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"Credit control."
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Credit risk
Modelling credit risk accurately is central to the practice of mathematical finance. This volume of the Mastering Mathematical Finance series offers a comprehensive and accessible introduction to the subject tailored specially for master's students. The book focuses on the two mainstream modelling approaches to credit risk, namely structural models and reduced form models, and on pricing selected credit risk derivatives. Balancing rigorous theory with real-world examples from the post-credit crisis financial markets, it takes readers through a natural development of mathematical ideas and financial intuition. Students, practitioners and researchers alike will benefit from the compact presentation and detailed worked examples, exercises and solutions.
Book
Capital Ideas
The right of governments to employ capital controls has always been the official orthodoxy of the International Monetary Fund, and the organization's formal rules providing this right have not changed significantly since the IMF was founded in 1945. But informally, among the staff inside the IMF, these controls became heresy in the 1980s and 1990s, prompting critics to accuse the IMF of indiscriminately encouraging the liberalization of controls and precipitating a wave of financial crises in emerging markets in the late 1990s. In Capital Ideas, Jeffrey Chwieroth explores the inner workings of the IMF to understand how its staff's thinking about capital controls changed so radically. In doing so, he also provides an important case study of how international organizations work and evolve. Drawing on original survey and archival research, extensive interviews, and scholarship from economics, politics, and sociology, Chwieroth traces the evolution of the IMF's approach to capital controls from the 1940s through spring 2009 and the first stages of the subprime credit crisis. He shows that IMF staff vigorously debated the legitimacy of capital controls and that these internal debates eventually changed the organization's behavior--despite the lack of major rule changes. He also shows that the IMF exercised a significant amount of autonomy despite the influence of member states. Normative and behavioral changes in international organizations, Chwieroth concludes, are driven not just by new rules but also by the evolving makeup, beliefs, debates, and strategic agency of their staffs.
eBook
Just debt : theology, ethics, and neoliberalism
\"... We [have] come to have a delimited and skewed view on debt and its economy ... In this book, I argue, a more holistic social ethics of debt is established by reintegrating these two essential elements of debt: logic and story. From the perspective of a more holistic ethics of debt, neoliberal concept of debt is problematic because by neglecting the story aspect of debt, it has enervated the moral ethos of debt rendering it as a matter of mere contract and mechanical calculation\"--Introduction.
Book
The Impact of Working Capital Management and Credit Management Policies on the Financial Performance of Kosovo Banks
This study examines banking stability in Southeast Europe by analyzing both financial and institutional factors by using the Z-score as a key metric. On the basis of covering the period of 2012–2023, the research evaluates the impact of capital adequacy, lending rates, non-performing loans, rule of law, regulatory quality, control of corruption, judicial efficiency, and government integrity. The analysis combines static Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and dynamic Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) methods on panel data. The key findings reveal that capital adequacy, non-performing loans, and regulatory quality positively influence banking stability, thereby suggesting the benefits of strong financial regulation. Conversely, control of corruption and weak government integrity negatively affect stability, highlighting institutional weaknesses. A novel aspect of the study lies in comparing the static and dynamic models: while OLS results show the rule of law as significant and positive and judicial effectiveness as negative, the GMM model finds these institutional variables largely insignificant. This divergence emphasizes the importance of using multidimensional empirical approaches to assess the complex interplay of governance and financial performance in the banking sector. The study ultimately demands strengthened legal and regulatory institutions to enhance banking stability in the region.
Journal Article
Uncle Sam in pinstripes : evaluating U.S. federal credit programs
\"Explains the pervasiveness and complexity of the many federal lending programs, their effect on the overall economy, the costs, as well as the benefits and risks they pose, and actions that should be taken to ensure such programs are more efficient and effective\"--Provided by publisher.
Book
What You Sell Is What You Lend? Explaining Trade Credit Contracts
We relate trade credit to product characteristics and aspects of bank—firm relationships and document three main empirical regularities. First, the use of trade credit is associated with the nature of the transacted good. In particular, suppliers of differentiated products and services have larger accounts receivable than suppliers of standardized goods and firms buying more services receive cheaper trade credit for longer periods. Second, firms receiving trade credit secure financing from relatively uninformed banks. Third, a majority of the firms in our sample appear to receive trade credit at low cost. Additionally, firms that are more creditworthy and have some buyer market power receive larger early payment discounts.
Journal Article
Controlling credit : central banking and the planned economy in postwar France, 1948-1973
\"It is common wisdom that central banks in the postwar (1945-1970s) period were passive bureaucracies constrained by fixed-exchange rates and inflationist fiscal policies. This view is mostly retrospective and informed by US and UK experiences. This book tells a different story. Eric Monnet shows that the Banque de France was at the heart of the postwar financial system and economic planning, and contributed to economic growth by both stabilizing inflation and fostering direct lending to priority economic activities. Credit was institutionalized as a social and economic objective. Monetary policy and credit controls were conflated. He then broadens his analysis to other European countries and sheds light on the evolution of central banks and credit policy before the Monetary Union. This new understanding has important ramifications for today, since many emerging markets have central bank policies that are similar to Western Europe's in the decades of high growth.\" -- Provided by publisher.
Book
Does Macro-Prudential Regulation Leak? Evidence from a UK Policy Experiment
The regulation of bank capital as a means of smoothing the credit cycle is a central element of forthcoming macro-prudential regimes internationally. For such regulation to be effective in controlling the aggregate supply of credit it must be the case that: (i) changes in capital requirements affect loan supply by regulated banks, and (ii) unregulated substitute sources of credit are unable to offset changes in credit supply by affected banks. This paper examines micro evidence—lacking to date—on both questions, using a unique data set. In the UK, regulators have imposed time-varying, bank-specific minimum capital requirements since Basel I. It is found that regulated banks (UK-owned banks and resident foreign subsidiaries) reduce lending in response to tighter capital requirements. But unregulated banks (resident foreign branches) increase lending in response to tighter capital requirements on a relevant reference group of regulated banks. This \"leakage\" is substantial, amounting to about one-third of the initial impulse from the regulatory change.
Journal Article
Creditor Control Rights, Corporate Governance, and Firm Value
We provide evidence that creditors play an active role in the governance of corporations well outside of payment default states. By examining the Securities and Exchange Commission's filings of all U. S. nonfinancial firms from 1996 through 2008, we document that, in any given year, between 10% and 20% of firms report being in violation of a financial covenant in a credit agreement. We show that violations are followed immediately by a decline in acquisitions and capital expenditures, a sharp reduction in leverage and shareholder payouts, and an increase in CEO turnover. The changes in the investment and financing behavior of violating firms coincide with amended credit agreements that contain stronger restrictions on firm decision-making; changes in the management of violating firms suggest that creditors also exert informal influence on corporate governance. Finally, we show that firm operating and stock price performance improve post-violation. We conclude that actions taken by creditors increase the value of the average violating firm.
Journal Article