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Aim: The use of covert means is any information gathering intelligence operation (secret police activity) in which the authorised authorities of the State seek to obtain new knowledge in the course of administrative and criminal proceedings without the knowledge of the holder of the information, by limiting the right of self-determination. In dictatorships, this form of exercise of state power is also dominated by arbitrariness. Constitutional states place the use of secret means on a public law basis. This study aims to demonstrate that it is possible to regulate acts of public authority that are at the heart of secrecy by means of legal instruments whose core is publicity. Methodology: The objective outlined above can only be achieved if the dogmatic and moral characteristics of the legislation are harmonised with the specific characteristics of the secret police. The task is not easy. Legislation is always about the future and is always based on abstract prognosis; covert intelligence aims to discover the past, the present and the future, and the knowledge to be acquired is always unique and concrete. Finidings: The abstract nature of the regulation and the uniqueness of the intelligence operation resolve the contradiction between publicity and secrecy. What is public is the rule, what is secret is the application of the rule to a specific situation. However, legislation can become fully formalised when it no longer imposes limits on the operation of state power, but merely authorises it, opening the way to free discretion. In such a case, the guise of legality conceals an untrammelled power. Value: Law that serves humanity is an effective means of preserving social order. Secret data-collection requires a limitation of rights, yet it is indispensable to combat violations (principle of necessity), provided that it does not cause more serious harm than the threat against which it is used (principle of proportionality). Aim: The use of covert means is any information gathering intelligence operation (secret police activity) in which the authorised authorities of the State seek to obtain new knowledge in the course of administrative and criminal proceedings without the knowledge of the holder of the information, by limiting the right of self-determination. In dictatorships, this form of exercise of state power is also dominated by arbitrariness. Constitutional states place the use of secret means on a public law basis. This study aims to demonstrate that it is possible to regulate acts of public authority that are at the heart of secrecy by means of legal instruments whose core is publicity. Methodology: The objective outlined above can only be achieved if the dogmatic and moral characteristics of the legislation are harmonised with the specific characteristics of the secret police. The task is not easy. Legislation is always about the future and is always based on abstract prognosis; covert intelligence aims to discover the past, the present and the future, and the knowledge to be acquired is always unique and concrete. Finidings: The abstract nature of the regulation and the uniqueness of the intelligence operation resolve the contradiction between publicity and secrecy. What is public is the rule, what is secret is the application of the rule to a specific situation. However, legislation can become fully formalised when it no longer imposes limits on the operation of state power, but merely authorises it, opening the way to free discretion. In such a case, the guise of legality conceals an untrammelled power. Value: Law that serves humanity is an effective means of preserving social order. Secret data-collection requires a limitation of rights, yet it is indispensable to combat violations (principle of necessity), provided that it does not cause more serious harm than the threat against which it is used (principle of proportionality).

For hundreds of years, states have sought to intervene in the affairs of others in a surreptitious manner. Since the professionalization of intelligence services in the aftermath of the Second World War, this behaviour has become known as covert action, which—for generations of scholars—has been defined as plausibly deniable intervention in the affairs of others; the sponsor’s hand is neither apparent nor acknowledged. We challenge this orthodoxy. By turning the spotlight away from covert action and onto plausible deniability itself, we argue that even in its supposed heyday, the concept was deeply problematic. Changes in technology and the media, combined with the rise of special forces and private military companies, give it even less credibility today. We live in an era of implausible deniability and ambiguous warfare. Paradoxically, this does not spell the end of covert action. Instead, leaders are embracing implausible deniability and the ambiguity it creates. We advance a new conception of covert action, historically grounded but fit for the twenty-first century: unacknowledged interference in the affairs of others.

Many analysts argue colorblindness as the reigning ideological buttress of a historically distinct form of structural white supremacy, color-blind racism. In contrast to slavery and legal segregation, color-blind racism is theorized as covert and highly institutionalized. As such, analyses of contemporary racial reproduction often emphasize the structure of colorblindness, particularly the habitual routines and discursive patterns of everyday white actors. Though invaluable, this work may conceal whites’ innovation in reproducing, revising, and at times resisting white supremacy and corresponding logics. As opposed to focusing on the structural elements of colorblindness, I elevate colorblindness as a culturally recursive accomplishment grounded in an epistemology of ignorance—that is a process of knowing designed to produce not knowing surrounding white privilege and structural white supremacy. Qualitatively analyzing 105 family wealth analyses produced by white college undergraduates researching racial inequality and the wealth gap, I identify four epistemic maneuvers by which students creatively repaired a breach in normative colorblindness. Demonstrating innovative means by which ordinary whites bypass and mystify racial learning highlights their vested commitment to maintaining and creatively defending the ideologies that buttress racial domination and white supremacy. As such, this research additionally advises updating strategies for challenging whites’ colorblindness in efforts to advance racial justice.

States seldom resort to war to overthrow their adversaries. They are more likely to attempt to covertly change the opposing regime, by assassinating a foreign leader, sponsoring a coup d'état, meddling in a democratic election, or secretly aiding foreign dissident groups. InCovert Regime Change, Lindsey A. O'Rourke shows us how states really act when trying to overthrow another state. She argues that conventional focus on overt cases misses the basic causes of regime change. O'Rourke provides substantive evidence of types of security interests that drive states to intervene. Offensive operations aim to overthrow a current military rival or break up a rival alliance. Preventive operations seek to stop a state from taking certain actions, such as joining a rival alliance, that may make them a future security threat. Hegemonic operations try to maintain a hierarchical relationship between the intervening state and the target government. Despite the prevalence of covert attempts at regime change, most operations fail to remain covert and spark blowback in unanticipated ways. Covert Regime Changeassembles an original dataset of all American regime change operations during the Cold War. This fund of information shows the United States was ten times more likely to try covert rather than overt regime change during the Cold War. Her dataset allows O'Rourke to address three foundational questions: What motivates states to attempt foreign regime change? Why do states prefer to conduct these operations covertly rather than overtly? How successful are such missions in achieving their foreign policy goals?

What are the effects of partisan electoral interventions on the subsequent character of the regime in the targeted country? Partisan electoral interventions have been frequently used by the great powers ever since the rise of meaningful competitive elections around the world. Such interventions have been found to have significant effects on the results of the intervened elections determining in many cases the identity of the winner. Nevertheless, there has been little research on the effects of partisan electoral interventions on the target’s subsequent level of democracy. This study investigates this question, testing three hypotheses derived from relevant political science literatures. I find suggestive evidence that covert electoral interventions have a significant negative effect on the target’s democracy increasing its susceptibility to a democratic breakdown. I also find preliminary evidence that the identity of the intervener has a mediating effect on the negative effects of covert interventions.

This article focuses on applying the provisions of the Criminal Intelligence Law to detect criminal offences. Based on the recent case law of the Supreme Court of Lithuania, the author provides insights into the problematic aspects of the application of certain provisions of the Criminal Intelligence Law. It examines the extent to which the tools of criminal intelligence can legitimately invade a person’s private life. The conditions for provocation by criminal intelligence, the criteria for (non-)recognition of evidence collected by private individuals, the problems of establishing a factual basis for initiating a criminal intelligence investigation, and the nuances of the duration of non-public actions are discussed. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not regulate the conditions for the use in criminal proceedings of data obtained in the course of a criminal intelligence investigation; therefore, it is decided on a case-by-case basis, taking into account, inter alia, the case law of the Supreme Court of Lithuania, and whether the information obtained in the course of a criminal intelligence investigation meets the requirements for evidence set out in the Code.

In 2014, Russia denied that its military was assisting separatists in eastern Ukraine, despite overwhelming evidence. Why do countries bother to deny hostile actions like this even when they are obvious? Scholars have argued that making hostile actions covert can reduce pressure on the target state to escalate. Yet it is not clear whether this claim applies when evidence of responsibility for the action is publicly available. We use three survey experiments to test whether denying responsibility for an action in the presence of contradictory evidence truly dampens demand for escalation among the public in the target state. We also test three causal mechanisms that might explain this: a rationalist reputation mechanism, a psychological mechanism, and an uncertainty mechanism. We do find a de-escalatory effect of noncredible denials. The effect is mediated through all three proposed causal mechanisms, but uncertainty and reputational concern have the most consistent effect.

Ofir discusses the attack of Israel on Lebanon using exploding electronics which is part of a long history and strategy of targeting civilians. The ongoing attack, which can only be described as terrorist in nature, is unprecedented in its scope and method, but the nature of its indiscriminate attack is far from unique for Israel. In fact, Israel's doctrine of inflicting massive harm to civilians is named after the area of Beirut, Dahiya, where this very attack was centered. The most recent development marks a shocking advancement in Israel's wholesale disregard for human life but it is not new, even if one would never learn that from reading the Western press. The name of the Dahiya Doctrine stems from the Dahiya quarter of Beirut that Israel targeted and leveled during the 2006 war, a quarter where many families affiliated with Hezbollah lived. (Reprint 2024)

Covert action has long been a controversial tool of international relations. However, there is remarkably little public understanding about whether it works and, more fundamentally, about what constitutes success in this shadowy arena of state activity. This article distills competing criteria of success and examines how covert actions become perceived as successes. We develop a conceptual model of covert action success as a social construct and illustrate it through the case of ‘the golden age of CIA operations’. The socially constructed nature of success has important implications not just for evaluating covert actions but also for using, and defending against, them.

Research on violent mobilization broadly emphasizes who joins rebellions and why, but neglects to explain the timing or nature of participation. Support and logistical apparatuses play critical roles in sustaining armed conflict, but scholars have not explained role differentiation within militant organizations or accounted for the structures, processes, and practices that produce discrete categories of fighters, soldiers, and staff. Extant theories consequently conflate mobilization and participation in rebel organizations with frontline combat. This article argues that, to understand wartime mobilization and organizational resilience, scholars must situate militants in their organizational and social context. By tracing the emergence and evolution of female-dominated clandestine supply, financial, and information networks in 1980s Lebanon, it demonstrates that mobilization pathways and organizational subdivisions emerge from the systematic overlap between formal militant hierarchies and quotidian social networks. In doing so, this article elucidates the nuanced relationship between social structure, militant organizations, and sustained rebellion.