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Based on the trend of ageing in rural populations, this study utilized the 2019 China Household Finance Survey data to theoretically and empirically analyze the rationing behavior of rural formal financial institutions in credit supply and demand. The study found that: (1) ageing of the rural population increases the risk of quantity rationing faced by farmers; (2) The results of the moderating effect show that pension insurance mitigates the impact of population ageing on farmers’ experience of quantity rationing; (3) Population ageing reduces the likelihood of farmers voluntarily giving up on applying for loans from formal financial institutions, a phenomenon mainly due to ageing weakening the effects of Transaction-cost rationing and risk rationing.The research outcomes provide theoretical guidance and decision-making support for enhancing the level of financial services in rural areas and meeting the capital needs of farmers in production and daily life.

Credit rationing problem in agriculture can seriously restrict the process of agricultural modernization. The paper starts from the definition and types of credit rationing, systematizes the classic literature and the latest research progress on credit rationing, summarizes and expands the types of credit rationing, introduces the concept of discriminatory rationing, and reclassifies the concept of volume rationing. In addition, the paper summarizes the research results on credit rationing in the agricultural sector from two perspectives: ″internal″ and ″external″, and believes that future research should be further studied from the perspectives of theoretical depth and differentiation of national conditions.

We conduct a survey among 1922 Swiss SMEs to analyze their access to bank loans. Credit-constrained SMEs are six times more likely to be discouraged than rejected. The most dominant reasons for being discouraged are too high collateral requirements, cumbersome application procedure, and the expectation of being turned down. Through a unique feature in the Swiss banking market, we also find new evidence for the importance of a strong firm–bank relationship. We challenge the assumption that discouraged borrowers are very similar to rejected borrowers. Our results indicate that the group of discouraged borrowers is more similar to the denied borrowers than to the group of approved borrowers, but only with respect to firm characteristics. For variables describing business development and firm–bank relationship, discouraged SMEs have less in common with credit-constrained firms than with their unconstrained counterparts. Even with a conservative prediction, about 60% of the discouraged firms would have obtained a bank loan if they had applied for one. The self-rationing mechanism observed is thus rather inefficient, and banks and policy makers should think about how to foster SMEs’ courage to apply for the bank loans they need.Plain English SummaryFor each SME that applied for credit and was rejected, six other firms had a financing need but did not apply. Some 60% of these discouraged firms would have obtained a loan if they had applied for one, even by a conservative prediction. A survey among 1922 Swiss SMEs on their access to bank loans shows that they are more often credit constrained than might be expected. The dominant reasons for being discouraged are too high collateral requirements, cumbersome application procedures, and the expectation of being turned down. We also find new evidence for the beneficial effect of a good firm–bank relationship. Banks and policy makers should consider how to foster SMEs’ courage to apply for the bank loans they need in order to sustain or increase both their investments and their workforce.

We estimate a structural model of bank portfolio lending and find that the typical U.S. community bank reduced its business lending during the global financial crisis. The decline in business credit was driven by increased risk overhang effects (consistent with a reduction in the liquidity of assets held on bank balance sheets) and by reduced loan supply elasticities suggestive of credit rationing (consistent with an increase in lender risk aversion). Nevertheless, we identify a group of strategically focused relationship banks that made and maintained higher levels of business loans during the crisis.

This paper analyses the non-performing assets (NPA) crisis in the Indian banking system from the perspective of soft budget constraints. Using a panel dataset of 105 publicly listed firms, it explores the relationship between NPAs and bank lending behaviour, particularly examining credit rationing regarding firm size and risk level. The findings indicate that Indian banks favour large firms over smaller ones, while credit rationing is not adequately aligned with borrower riskiness. However, the Asset Quality Review (AQR) by the Reserve Bank of India and the introduction of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) seem to have enforced risk-based lending to some extent. These results shed light on the systemic issues that drive NPAs, linking them to governance weaknesses and the prevalence of soft budget constraints.

PurposeThe design of effective policies that increase access to agricultural credit should consider understanding credit constraint farmers’ groups and their response to changes in the credit conditions. To contribute to this understanding, this study surveyed farmers from Chile and classified them into five credit constraint categories discussed in credit literature. In addition, these farmers indicated how they would react to a series of hypothetical conditions related to changing interest rates, loan maturity and grace periods. Their responses were employed to measure credit demand scores (i.e. relative elasticities). Regression tests evaluated how different types of farmers reacted to changing credit conditions.Design/methodology/approachFarmers from Chile were surveyed using a mix of random and convenience sampling. Surveyed farmers were classified into five credit constraint categories proposed by previous research. Farmers rated their demand for credit on a five-point Likert-type scale for hypothetical changes in interest rates, loan maturities and grace periods. Their responses were employed to measure credit demand scores or relative credit elasticities. The study evaluated credit elasticity as a function of farmers’ credit constraint and some control variables using several regressions, including OLS, ordered probit and hierarchical regression.FindingsThe study identified 44% unconstrained nonborrowing farmers, 23% unconstrained borrowers, 14% quantity-constrained, 16% risk-constrained and 3% transaction cost-constrained farmers. Unconstrained borrowers and quantity-constrained farmers responded most to changing interest rates and loan maturity conditions. In addition, unconstrained nonborrowers and risk-constrained farmers were statistically less sensitive to changes in credit conditions than unconstrained borrowers. This finding is significant because, as discussed, unconstrained nonborrowers represent 44% of our sample. Furthermore, risk-constrained farmers were the least sensitive to changes in interest rates and loan maturity across all other credit categories.Practical implicationsThis study gives insights that can guide agribusiness policies to enhance access to credit in developing countries such as Chile. Agricultural credit capital institutions can better target their clientele by identifying farmers’ possible reactions before implementing policy changes to increase access to credit. This study’s credit constraint categorization and the results discussed can guide that identification. For instance, policies directed toward unconstrained borrowing farmers may find positive responses. However, implementing policies targeting the other three groups (unconstrained nonborrowing, risk-constrained and transaction cost-constrained farmers) is more challenging because these farmers are less responsive to changing credit conditions.Originality/valueThis article correlates farmers’ propensity to borrow and credit constraints across five categories of farmers. Prior research using this categorization framework has not identified farmers into the five groups. Furthermore, in addition to interest rate and loan maturity credit demand relative elasticity, this study adds the grace period elasticity, which has not been included in previous studies on agricultural credit.

This paper investigates firms’ access to bank credit in eleven euro area countries over the periods 2014–2019. Exploiting firm-level longitudinal data, we analyse loan demand and credit rationing probabilities, accounting for sample selection, unobserved heterogeneity and state dependence. Empirical results show that small and informationally opaque businesses, with deteriorated public support and credit history, face greater difficulties in obtaining bank loans. Furthermore, we provide evidence of a significant degree of state dependence in access to credit. In particular, firms that have already experienced credit restrictions are more likely to face further constraints, while enterprises that applied for bank financing in the past seem to have easier access to credit. Focusing on the subset of firms actually needing additional bank financing, we also find that past credit restrictions significantly reduce their current demand, providing evidence of a significant discouragement effect. Access to bank credit is a key driver of firms’ survival and growth, especially in bank-based financial systems. Building on detailed longitudinal survey data, this study investigates the determinants of access to bank financing by firms in the euro area, both in a static and dynamic setting. Most importantly, we account for the intertemporal nature of firms’ loan demand behaviour and banks’ credit granting choices and show that they are both characterized by significant persistence over time. We also find that repeated lending interactions enhance access to credit and that firms needing additional financing tend to be discouraged from applying after having experienced an actual credit restriction. Our findings shed light on the existence of substantial and persistent financial frictions in banking markets, which play a key role in amplifying adverse economic shocks, and call for policy and regulatory interventions to improve firms’ access to credit and limit systemic vulnerabilities.

Using a unique sample of small and medium-sized Italian firms, we investigate the effect of financial constraints on firms' participation in domestic and international supply chains. We find that firms more exposed to bank credit rationing and with weaker relationships with banks are more likely to participate in supply chains to overcome liquidity shortages. This benefit of supply chains is especially strong when firms establish long-term trading relationships and when they forge ties with large and international trading partners. To control for possible endogeneity of firms' access to credit, we construct instruments capturing exogenous shocks to the structure of the Italian local banking markets.

This paper develops a principal-agent model with adverse selection to analyse firms’ decisions between an existing carbon-intensive technology and a new low-carbon technology requiring an externally funded initial investment. We find that a Pigouvian emission tax alone may result in credit rationing and under-investment in low-carbon technologies. Combining the Pigouvian tax with interest subsidies or loan guarantees resolves credit rationing and yields a first-best outcome. An emission tax set above the Pigouvian level can also resolve credit rationing and, in some cases, yields a first-best outcome. If a carbon price is (politically) not feasible, intervention on the credit market alone can promote low-carbon development. However, such a policy yields a second-best outcome. The issue of credit rationing is temporary if the risks of low-carbon technologies decline. However, there are social costs of delay if credit rationing is not addressed.

This paper shows that collateralized short-term debt, although privately optimal for reducing borrowers’ isk-taking incentives, can induce fragility (multiple equilibria). Despite sequential-service property being absent in collateralized debt, such as repurchase agreements, a systemic run can arise, featuring large increases in default risks, fire-sale discounts of collateral, cost of credit, and amount of credit rationing. Asset price guarantees, leverage caps, and central clearing promote stability and welfare. Using global games techniques, I show that a systemic run is more likely in bad times, and a large enough asset price guarantee reduces run risks.