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Contract farming is typically considered an appropriate measure for small-scale farmers to solve their constraints and problems. However, despite positive effects, low participation in and high dropout rates from contract farming schemes remain challenges. Therefore, this study objects to evaluate preferences for contract attributes and attribute levels among contracting buyers, farmers, and government officials through data triangulation from key informant interviews, focus group discussions, and participant observations. Based on Henry Garrett Ranking, Rank Based Quotient, and Rank Based Sum methods, results indicate that the most important attributes were price options, payment, delivery arrangement, input provision, input-use requirements, and product quality standards. Despite a consensus on the ranking of the contract attributes, the preferences for the attribute levels among the stakeholders were heterogeneous. It is recommended that attributes and their levels should be pertinent in contract agreements. Thus, contract design with an adjusted or premium price, 50% of estimated payment before harvesting and the rest after delivery three to five days or lump-sum immediate payment, delivery after harvesting, inputs provision by the contractors through the representative branches or stores located at the local areas or cooperatives, banning active-ingredients or flexible use of inputs from the contractors to produce Good Agricultural Practices or organic products are considerable options.

Land-tenure security is integral to local communities’ socioeconomic development. It has been a center of debate in academia and for legislators and advocates to implement reforms to enhance efficient and sustainable development in land management. Yet, knowledge gaps remain in how various contract-farming regimes contribute to land-improvement investment and technical efficiency. This study used a data set of 650 farm households collected through a two-stage stratified sampling to investigate the influence of three contract-farming regimes: long-term, medium-term, and short-term contracts, on the land-improvement investment, productivity, and technical efficiency of contract farmers in Punjab, Pakistan. The study used multivariate probit and ordinary least square regression models to examine the posit relationships. The findings highlight that farmers with long-term land contracts have higher per hectare yield, income and profit than those with medium-term and short-term contracts. The results confirm that farmers with medium- and long-term contracts tend to invest more in land-improvement measures, i.e., organic and green manure. Further, the study findings demonstrate that long-term land tenures are more effective when farmers make decisions regarding the on-farm infrastructure, like tube-well installation, tractor ownership, and holding farm logistics. Last, the study results confirm that long-term contracts are more robust regarding technical efficiency. Moreover, the findings support the Marshallian inefficiency hypothesis and extend the literature on contract farming, land-improvement investment, and land use policy, and offer coherent policy actions for stakeholders to improve farmers’ productivity, technical efficiency, and income.

This paper analyses how farmers to take decision to allocate and use their lands for potato production when both contract and non-contract farming options are available in West Bengal. We used a primary data collected from 327 potato producing households in Bankura and Bardhaman districts of West Bengal. We used generalized least squares fixed effect model in the empirical analysis. We observed that imposed restriction of seed supply limits the choice of both potato farming and non-potato farming. The benefits from contract farming are not accrued by the farmers who are mainly small and marginal landholders. They are also in a moment of ambiguity to choice their land use under non-potato cultivation. The choice of the farmers, therefore, remains constrained. This uncertainty can be overcome only through effective land use planning and institutional intervention.

Contractual arrangements of different types have increasingly found in West Sumatera not only in subsistence and commercial crops but particularly also in livestock sector. Contract farming in livestock agribusiness is generally defined as broiler farms under an agreement between farmers and a livestock inputs supplier. Within this broad definition, there are different variants of contracts depending on the formality and intensity of contractual arrangement. This study objective was to prove that the design of a contract, as representation of vertical integration intensity in broiler agribusiness, has different efficiency effects on production. The stochastic frontier production function was used in this study, and employed a regression method to estimate the level of technical efficiency. Data were collected from 87 broiler fattening farms consisted of 50 broiler fattening farms under formal contractual system and 37 broiler fattening farms under informal contractual system. The results showed that farm experience and improvement of the contract system would reduce the level of technical inefficiency of broiler farms. The study concluded that broiler farms under formal and detail contract farming had greater technical efficiencies compared to broiler farms under informal unwritten contract arrangement. However, the broiler farms under informal contract obtained higher net returns compared to the broiler farms under formal contract arrangement.

The study explores centralized contract farming sustainability among tobacco smallholder farmers in Zimbabwe. Despite studies on centralized contract farming to date, little has been theorized with regard to its sustainability. Using mixed-method research, questionnaires, key informant interviews, document review and focus group discussions were employed in gathering data from farmers, Extension Officers and field officers of the contracting firms. Using Pearson Correlation Coefficient and thematic analysis findings revealed that centralized contract tobacco farming is unsustainable. Institutional contract arrangements are manipulative and are unwelcome to farmers. Economically, contracting firms find it viable as they obtain more profit at the expense of smallholder farmers. Although farmers are assured of inputs, extension service and market for the product, the contract terms are characterized by transaction cost, uncertainty and information asymmetry. Moreso, although financial and physical assets ownership have been increased, human, natural and social capital are a challenge. Shocks, stresses and seasonality still characterize the vulnerability context of the farmers as society has been exposed to women and child abuses, food insecurity, and social decay. The study therefore recommends an increased participatory action and learning in crafting and implementing contract terms by farmers, state and non-state actors for sustainability to be realized.

Poverty is prevalent in the small-farm sector of many developing countries. A large literature suggests that contract farming—a preharvest agreement between farmers and buyers—can facilitate smallholder market participation, improve household welfare, and promote rural development. These findings have influenced the development policy debate, but the external validity of the extant evidence is limited. Available studies typically focus on a single contract scheme or on a small geographical area in one country. We generate evidence that is generalizable beyond a particular contract scheme, crop, or country, using nationally representative survey data from 6 countries. We focus on the implications of contract farming for household income and labor demand, finding that contract farmers obtain higher incomes than their counterparts without contracts only in some countries. Contract farmers in most countries exhibit increased demand for hired labor, which suggests that contract farming stimulates employment, yet we do not find evidence of spillover effects at the community level. Our results challenge the notion that contract farming unambiguously improves welfare. We discuss why our results may diverge from previous findings and propose research designs that yield greater internal and external validity. Implications for policy and research are relevant beyond contract farming.

The gains from insurance arise from the transfer of income across states. Yet, by requiring that the premium be paid up front, standard insurance products also transfer income across time. We show that this intertemporal transfer can help explain low insurance demand, especially among the poor, and in a randomized control trial in Kenya we test a crop insurance product which removes it. The product is interlinked with a contract farming scheme: as with other inputs, the buyer of the crop offers the insurance and deducts the premium from farmer revenues at harvest time. The take-up rate for pay-at-harvest insurance is 72 percent, compared to 5 percent for the standard pay-up-front contract, and the difference is largest among poorer farmers. Additional experiments and outcomes provide evidence on the role of liquidity constraints, present bias, and counterparty risk, and find that enabling farmers to commit to pay the premium just 1 month later increases demand by 21 percentage points.

Contract farming has often been associated with an increase in the income of participating households. It is unclear, however, whether contract farming increases other aspects of household welfare. We use data from six regions of Madagascar and a selection-on-observables design in which we control for a household's marginal utility of participating in contract farming, which we elicited via a contingent valuation experiment, to show that participating in contract farming reduces the duration of a household's hungry season by about eight days on average. Moreover, participation in contract farming makes participating households about 18% more likely to see their hungry season end at any time. Further, we find that these effects are more pronounced for households with more children, and for households with more girls. This is an important result as children—especially girls—often bear the burden of food insecurity.