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General issues and problems of assessing the number of losses among associates of domestic state security agencies are discussed. Errors contained in published materials have been identified, the causes of discrepancies in calculating the number of losses in state security agencies have been found and explained, proposals have been formulated to specify the losses and establish the fate of state security associates who were captured or missing, and potential directions to search for relevant information have been established.

This article thoroughly analyses international experiences in the legal support of counterintelligence activities, focusing on the approaches of the UKUSA agreement member countries, European Union states and those in Asia. The main aspects of the legal regulation of special services are discussed, including their organisational structure, mechanisms of democratic control, human rights protection and integration into the international legal system. This article also addresses how counterintelligence agencies respond to modern challenges such as cyber threats and transnational crime. Specific recommendations are offered for adapting leading global practices to Ukrainian realities to enhance the effectiveness of counterintelligence activities, ensure national security and comply with international standards.Keywords: counterintelligence activities, special services, national security, legal support, international experience.

A normative defense of espionage and counterintelligence activities in the service of foreign policy goals must show at least two things. First, it must show which foreign policy goals, if any, provide a justification for such activities. Second, it must provide an account of the means that intelligence agencies are morally permitted, indeed morally obliged, to use during those activities. I first discuss Ross Bellaby's probing critique of my defense of economic espionage. I then turn to the other four essays, which consider the ethics of the means by which espionage and counterintelligence activities are conducted.

In the interwar period of the 20th century, the Cracow Voivodship was the target of infiltration by secret services of all countries neighboring the Republic of Poland. Therefore, the cooperation of all Polish services dealing with combating the espionage, including military counterintelligence with the state police, was important. This cooperation had various forms, scales and effects. Both the police and counterintelligence jointly conducted surveillance, infiltration and detention operations of those suspected of espionage. The cooperation was not easy and there were often disputes over competence. The following years of the state’s existence slowly improved the quality of work of both services and their cooperation.

Understanding Human Intelligence (HUMINT) within the context of social networks requires a clear distinction between Complicated and Complex systems. Complicated systems are predictable,decomposable, and governed by linear relationships. Complex systems, by contrast, are adaptive, nonlinear, and characterized by emergent behaviors that cannot be fully anticipated.This paper argues that clandestine and illicit networks—such as terrorist cells, insurgent groups, and criminal syndicates—function as Complex adaptive systems rather than merely complicated organizations. These systems challenge conventional intelligence methodologies because they can absorb disruption, selforganize, and continuously adapt to changing circumstances. Applying complexity thinking can enable HUMINT professionals to detect potential shifts, exploit vulnerabilities, and navigate uncertainty more effectively. The paper ultimately contends that embracing complexity is essential to enhancing HUMINT’s effectiveness within dynamic and unpredictable social network environments.

In an increasingly networked global context, commercial counterintelligence units and competitive intelligence experts must deal with sophisticated social engineering threats that exploit human psychology rather than technological shortcomings. This article highlights the importance of counterintelligence training and robust security measures while analyzing the psychological manipulation tactics employed by adversaries to lower these risks. The article examines social engineering strategies such as scarcity, authority, reciprocity, fear, and trust qualitatively to emphasize the significance of behavioral defenses and organizational awareness. The methodology, which evaluates institutional responses and psychological exploitation strategies, incorporates a review of the literature and expert comments. The paper’s conclusion recommends a multi-layered approach that incorporates organizational cultural reforms, technical defenses, and psychological awareness to safeguard sensitive data from insider threats and social engineering

Intelligence scholars are drawing on behavioural decision theory to improve decision-making under risk and uncertainty in intelligence and counterintelligence. Such an undertaking is essentially lacking without the Austrian school’s concepts of knowledge, discovery, (entrepreneurial) judgement, ignorance, rational calculation and, more generally, its analysis of human action in the face of true uncertainty. Decision theory, both orthodox and behavioural, depicts decision rather narrowly as a prioritisation task undertaken within a delineated problem space where the probabilities “sum to one”. From such a perspective, certain perennial challenges in intelligence and counterintelligence appear resolvable when in fact they are not, at least not when approached from the usual direction. We explain how Austrian concepts can complement efforts to improve intelligence decision-making. We conclude that the future strategic value of intelligence analysis is located beyond information acquisition, however fast and however vast. Intelligence agencies have no price signals to help them determine how much intelligence to produce. And governments have no price signals to moderate their appetites for the intelligence product. Ultimately, those agencies that recognise the implications of intelligence agencies as non-price institutions and adapt their decision-making processes may find that they have the upper hand over their rivals.

From Introduction: \"The initial idea of using narcoanalysis for investigation purposes arose soon after surgeons began using narcosis (sedation) to induce sleep during surgery. There are four phases that a patient goes through in general anaesthesia (e.g. with ether or chloroform): the state of shock or analgesia (stadium analgesiae), the state of delirium (stadium excitationis), the state of surgical anaesthesia (stadium anaestesiae chirurgicae), and the stage of respiratory arrest (stadium asphycticum) (Danysz, Gryglewski, 1982).\"(...)