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In a 1998 article, Bohman argued that the contemporary deliberative turn in democratic theory had reached its ‘coming of age’, as deliberative democrats began to show greater interest in the institutionalization of their proposal. Moreover, Bohman referred to this growing interest with an expression that was unprecedented at the time: ‘deliberative constitutionalism’. At present, deliberative constitutionalism has become one of the most original and relevant contemporary proposals. In this context, my article proceeds as follows. I begin by arguing that the contemporary deliberative turn in democratic theory also gave rise to a deliberative turn in constitutionalism—that is, a trend aimed at orienting constitutionalism and judicial review towards democratic deliberation. Next, I argue that, at that embryonic yet promising stage, deliberative constitutionalism had shortcomings that hindered the aim assumed since its origins. Finally, I argue that, over recent decades, these shortcomings have been finessed, which shows that deliberative constitutionalism has also reached its coming of age.

Este ensayo explora la relación entre los tribunales constitucionales y la democracia, con énfasis en la legitimidad de la intervención de estos en decisiones tomadas por mayorías democráticas. A través de un análisis del constitucionalismo y la democracia, se examina cómo los tribunales, al actuar como órganos contramayoritarios, equilibran la protección de los derechos fundamentales con el control del poder estatal. El análisis se desarrolla desde dos enfoques: uno sustantivo, centrado en los derechos, y otro procedimental, enfocado en los aspectos formales. Asimismo, se busca justificar la legitimidad de los tribunales constitucionales en el marco del constitucionalismo contemporáneo, para luego analizar la objeción contramayoritaria y su impacto en la relación entre los tribunales y las mayorías democráticas.

In The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism Stephen Gardbaum defends a model of constitutionalism in which courts can review legislation for compliance with rights, but the legislature is given 'the legislative last word'. Gardbaum argues that this new model offers a solution to the counter-majoritarian difficulty, and provides a stable, distinct and appealing 'third way' between the model of judicial supremacy on the one hand and legislative supremacy on the other. This review argues that the hope of solving the counter-majoritarian difficulty by giving the legislature 'the legislative last word' has not been realised in practice, thus casting doubt on the stability and distinctiveness of the new model. It argues, further, that, by looking at the new model through the lens of the last word, Gardbaum obscures and overlooks key features of rights-based review in 'new model' systems—features which they share with the models of judicial and legislative supremacy he takes as his foils.

This article argues that understanding the role of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or the Court) to be that of a guardian of discourse would respect legitimate disagreement among pluralist democracies, while enabling the Court to safeguard human rights in a meaningful and effective way. From the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR or the Convention) and the Court's jurisprudence, three basic standards of review can be distilled: First, wherever the Convention's requirements are sufficiently concrete, the Court holds contracting states to well-established standards. Second, when applying broad, abstract and relative Convention rights, the Court safeguards the practical rationality of a democratic decision-making discourse under the rule of law – a substantive review standard that is influenced by procedural factors. Third, the Court also needs to check the facts underlying the case, in order to render its control effective. By setting ‘soft’ precedent in the form of factors that guide future decision-making without entirely prejudging it, and by taking into account second-order reasons concerning its legitimacy to intervene, the Court is acting as a second player in states’ decision-making discourse. Its task is not to replace the institutions originally responsible for taking the decision, but to ensure that they conform to their own role.

El constitucionalismo fuerte, hoy prevaleciente a nivel global, se encuentra en una encrucijada. Por un lado, a partir de las crecientes y detalladas objeciones hacia la jurisdicción constitucional que comienzan a dirigirse desde la mitad del siglo xx. Por otro lado, a partir de los estándares que ofrece el giro deliberativo de la democracia, el cual tiene lugar a final del siglo xx, para evaluar y mejorar los procesos de toma de decisiones. En este marco, el constitucionalismo deliberativo es una alternativa que morigera las objeciones a la jurisdicción constitucional desde el compromiso con los estándares de la democracia deliberativa. El presente artículo, entonces, aborda cómo ambos cuestionamientos ponen en jaque al constitucionalismo fuerte, y cómo el sentido de ambos cuestionamientos es recobrado por el constitucionalismo deliberativo.

In Brennan and Democracy, a leading thinker in U.S. constitutional law offers some powerful reflections on the idea of \"constitutional democracy,\" a concept in which many have seen the makings of paradox. Here Frank Michelman explores the apparently conflicting commitments of a democratic governmental system where key aspects of such important social issues as affirmative action, campaign finance reform, and abortion rights are settled not by a legislative vote but by the decisions of unelected judges. Can we--or should we--embrace the values of democracy together with constitutionalism, judicial supervision, and the rule of law? To answer this question, Michelman calls into service the judicial career of Supreme Court Justice William Brennan, the country's model \"activist\" judge for the past forty years. Michelman draws on Brennan's record and writings to suggest how the Justice himself might have understood the judiciary's role in the simultaneous promotion of both democratic and constitutional government.

THE CHARGE IS WELL KNOWN: from a democratic point of view, it is contended, it is not legitimate for courts to invalidate statutes that a popularly elected assembly has enacted. What can be said in response to this democratic objection, which is usually referred to as the “countermajoritarian difficulty”?¹ Even if we are ultimately in favor of judicial review, we should acknowledge that there is an important connection between the democratic principle and the enactment of a statute by the majority of a popularly elected parliament. Democracy is conceptually tied to the existence of a procedure that gives citizens an