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The economics profession in twentieth-century America began as a humble quest to understand the \"wealth of nations.\" It grew into a profession of immense public prestige--and now suffers a strangely withered public purpose. Michael Bernstein portrays a profession that has ended up repudiating the state that nurtured it, ignoring distributive justice, and disproportionately privileging private desires in the study of economic life. Intellectual introversion has robbed it, he contends, of the very public influence it coveted and cultivated for so long. With wit and irony he examines how a community of experts now identified with uncritical celebration of ''free market'' virtues was itself shaped, dramatically so, by government and collective action. In arresting and provocative detail Bernstein describes economists' fitful efforts to sway a state apparatus where values and goals could seldom remain separate from means and technique, and how their vocation was ultimately humbled by government itself. Replete with novel research findings, his work also analyzes the historical peculiarities that led the profession to a key role in the contemporary backlash against federal initiatives dating from the 1930s to reform the nation's economic and social life. Interestingly enough, scholars have largely overlooked the history that has shaped this profession. An economist by training, Bernstein brings a historian's sensibilities to his narrative, utilizing extensive archival research to reveal unspoken presumptions that, through the agency of economists themselves, have come to mold and define, and sometimes actually deform, public discourse. This book offers important, even troubling insights to readers interested in the modern economic and political history of the United States and perplexed by recent trends in public policy debate. It also complements a growing literature on the history of the social sciences. Sure to have a lasting impact on its field,A Perilous Progressrepresents an extraordinary contribution of gritty empirical research and conceptual boldness, of grand narrative breadth and profound analytical depth.

The economics profession in twentieth-century America began as a humble quest to understand the \"wealth of nations.\" It grew into a profession of immense public prestige--and now suffers a strangely withered public purpose. Michael Bernstein portrays a profession that has ended up repudiating the state that nurtured it, ignoring distributive justice, and disproportionately privileging private desires in the study of economic life. Intellectual introversion has robbed it, he contends, of the very public influence it coveted and cultivated for so long. With wit and irony he examines how a community of experts now identified with uncritical celebration of ''free market'' virtues was itself shaped, dramatically so, by government and collective action. In arresting and provocative detail Bernstein describes economists' fitful efforts to sway a state apparatus where values and goals could seldom remain separate from means and technique, and how their vocation was ultimately humbled by government itself. Replete with novel research findings, his work also analyzes the historical peculiarities that led the profession to a key role in the contemporary backlash against federal initiatives dating from the 1930s to reform the nation's economic and social life. Interestingly enough, scholars have largely overlooked the history that has shaped this profession. An economist by training, Bernstein brings a historian's sensibilities to his narrative, utilizing extensive archival research to reveal unspoken presumptions that, through the agency of economists themselves, have come to mold and define, and sometimes actually deform, public discourse. This book offers important, even troubling insights to readers interested in the modern economic and political history of the United States and perplexed by recent trends in public policy debate. It also complements a growing literature on the history of the social sciences. Sure to have a lasting impact on its field, A Perilous Progress represents an extraordinary contribution of gritty empirical research and conceptual boldness, of grand narrative breadth and profound analytical depth.

In politics, ideas matter. They provide the foundation for economic policymaking, which in turn shapes what is possible in domestic and international politics. Yet until now, little attention has been paid to how these ideas are produced and disseminated, and how this process varies between countries.The National Origins of Policy Ideasprovides the first comparative analysis of how \"knowledge regimes\"-communities of policy research organizations like think tanks, political party foundations, ad hoc commissions, and state research offices, and the institutions that govern them-generate ideas and communicate them to policymakers. John Campbell and Ove Pedersen examine how knowledge regimes are organized, operate, and have changed over the last thirty years in the United States, France, Germany, and Denmark. They show how there are persistent national differences in how policy ideas are produced. Some countries do so in contentious, politically partisan ways, while others are cooperative and consensus oriented. They find that while knowledge regimes have adopted some common practices since the 1970s, tendencies toward convergence have been limited and outcomes have been heavily shaped by national contexts. Drawing on extensive interviews with top officials at leading policy research organizations, this book demonstrates why knowledge regimes are as important to capitalism as the state and the firm, and sheds new light on debates about the effects of globalization, the rise of neoliberalism, and the orientation of comparative political economy in political science and sociology.

In this book, one of Germany's most influential economists describes his country's economy, the largest in the European Union and the third largest in the world, and analyzes its weaknesses: poor GDP growth performance, high unemployment due to a malfunctioning labor market, and an unsustainable social security system. Horst Siebert spells out the reforms necessary to overcome these shortcomings. Taking a broader view than other recent books on the German economy, he considers Germany's fiscal policy stance, product market regulation, capital market, environmental policy, aging and immigration policies, and its system for human capital formation as well as Germany's role in the European Union, including the euro zone. Germany's system of economic governance emerges as a common theme as Siebert examines why this onetime economic powerhouse is today a faltering giant. He argues that what Germany needs, above all, is a market renaissance; that it must throw off the shackles of its social welfare economy and of its hallmark consensus approach, whereby group-based cooperative decision-making has undermined competition and markets. In doing so he examines both the country's social security system and its labor market, including trade unions. His focus throughout is on Germany's present concerns, foreseeable future problems, and long-term policy issues. The definitive word on the postwar German economy to the present day, The German Economy is essential reading for economists and finance professionals as well as students, researchers, and others interested in modern-day Germany and its place and prospects at the heart of Europe.

Jared Bernstein from President Biden's Council of Economic Advisors describes the outlook ahead for the U.S. economy.

The year 1996 marked the 50th anniversary of what has turned out to be an enormously successful institutional innovation: the Council of Economic Advisers. It was neither obvious nor inevitable that the CEA would enjoy the success it has had. To be sure, the CEA's influence has fluctuated and has had to be established anew with each administration. But the durability of the institution, despite repeated reexaminations, is a testimony to the contribution that it has made in both Democratic and Republican administrations.

After initially concentrating on macroeconomic policy, the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA) soon began to provide the president with advice on virtually all issues with economic content. On a wide range of issues there has been a commonality of advice given by the CEA to administrations of both parties, reflecting a broad consensus within the mainstream economics profession especially on microeconomics. While the differences within the profession and among various CEAs on issues of macroeconomic stabilization have narrowed, differences in assessing the supply-side effect of changes in taxes have grown in importance.

The Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), created by congressional initiative in the Employment Act of 1946, represented a genuine experiment. Not only is the CEA unique, but its survival is remarkable. Of the nearly 50 entities that have been located in the Executive Office of the President since it was created in 1939, the CEA is one of only 11 that remain. And today its prospects appear far brighter than when it first appeared in the Executive Office. There are at least 4 keys to its success: 1. It has maintained a modest size by Washington standards and has eschewed self aggrandizement. 2. It has maintained a professional, nonpartisan staff with a reputation for high-quality analysis. 3. It has not allowed its reach to exceed its grasp. 4. It has concentrated its energies not on long-term studies or detailed reports, but on the steady stream of day-to-day economic decisions requiring presidential attention.

The Employment Act of 1946 created the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA)--and served as a convenient marker of the government's acceptance of the burden of stabilizing the macroeconomy. The willingness of post-WWII governments to let automatic stabilizers function in recessions may well have moderated the post-WWII business cycle. The CEA has also served as an advocate of allocative efficiency in economic policy. Its relative success can be primarily ascribed to Chairman Arthur Burns, who hired a CEA staff composed of short-term appointees whose principal loyalty was to economic rationality.