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Previous animal-learning studies have shown that the effect of the predictive history of a cue on its associability depends on whether priority was set to the absolute or relative predictiveness of that cue. The present study tested this assumption in a human contingency-learning task. In both experiments, one group of participants was trained with predictive and nonpredictive cues that were presented according to an absolute-predictiveness principle (either continuously or partially reinforced cue configurations), whereas a second group was trained with co-occurring cues that differed in predictiveness (emphasizing the relative predictive validity of the cues). In both groups, later test discriminations were learned more readily if the discriminative cues had been predictive in the previous learning stage than if they had been nonpredictive. These results imply that both the absolute and relative predictiveness of a cue lead positive transfer with regard to its associability. The data are discussed with respect to attentional models of associative learning.

One of the most influential ideas in recent decades in the cognitive psychology literature is conflict monitoring theory. According to this account, each time we experience a conflict (e.g., between a colour word and print colour in the Stroop task), attentional control is upregulated to minimize distraction on subsequent trials. Though influential, evidence purported to support this theoretical model (primarily, proportion congruent and congruency sequence effects) has been frequently criticized. Furious debate has centered on whether or not conflict monitoring does or does not occur and, if so, under which conditions. The present article presents an updated review of this debate. In particular, the article considers new research that either (a) seems particularly damaging for the conflict monitoring view or (b) seems to provide support for the theory. The author argues that new findings of the latter sort are still not compelling, several of which have already-demonstrated confounds and others which are plausibly confounded. Further progress has, to a greater extent than not, provided even stronger support for the position that conflict monitoring is merely an illusion. Instead, the net results can be more coherently understood in terms of (relatively) simpler learning/memory biases unrelated to conflict or attention that confound the key paradigms.

Transgender women, particularly racial/ethnic minority transgender women, evidence disproportionately high rates of untreated HIV infection and disproportionately low rates of HIV viral suppression. The Alexis Project was a combined peer health navigation (PHN) and contingency management (CM) intervention that targeted HIV milestones associated with advancement along the HIV care continuum. From February 2014 through August 2016, 139 transgender women of color (TWOC) enrolled and received unlimited PHN sessions and an escalating CM rewards schedule for confirmed achievement of both behavioral (e.g., HIV care visits) and biomedical (e.g., viral load reductions and achieved/sustained viral suppression) HIV milestones. Results demonstrated that increased attendance to PHN sessions was associated with significant achievement of both behavioral (coef. range 0.12–0.38) and biomedical (coef. = 0.10) HIV milestones (all p ≤ 0.01); 85% were linked to HIV care, and 83% who enrolled detectable and achieved the minimum 1 log viral load reduction advanced to full viral suppression. The combined PHN and CM intervention successfully promoted advancement along the HIV Care Continuum, with particularly robust effects for behavioral HIV milestones.

Conflict adaptation is one of the most popular ideas in cognitive psychology. It purports to explain a wide range of data, including both brain and behavioral data from the proportion congruent and Gratton paradigms. However, in recent years, many concerns about the viability of this account have been raised. It has been argued that contingency learning, not conflict adaptation, produces the proportion congruent effect. Similarly, the Gratton paradigm has been shown to contain several confounds—most notably, feature repetition biases. Newer work on temporal learning further calls into question the interpretability of the behavioral results of conflict adaptation studies. Brain data linking supposed conflict adaptation to the anterior cingulated cortex has also come into question, since this area seems to be responsive solely to time-on-task, rather than conflict. This review points to the possibility that conflict adaptation may simply be an illusion. However, the extant data remain ambiguous, and there are a lot of open questions that still need to be addressed in future research.

•The reversed Simon effect suggests the involvement of irrelevant S-R learning.•Unsigned PEs of irrelevant S-R learning models can predict behavioral responses.•Unsigned PEs of learning models can predict activity of cognitive control regions. It has been shown that manipulating the proportion of congruent to incongruent trials in conflict tasks (e.g., Stroop, Simon, and flanker tasks) can vary the size of conflict effects, however, by two different mechanisms. One theory is the control learning account (the brain learns the probability of conflict and uses it to proactively adjust the control demand for future trials). The other is the irrelevant stimulus-response learning account (the brain learns the probability of irrelevant stimulus-response associations and uses it to prepare responses). Previous fMRI studies have detected the brain regions that contribute to the control-learning-modulated conflict effects, but it is less known what neural substrates underlie the conflict effects modulated by irrelevant S-R learning. We here investigated this question with a model-based fMRI study, in which the proportion of congruent to incongruent trials changed dynamically in the Simon task and the models learned the probability of irrelevant S-R associations quantitatively. Behavioral analyses showed that the unsigned prediction errors (PEs) of responses generated by the learning models correlated with reaction times irrespective of congruent and incongruent trials, indicating that large unsigned PEs associated with slow responses. The fMRI results showed that the regions of fronto-parietal and cingulo-opercular network involved in cognitive control were significantly modulated by the unsigned PEs, also irrespective of congruent and incongruent trials, indicating that large unsigned PEs associated with transiently increased activity in these regions. These results together suggest that learning of irrelevant S-R associations modulates reactive control, which demonstrates a new way to modulate cognitive control compared to the control learning account.

Humans are evidently able to learn contingencies from the co-occurrence of cues and outcomes. But how do humans judge contingencies when observations of cue and outcome are learned on different occasions? The pseudocontingency framework proposes that humans rely on base-rate correlations across contexts, that is, whether outcome base rates increase or decrease with cue base rates. Here, we elaborate on an alternative mechanism for pseudocontingencies that exploits base rate information within contexts. In two experiments, cue and outcome base rates varied across four contexts, but the correlation by base rates was kept constant at zero. In some contexts, cue and outcome base rates were aligned (e.g., cue and outcome base rates were both high). In other contexts, cue and outcome base rates were misaligned (e.g., cue base rate was high, but outcome base rate was low). Judged contingencies were more positive for contexts in which cue and outcome base rates were aligned than in contexts in which cue and outcome base rates were misaligned. Our findings indicate that people use the alignment of base rates to infer contingencies conditional on the context. As such, they lend support to the pseudocontingency framework, which predicts that decision makers rely on base rates to approximate contingencies. However, they challenge previous conceptions of pseudocontingencies as a uniform inference from correlated base rates. Instead, they suggest that people possess a repertoire of multiple contingency inferences that differ with regard to informational requirements and areas of applicability.

A robust finding in the Stroop literature is that congruency effects (i.e., the color-naming latency difference between color words presented in incongruent vs. congruent colors) are larger for color words presented most often in their congruent color than for color words presented most often in incongruent colors. However, the cause of this item-specific proportion congruent (ISPC) effect is unclear, as it might be produced by either a conflict-adaptation strategy (e.g., prepare for conflict when the word RED appears) and/or a more general learning mechanism of stimulus-response contingencies (e.g., prepare to respond blue when the word RED appears). Thus far, attempts to directly dissociate the two processes appear to indicate no role for conflict adaptation, at least in situations in which contingency learning is also possible. We re-examined this conclusion in a Stroop task in which contingency learning and item-specific conflict frequency were manipulated partially independently. In addition to a contingency-learning effect emerging for stimuli matched on conflict frequency, a conflict-adaptation effect also emerged for stimuli matched on contingency. The two effects also had different time courses, with the contingency-learning effect emerging early and remaining stable throughout the experiment and the conflict-adaptation effect arising later in the experiment. These results challenge not only the contingency-learning account of the ISPC effect, an account that denies the existence of a conflict-adaptation process, but also control accounts that assume that, although conflict-adaptation processes do exist, they are not used when contingency learning is also possible.

Background: Examining visual behavior during a motor learning paradigm can enhance our understanding of how infants learn motor skills. The aim of this study was to determine if infants who learned a contingency visually anticipated the outcomes of their behavior. Methods: 15 infants (6–9 months of age) participated in a contingency learning paradigm. When an infant produced a right leg movement, a robot provided reinforcement by clapping. Three types of visual gaze events were identified: predictive, reactive, and not looking. An exploratory analysis examined the trends in visual-motor behavior that can be used to inform future questions and practices in contingency learning studies. Results: All classically defined learners visually anticipated robot activation at greater than random chance (W = 21; p = 0.028). Specifically, all but one learners displayed a distribution of gaze timing identified as predictive (skewness: 0.56–2.42) with the median timing preceding robot activation by 0.31 s (range: −0.40–0.18 s). Conclusions: Findings suggest that most learners displayed visual anticipation withing the first minutes of performing the paradigm. Further, the classical definition of learning a contingency paradigm in infants can be sharpened to further the design of contingency learning studies and advance the processes infants use to learn motor skills.

The pseudocontingency framework provides a parsimonious strategy for inferring the contingency between two variables by assessing the base rates. Frequently occurring levels are associated, as are rarely occurring levels. However, this strategy can lead to different contingency inferences in different contexts, depending on how the base rates vary across contexts. Here, we examine how base-rate consistency influences base-rate learning and reliance by contrasting consistent with inconsistent base rates. We hypothesized that base-rate learning is facilitated, and that people rely more on base rates if base rates are consistent. In Experiment 1, the base rates across four contexts implied the same (consistent) or different (inconsistent) contingencies. Base rates were learned equally accurately, and participants inferred contingencies that followed the base rates but deviated from the genuine contingencies within contexts, regardless of consistency. In Experiment 2, we additionally manipulated whether the context was a plausible moderator of the contingency. While we replicated the first experiment's results when the context was a plausible moderator, base-rate inferences were stronger for consistent base rates when the context was an implausible moderator. Possibly, when a moderation-by-context was implausible, participants also relied on the base-rate correlation across contexts, which implied the same contingency when base rates were consistent but was zero when the base rates were inconsistent. Thus, our findings suggest that contingency inferences from base rates involve top-down processes in which people decide how to use base-rate information.

People sometimes perceive causal relationships between non-contingent events. When having to assess the contingency between a putative cause and an outcome, it is vital to ensure that all other causal forces are held constant whether the studied cause is present or not. Nevertheless, a recent work suggested that, in conventional contingency learning scenarios, people do not necessarily assume that it is the case. A possible contributing factor to this asset is that instructions in contingency learning tasks do not typically clarify this point. In two experiments, we manipulated the task instructions so that only half of the participants were explicitly informed that the introduction of the putative cause was randomly decided for each trial. The second experiment further instructed participants in the implications of random assignment regarding the control of alternative causes. Results of both experiments indicated that the manipulation of the instructions had no impact on the strength of causal illusions (minimum BF 01 = 5.853). Nevertheless, the susceptibility to develop causal illusions was related to a lack of an appropriate consideration of alternative causal forces and a tendency to overweight the importance of the probability of the outcome in the presence, rather than in the absence, of the putative cause.