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Civil society
\"Now in its fourth edition, Civil Society has become a major work of reference for those who seek to understand the role of voluntary citizen action in a troubled world. Ideas about the civil sphere can shed much light on how we might respond to polarization, privatization, and authoritarians of different various stripes\"-- Provided by publisher.
Book
Human Capital, Bankruptcy, and Capital Structure
We derive the optimal labor contract for a levered firm in an economy with perfectly competitive capital and labor markets. Employees become entrenched under this contract and so face large human costs of bankruptcy. The firm's optimal capital structure therefore depends on the trade-off between these human costs and the tax benefits of debt. Optimal debt levels consistent with those observed in practice emerge without relying on frictions such as moral hazard or asymmetric information. Consistent with empirical evidence, persistent idiosyncratic differences in leverage across firms also result. In addition, wages should have explanatory power for firm leverage.
Journal Article
How to play and win at bridge : rules, skills and strategy, from beginner to expert, demonstrated in over 700 step-by-step illustrations
Learn how to play the classic game with full step-by-step instructions, techniques and tactics for players of all ages, skills and experience.
Book
Reputations, Relationships, and Contract Enforcement
When the quality of a good is at the discretion of the seller, how can buyers assure that the seller provides the mutually efficient level of quality? Contracts that provide a bonus to the seller if the quality is acceptable or impose a penalty on the seller if quality is unacceptable can, in theory, provide efficient incentives. But how are such contracts enforced? While the courts can be used, doing so involves high real costs. Informal enforcement, involving a loss of reputation and future access to the market for any party that defaults on a contract, may often be a better alternative. This paper explores the use of both formal and informal enforcement mechanisms, provides a rationale for a variety of observed market mechanisms, and then generates a number of testable hypotheses.
Journal Article
Theologians and contract law : the moral transformation of the ius commune (ca. 1500-1650)
In Theologians and Contract Law, Wim Decock offers an account of the moral roots of modern contract law. He explains why theologians in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries built a systematic contract law around the principles of freedom and fairness.
eBook
Bridge for dummies
\"Build a winning hand and bid with confidence; strategize with your bridge partner; play online and in clubs and tournaments\"--Cover.
Book
Supply Chain Contract Design Under Financial Constraints and Bankruptcy Costs
We study contract design and coordination of a supply chain with one supplier and one retailer, both of which are capital constrained and in need of short-term financing for their operations. Competitively priced bank loans are available, and the failure of loan repayment leads to bankruptcy, where default costs may include variable (proportional to the firm’s sales) and fixed costs. Without default costs, it is known that simple contracts (e.g., revenue-sharing, buyback, and quantity discount) can coordinate and allocate profits arbitrarily in the chain. With only variable default costs, buyback contracts remain coordinating and equivalent to revenue-sharing contracts but are Pareto dominated by revenue-sharing contracts when fixed default costs are present. Thus, for general bankruptcy costs, contracts without buyback terms are of most interest. Quantity discount contracts fail to coordinate the supply chain, since a necessary condition for coordination is to proportionally reallocate debt obligations within the channel. With only variable default costs and with high fixed default costs exhibiting substantial economies-of-scale, revenue-sharing contracts with working capital coordination continue to coordinate the chain. Unexpectedly, for fixed default costs with small economies-of-scale effects, the two-firm system under a revenue-sharing contract with working capital coordination might have higher expected profit than the one-firm system. Our results provide support for the use of revenue-sharing contracts with working capital coordination for decentralized management of supply chains when there are bankruptcy risks and default costs.
This paper was accepted by Serguei Netessine, operations management.
Journal Article
Relationship-Specificity, Contract Enforceability, and Income Smoothing
Contracting parties, such as the firm and its supplier, have cost-reducing incentives to make investments that support the unique transactions between them. However, to the extent that one party may renege on its contractual obligations, the other party incurring the cost of the relationship-specific investment bears additional risk and is less willing to invest such that sub-optimal investment occurs. In countries where enforceability of explicit contracts is particularly weak, parties have incentives to signal their willingness to fulfill implicit claims and maintain long-term relationships. We predict that firms engage in income smoothing to send such a signal to their suppliers. Consistent with these expectations, we find that firms that both reside in countries with weak contract enforceability and operate in industries with a greater need for relationship-specific investments tend to smooth reported income more. We further decompose income smoothing into \"informational\" and \"garbled\" components and find that results are driven by the informational component of income smoothing. Our results support the important role that accruals play in providing information in the presence of incomplete contracts.
Journal Article