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A large urban district (N = 90,546 students, n = 180 schools) implemented restorative interventions as a response to school discipline incidents. Findings from multilevel modeling of student discipline records (n =9,921) revealed that youth from groups that tend to be overrepresented in suspensions and expulsions (e.g., Black, Latino, and Native American youth; boys; and students in special education) had similar, if not greater, rates of participation in restorative interventions than their peers. First-semester participants in restorative interventions had lower odds of receiving office discipline referrals (OR .21, p < .001) and suspensions (OR .07, p < .001) in the second semester. However, the suspension gap between Black and White students persisted. Implications for reform in school discipline practices are noted.

This article tests the plausibility of several leading, explanatory theories of tort by reference to the fact that tort law possesses neither the juridical nor the structural unity that the relevant theories ascribe to it. It considers a wide range of tort actions that reveal a much more heterogeneous body of law than any of the targeted theorists admit exists. It concludes that, taken together, tort law’s varying liability bases, its departures from the requirement of a rights infringement, its structural variations and its remedial diversity combine to belie the various reductionist claims the theorists in question make.

The emergence of restorative justice as an alternative model to Western, court-based criminal justice may have important implications for the psychology of justice. It is proposed that two different notions of justice affect responses to rule-breaking: restorative and retributive justice. Retributive justice essentially refers to the repair of justice through unilateral imposition of punishment, whereas restorative justice means the repair of justice through reaffirming a shared value-consensus in a bilateral process. Among the symbolic implications of transgressions, concerns about status and power are primarily related to retributive justice and concerns about shared values are primarily related to restorative justice. At the core of these processes, however, lies the parties' construal of their identity relation, specifically whether or not respondents perceive to share an identity with the offender. The specific case of intergroup transgressions is discussed, as are implications for future research on restoring a sense of justice after rule-breaking.

Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) is critical for achieving net-zero and net-negative CO 2 emissions that can halt and potentially reverse global warming, respectively. However, reliable CDR is still costly and comes with considerable technological and ecological uncertainties. Despite the centrality of equity in the Paris Agreement, no integrated framework exists to equitably allocate responsibilities for CDR and residual emissions among countries. Here, we present a justice-based framework that separates out ethical considerations for equitably allocating gross emissions and gross CDR, addressing how these contributions shift before and after reaching global net-zero CO 2 emissions. The framework distinguishes between CDR delivered as a common good to reach a collective global climate outcome, and CDR that is used to pay off carbon debts due to emissions overconsumption. We offer a new perspective for how nations with substantial historical responsibilities and emerging economies with increasing capacities can collaborate and equitably share the CDR burden, enhancing both international cooperation and national-level climate action.

Background Since pregnant women are severely underrepresented in clinical research, many take the position that the exclusion of pregnant women from research must be justified unless there are compelling “scientific reasons” for their exclusion. However, it is questionable whether this approach renders research with pregnant women fair. This paper analyzes and evaluates when research with pregnant women can be considered as fair and what constitutes scientific reasons for exclusion. Methods Conceptual ethical and methodological analysis and evaluation of fair inclusion. Results Fair inclusion of pregnant women means (1) that pregnant women who are eligible are not excluded solely for being pregnant and (2) that the research interests of pregnant women are prioritized, meaning that they ought to receive substantially more attention. Fairness does not imply that pregnant women should be included in virtually every research project, as including only a few pregnant women in a population consisting only of women will not help to determine the effectiveness and safety of a treatment in pregnant women. Separate trials in pregnant women may be preferable once we assume, or know, that effects of interventions in pregnant women differ from the effects in other subpopulations, or when we assume, or know, that there are no differences. In the latter case, it may be preferable to conduct post-marketing studies or establish registries. If there is no conclusive evidence indicating either differences or equivalence of effects between pregnant and non-pregnant women, yet it seems unlikely that major differences or exact equivalence exist, the inclusion of pregnant women should be sufficient. Depending on the research question, this boils down to representativeness in terms of the proportion of pregnant and non-pregnant women, or to oversampling pregnant women. Conclusions Fair inclusion of pregnant women in research implies that separate trials in pregnant women should be promoted. Inclusion of pregnant women has to be realized at the earliest phases of the research process. In addition to researchers and research ethics committees, scientific advisory councils, funders, drug regulatory agencies, pharmaceutical companies, journal editors and others have a joint responsibility to further develop the evidence base for drug use in pregnant women.

In this paper I discuss the proposal that the law of torts exists to do justice, more specifically corrective justice, between the parties to a tort case. My aims include clarifying the proposal and defending it against some objections (as well as saving it from some defences that it could do without). Gradually the paper turns to a discussion of the rationale for doing corrective justice. I defend what I call the 'continuity thesis' according to which at least part of the rationale for doing corrective justice is to mitigate one's wrongs, including one's torts. I try to show how much of the law of torts this thesis helps to explain, but also what it leaves unexplained. In the process I show (what I will discuss in a later companion paper) that 'corrective justice' cannot be a complete answer to the question of what tort law is for.

Peter Birks' four-limb formula of unjust enrichment is well known. According to this formula, the plaintiff should show (a) a transfer of value from them to the defendant (aka 'enrichment'); (b) a causal link between the defendant's enrichment and the plaintiff (aka 'at the plaintiff's expense'); and (c) the existence of one of the previously-recognized restitution categories, such as mistake, undue influence, duress, incapacity, necessity, or illegality (aka 'unjust'). If the plaintiff meets those requirements, it is open to the defendant to demonstrate (d) a presence of one of the previously recognized defences, such as 'change of position' or illegality.

According to a widely accepted thesis, all rights violations wrong the right-holder. According to another widely accepted thesis, rights protect interests. But many conventional rights protect morally trivial interests. Hence, the two theses taken together lead to the puzzling conclusion that one can wrong another by frustrating a trivial interest. In this essay, I first introduce this “moral magic” problem and show why the interest theory of rights has no resources to address it.

The use of restorative justice in cases of sexual violence is highly contentious. Some argue that it may trivialize violence against women, revictimize the vulnerable, and endanger the safety of victim-survivors. On the other hand, from the perspective of victim-survivors, it may enable us to hear their stories more holistically, offering greater control and validation, and reduce victim-blaming. It may also provide an additional opportunity to secure some form of justice. Debate over the validity of these competing claims has largely taken place in an empirical vacuum. This article considers the results of an exploratory study of a restorative justice conference involving an adult survivor of child rape and other sexual abuse. The results, while necessarily tentative, provide good ground to consider afresh the possibilities of restorative justice in cases of sexual violence. We suggest that for those victim-survivors who wish to pursue this option, restorative justice may offer the potential to secure some measure of justice.

This Essay gingerly enters the tort theory “wars” that torts scholars have been debating for many decades. Is the essence of tort law instrumentalism in some form, including most notably in providing appropriate incentives to minimize the costs of accidents, as Guido Calabresi normatively proposed and William Landes and Richard Posner descriptively claimed? Or, on the other hand, is tort law simply about the injurer and victim and the just manner for allocating the victim’s loss—blind to any collateral consequences? We address these debates from our perspective as Restatement Reporters, honing in on the question of what role tort theory plays in our work. Our answer is virtually none. There are two independent and sufficient reasons for this conclusion. First, we are deeply skeptical that there an immanent meta-theory that explains tort law or guides its development. Instead, we think tort law is a hodgepodge, influenced by public policy, culture, administrative concerns, evidentiary lacunae, technological developments, and random events. These eclectic and shifting forces influence what tort law is and how it evolves with the felt needs of any given era. Tort law, in short, is built from the bottom up, not the top down and is far too messy to be the product of intelligent design. Beyond that, even if there were such a force at tort law’s heart, that force would still have little influence on our work. The doctrinal level at which Restatements operate and the case law that fuels the production of Restatements—ground level law—is a disjunction from theory, which operates at 30,000 feet. This disjunction means that the latter is of little assistance when it comes to addressing the quotidian matters important to tort law and Restatements. Whether tort law is entirely instrumental or solely about corrective justice cannot answer the question of whether parents should have immunity from tort suits by their children. The answer to that question must be found in the case law, not in Kant.