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161,768 result(s) for "Constitutions"
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Qué significa y para qué sirve la reserva de Constitución?
Reserva de Constitución significa, además de establecer un límite entre Poder Constituyente y poderes constituidos que no puede ser materialmente traspasado, la afirmación de la incumbencia exclusiva de la Constitución sobre determinadas cuestiones. Se trata de cuestiones relacionadas con los derechos fundamentales y la organización del poder que precisan del acuerdo de la mayoría social que soporta en términos de cultura política la existencia misma de la Constitución. Como refleja Eloy García en esta nueva entrega de nuestra TRIBUNA CONSTITUCIONAL, las implicaciones de esta idea son enormes. (1) Para empezar, supone el absoluto respeto al contenidos normativos establecidos por la Constitución que no pueden ser enmendados, sobrepasados o alterados por el legislador posterior más que acudiendo a la reforma constitucional. (2) Además significa entender que los órganos de supremacía constitucional, directamente creados y definidos por la Constitución, no pueden asumir más funciones que las estipuladas estrictamente por la propia Constitución, lo que equivale a poner en duda tanto la capacidad del legislador ordinario para atribuir nuevas capacidades a los poderes del Estado, cuanto la posibilidad de rediseñar vía interpretativa el cometido constitucional de órganos que como el Tribunal Constitucional, desde el primer momento de su gestación legislativa y a través de figuras creativas como el bloque de la constitucionalidad, ha venido ultrapasando claramente los límites de la reserva constitucional. (3) Al mismo tiempo significa revalidar y potenciar la naturaleza política de los órganos de supremacía constitucional en orden a la realización de la Forma de Gobierno, lo que entraña una revitalización de la dimensión nacional de la democracia que limite la tendencia desconstitucionalizadora de las clausulas de apertura que permiten que organizaciones y pactos internacionales de estructura incontrolable asumen atribuciones que la Constitución reserva al autogobierno de la política. (4) Finalmente también evidencia la reserva de Constitución la diferente posición que la Constitución confiere a los poderes y competencias del Estado, de las propias de las Comunidades Autónomas que contra lo que se ha dicho y fallado no pueden asumir el papel Constitucional del Estado so pena de desnaturalizar la propia arquitectura del poder Constituyente en la que a fin de cuentas descansa existencialmente la supervivencia de la comunidad política.
IL LAVORO COME DOVERE
The essay suggests a unitary reconstruction of the concept of labour included into the Italian Constitution and marks the political value conferred to it by the Constitution itself. The duty to work as stated in article 4 of the Italian Constitution is analyzed in the light of the general discussion on constitutional duties. In this perspective, the essay offers a magis ut valeat interpretation of the article 4 of the Constitution. Special attention is given to the duty of work intended as a limit to the enjoyment of rights and to the cases in which from that duty derives a clear legal obligation.
2017 Anayasa Değişikliği Sonrası Cumhurbaşkanlığı Kararnamelerine Ait Mahfuz Alan Meselesi
Cumhurbaşkanlığı kararnameleri 2017 Anayasa reformundan sonra Türk hukuk gündeminin merkezi kavramlarından bir hâline gelmiştir. Bu durumun en başta gelen sebebi olarak Anayasa değişikliği metninin barındırdığı muğlaklık gösterilebilir. Yürütmeye tanınmış olan kararname gücüne ilişkin tereddütlü alanların başında ise bu yetkinin belirli konular bakımından kanun alanına kapatılarak yürütmeye münhasır kılınıp kılınmadığı yönündeki soru işaretidir. Bu bağlamda öğretinin belirgin bir ikilem içinde olduğu ve bu soruya her iki cihette de cevaplar verildiği görülebilmektedir. Sonuçları yönünden bu denli önemli olan bir meseleye cevap ararken tek bir yorumlama biçimine başvurmak yerine, sağlıklı ve geniş kapsamlı bir değerlendirme yapmayı teminen Anayasanın lafzi, sistematik, tarihi ve gaî yorumuna girişmek ve aynı zamanda mümkünse karşılaştırmalı hukuktan yeni sisteme uygun düşecek bir örnek bularak elde edilecek verilerle bir mukayese yapmak daha doğru olacaktır. İşte bu çalışmada doktrinde anılan yorum yollarıyla elde edilen açıklamalar ortaya konulmak ve kararnameler rejimi bakımından yeni Türk sistemine dönük kayda değer açılımlar içeren Fransız uygulaması değerlendirilmek suretiyle ülkemizde yürürlükte olan Anayasa hükümlerinin mahfuz bir alana vücut vermeyeceği düşüncesine erişilmiştir. Presidential decrees have become one of the central concepts of the Turkish legal agenda after the 2017 Constitutional reform. The most important reason for this situation can be shown as the ambiguity of the amendment text. The most important problematic area regarding the decree power granted to the executive is the question that ask whether this authority is restricted to the field of law in terms of certain issues and is made exclusive to the executive power. In this context, it can be seen that the Turkish literature is in a dilemma and certain answers are given to this question in both directions. Instead of applying to a single interpretation method when seeking an answer to an issue that’s so vital in terms of its results, it would be more accurate to engage in literal, systematic, historical and teleological interpretation of the Constitution in order to have a comprehensive evaluation and at the same time, if possible to find an example from comparative law that fits the new system for comparing. Concordantly in this study, it has been reached the idea that the articles of Constitution in force in Turkey will not give rise to a concept of reserved area, by revealing the explanations obtained through the interpretation methods mentioned in the literature and evaluating the French practice, which includes significant instructions towards the new Turkish system in terms of the decrees regime.
Presentación
Como muchas revistas y publicaciones lo han hecho, la Revista Derecho del Estado también ha querido editar un número especial para celebrar los 30 años de la Constitución colombiana de 1991, que abrió para Colombia la oportunidad de convertirse en un Estado constitucional social de derecho.
Two concepts of constitutional legitimacy
What legitimates constitutions? One standard answer is that constitutions are legitimate only if they represent the people they govern. This article identifies two different conceptions of representation. Representation can be grounded either in the consent or the will of the citizens or when the constitution reflects the ‘real’ identity of the members of the nation. Alternatively, it is sometimes stated that the constitution is legitimate because it promotes justice or, more generally, is grounded in reason. While constitutions are typically grounded both in claims to represent the people and in claims concerning the justness and wisdom of the constitutional provisions, we establish that there are two types of constitutions: constitutions that are primarily representational (e.g. the US Constitution) and constitutions that are primarily reason-based (e.g. the German Constitution). We also show that this distinction has important ramifications for how constitutions are drafted and ratified, and how they operate. One central implication is that the legitimacy of constitutions that make weak claims to representation – for example, constitutions that are imposed by foreign powers – can still be defended on reason-based grounds.