Explore the vast range of titles available.

Workers in a wide variety of jobs are paid based on performance, which is commonly seen as enhancing effort and productivity relative to non-contingent pay schemes. However, psychological research suggests that excessive rewards can, in some cases, result in a decline in performance. To test whether very high monetary rewards can decrease performance, we conducted a set of experiments in the U.S. and in India in which subjects worked on different tasks and received performance-contingent payments that varied in amount from small to very large relative to their typical levels of pay. With some important exceptions, very high reward levels had a detrimental effect on performance.

This paper proposes an alternative solution to the problem related to the risk that banks incur in the protection of deposits. This solution lies in the use by banks of contingent convertible leasing contracts to face financial distress situations by solidifying their own funds and thus improving the quality of deposit protection. Convertible contingent leases are instruments that are automatically convertible into shares when the bank reaches a level of financial distress. They allow a limited bailout of the bank in times of generalized crisis when they are not able to issue sufficient levels of new equity.

How do potentially optimistic entrepreneurs attract prospective investors? We investigate an entrepreneur's decision to pursue either disclosure —where investors inspect the invention—or a contingent payment scheme (CPS) offer (e.g., salary deferral, royalty-based license)—where an invention's value is inferred from the entrepreneur's willingness to make her pay contingent on the invention's success. Using a parsimonious model, we highlight the role of optimism and demonstrate that it only affects CPS ex post. As a result, a novel trade-off unfolds ex ante: In choosing an action that maximizes the valuation of the invention, a moderately wealthy entrepreneur weighs optimism discount (affecting CPS) versus imitation discount (affecting disclosure). More broadly, the paper advances a view of entrepreneurs as optimists, thus departing from the prevailing approach, which characterizes entrepreneurs as opportunistic individuals who consciously pursue self-serving goals.

Since the world's first tax-system-based income-contingent repayment system for the repayment of student loans was introduced in Australia in 1989, there have been suggestions that Canada should adopt a similar system. But there has been little discussion of the practicalities involved in introducing a new system where there is joint federal and provincial involvement and where the new system would replace a pre-existing and generous, if incomplete, form of income-contingent repayment (ICR). Joint federal and provincial involvement is a problem unique to Canada, and replacement of the existing system becomes problematic when that system is more generous than the proposed alternative. In this article, we identify five key stumbling blocks that make us skeptical about the prospects of switching to tax-system-based repayment of student loans in Canada: the need for intergovernmental cooperation; additional responsibilities for the tax authorities; potential costs to employers from further complicating the withholding system; challenges if the new system were to try to fit the current program parameters into the tax system efficiently; and the political challenge of gaining student support. While there are certainly benefits to administering ICR through the tax system, these need to be weighed against the costs.

We study super-replication of contingent claims in markets with fixed transaction costs. This can be viewed as a stochastic impulse control problem with a terminal state constraint. The first result in this paper reveals that in reasonable continuous time financial market models the super-replication price is prohibitively costly and leads to trivial buy-and-hold strategies. Our second result derives nontrivial scaling limits of super-replication prices for binomial models with small fixed costs.

We study how monitoring and verification of accounting-based performance benchmarks influences the design and efficiency of earnout contracts. Earnouts are commonly used to resolve agency conflicts arising in mergers and acquisitions, but these contracts create measurement and other agency problems when contingent payments are tied to future accounting-based performance. Exploiting changes in auditor monitoring of earnouts that arose as\\ a consequence of SFAS 141(R), we find that acquisition contracts are more likely to incorporate accounting-based earnouts and that contingent payments tied to accounting-based performance benchmarks make up a larger portion of the consideration when acquiring firms have high-quality auditors. We also find that market reactions to announcements of earnout deals are more positive after SFAS 141(R) for acquisitions most susceptible to disputes over accounting-based performance metrics and these results are more pronounced for acquiring firms with high-quality auditors. By exploiting the features of this unique setting, we illuminate the role of monitoring and verification of accounting information in financial contracts.

Contests by their very nature involve risk, winning and losing are both possible, and the gain from winning can itself be uncertain. The participants in a contest use resources to increase their chance of winning. The main focus of this analysis is on the effects of risk aversion and risk in contests where only winners pay for resources used to compete. When payment is contingent on winning, the effect of risk aversion is in the opposite direction of what occurs when costs are paid by both winners and losers. A number of contests observed in the marketplace that exhibit this contingent payment property are discussed.

A large body of literature suggests willingness-to-pay is overstated in hypothetical valuation questions as compared to when actual payment is required. Recently, \"cheap talk\" has been proposed to eliminate the potential bias in hypothetical valuation questions. Cheap talk refers to process of explaining hypothetical bias to individuals prior to asking a valuation question. This study explores the effect of cheap talk in a mass mail survey using a conventional value elicitation technique. Results indicate that cheap talk was effective at reducing willingness-to-pay for most survey participants; however, consistent with previous research, cheap talk did not reduce willingness-to-pay for knowledgeable consumers.

The early literature on research contests stressed the advantages of a fixed prize in inspiring R&D effort. More recently the focus has moved towards endogenizing the rewards to research activity in these tournament settings, since this can induce extra effort or enhance the surplus of the buyer. We focus on a research contest as a means of selecting a partner for an R&D enterprise, in an informational setting in which the established providers of R&D services know more about each others' relative capabilities than does the buyer/sponsor. An alternative use of our model is in choosing between prospective patentees where the Patent Trading Office has less information on the patents than the competitors. This asymmetry creates a source of inefficiency if a rank order contest is used as a selection device; we show how the contest can be modified to improve selection efficiency, while maintaining its simplicity (as only ordinal information is required). The modification that we suggest involves endogenizing the prizes that are awarded contingent upon whether a contestant wins or loses the contest. Furthermore, the payment system and the selection mechanism are detail-free. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]

In this paper we study the implications of contingent payments on the clearing wealth in a network model of financial contagion. We consider an extension of the Eisenberg–Noe financial contagion model in which the nominal interbank obligations depend on the wealth of the firms in the network. We first consider the problem in a static framework and develop conditions for existence and uniqueness of solutions as long as no firm is speculating on the failure of other firms. In order to achieve existence and uniqueness under more general conditions, we introduce a dynamic framework. We demonstrate how this dynamic framework can be applied to problems that were ill-defined in the static framework.