Indian Constitution mandates independent commissions that exert additional checks and balances on the political system; it permits the President to issue ordinances that function like legislation, and it has been interpreted to require judges to have the final word on higher judicial appointments. This article focuses on a creeping and more nebulous challenge to separation of powers: the higher judiciary's expanding writ jurisdiction in fundamental rights cases. Specifically, it examines the evolution of public interest litigation (PIL) in the Supreme Court and High Courts over the past two decades, where judges act in both quasi-executive and quasi-legislative roles. Drawing on theories of constitutional dialogue, this article proposes how the Indian higher judiciary might retrench in its PIL jurisdiction by directing public attention to the most egregious executive failures and leaving the lawmaking to Parliament.

This paper addresses the issue of the Mullaperiyar Dam dispute between Kerala and Tamil Nadu with specific reference to the two judgments delivered by the Supreme Court of India on the matter. This paper attempts to examine the arguments, facts, and the judgment of the Court on each of the primary issues raised during the course of the dispute. The first case was filed by the Mullaperiyar Environmental Protection Forum in 2001, wherein the Court adjudged the case in favour of the respondents, the State of Tamil Nadu. Consequently, due to certain developments, examined in the course of the second case, the State of Tamil Nadu filed a petition before the Supreme Court against Kerala in 2006 seeking relief for the actions on the part of the latter after the judgment in the first case. A Constitution Bench was constituted to adjudicate this case, which re-examined certain issues raised during the first case and conclusively laid down its decision in favour of Tamil Nadu.

Filiation among Muslims in India is governed by Muslim personal law, a largely uncodified corpus of key Islamic legal treatises that has subsequently been interpreted and applied through the Common Law frame of British colonial courts and the post-Independence Indian judicial system by virtue of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act 1937. Muslim personal law recognizes only legitimate filiation resulting from a valid or irregular marriage, barring illegitimate children from maintenance and intestate succession and prohibiting adoption. However, a number of legislative enactments have modified key aspects of the law of filiation among Muslims: shifting the presumption of legitimacy arising from a valid marriage to the time of the wedding, rather than the time of conception; invalidating the doctrine of dormant fetus; and lifting certain disabilities incurred from illegitimacy. Further, although adoption based on customary law is somewhat common in India and has been recognized by courts, its effect among Muslims has tended only to lift the bar to paternal succession and seldom creates filiation with the adoptive family. Notwithstanding, following the enactment of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act 2000 and its subsequent amendments, an optional secular legal framework for adoption is now available to Muslim prospective parents. The procedure set forth by the Act is nonetheless unwieldly and implementation faces the very practical difficulties of the state in managing and protecting the vast number of destitute and abandoned children in India, for the most part with an unknown filiation.