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Culpability and dangerousness are the two central issues raised by any sensible societal attempt to deal with antisocial behavior. For the past century, mental health professionals have been heavily involved in helping the law address these issues. But critics deride clinical testimony about culpability as disguised storytelling and tar expert predictions by comparing them unfavorably to coin flipping. They have been aided in these efforts by a series of decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court that appear to impose a relatively high threshold for expert testimony, one that requires that the testimony’s underlying assumptions be verified as reliable through scientific or other testing. Although many courts have yet to consider the implications of those decisions for behavioral science testimony, an increasing number of lower court decisions suggest that a more restrictive evidentiary regime is in the offing. This book is an effort to sort out whether that development would be a good thing. How we should go about proving culpability and dangerousness depends on a number of variables, including the governing substantive law, our ability to answer the questions that this law generates, the extent to which judges and juries can arrive at sensible conclusions without the help of experts, and whether the testimony proffered is from the government or from the person whose liberty is at stake. The book concludes that culpability and dangerousness are socially constructed concepts that probably cannot, and in any event should not, be determined solely through the scientific method.

Winner of the 2013 John Hope Franklin Book Prize presented by the American Studies AssociationSocial Death tackles one of the core paradoxes of social justice struggles and scholarship - that the battle to end oppression shares the moral grammar that structures exploitation and sanctions state violence. Lisa Marie Cacho forcefully argues that the demands for personhood for those who, in the eyes of society, have little value, depend on capitalist and heteropatriarchal measures of worth.With poignant case studies, Cacho illustrates that our very understanding of personhood is premised upon the unchallenged devaluation of criminalized populations of color. Hence, the reliance of rights-based politics on notions of who is and is not a deserving member of society inadvertently replicates the logic that creates and normalizes states of social and literal death. Her understanding of inalienable rights and personhood provides us the much-needed comparative analytical and ethical tools to understand the racialized and nationalized tensions between racial groups. Driven by a radical, relentless critique, Social Death challenges us to imagine a heretofore unthinkable politics and ethics that do not rest on neoliberal arguments about worth, but rather emerge from the insurgent experiences of those negated persons who do not live by the norms that determine the productive, patriotic, law abiding, and family-oriented subject.

Like police officers patrolling the streets for crime, the front lines for most large business regulators—Environmental Protection Agency engineers, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau examiners, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission inspectors, among others—decide when and how to enforce the law. These regulatory monitors guard against toxic air, financial ruin, and deadly explosions. Yet whereas scholars devote considerable attention to police officers in criminal law enforcement, they have paid limited attention to the structural role of regulatory monitors in civil law enforcement. This Article is the first to chronicle the statutory rise of regulatory monitors and to situate them empirically at the core of modern administrative power. Since the Civil War, often in response to crises, the largest federal regulators have steadily accrued authority to collect documents remotely and enter private spaces without any suspicion of wrongdoing. Those exercising this monitoring authority within agencies administer the law at least as much as the groups that are the focus of legal scholarship: enforcement lawyers, administrative law judges, and rule writers. Regulatory monitors wield sanctions, influence rulemaking, and create quasi-common law. Moreover, they offer a better fit than lawyers for the modern era of “collaborative governance” and corporate compliance departments because their principal function—information collection—is less adversarial. Yet unlike litigation and rulemaking, monitoring-based decisions are largely unobservable by the public, often unreviewable by courts, and explicitly excluded by the Administrative Procedure Act. The regulatory-monitor function can thus be more easily ramped up or deconstructed by the President, interest groups, and agency directors. A better understanding of regulatory monitors—and their relationship with regulatory lawyers—is vital to designing democratic accountability not only during times of political transition but as long as they remain a central pillar of the administrative state.

In the past, domestic prosecutions of foreign corporations were not particularly noteworthy. Scholars had little reason to examine issues raised by prosecutions of foreign firms. Courts rarely had the occasion to analyze jurisdiction in such cases. Foreign nations did not complain that the United States inappropriately prosecuted their firms or questioned their criminal law or enforcement capabilities. All of this has changed. Federal prosecutors now advertise how they target foreign corporations. The Department of Justice (\"DOJ\") publicizes its goal to \"root out global corruption\" and touse a variety of tools to ensure \"the stability and security of domestic and global markets.\" Foreign firms, and their employees, are increasingly convicted of a range of crimes including antitrust violations, environmental crimes, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (\"FCPA\") violations, tax fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud.

In the 1932 case Gebardi v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the failure of a statute to punish a party necessary to the commission of the proscribed conduct reflected an affirmative legislative policy to leave such party unpunished. As such, the Court declined to use the conspiracy statute to frustrate Congress's grant of immunity. In doing so, the Court carved out an exception to the federal conspiracy statute: an exception that is referred to as the Gebardi principle and that has been extended to operate as an exception to accomplice liability as well. This Note argues that while courts have employed, and continue to employ, what they call the Gebardi principle, this principle has fractured into two different forms and is thus more accurately understood as two separate \"principles\" as opposed to a single one. The first form is narrower and more in line with the Court's articulation of the principle in Gebardi v. United States—creating an exception to conspiratorial and accomplice liability where the words of the statute fail to punish a party necessary to the commission of the underlying criminal conduct. The second form, however, is broader. It is not pegged to the structure of the statute itself but instead allows courts to apply the Gebardi principle based on the courts' determination of legislative intent. This Note cautions against the use of this second form.

When students suggest sentences for criminal offenders, do they rely more heavily on the harmfulness or on the wrongfulness of the offender's conduct? In Study 1, 116 Princeton University undergraduates rated the harmfulness and wrongfulness of, and suggested appropriate sentences for, a series of crimes. As expected, participants emphasized wrongfulness when choosing an appropriate criminal punishment. In Study 2, 33 Princeton undergraduates made similar ratings for violations of the University Honor Code, and rated their contempt for fabricated amendments to the Code that required sentencers to focus either only on harmfulness or only on wrongfulness. Again, sentences more closely reflected wrongfulness ratings, and participants were more contemptuous of the harmfulness-based proposal. We also consider the theoretical and practical implications of these findings for sentencing laws and policy.

Over the past century, the allegation that the tort liability system incentivizes legal extortion and is chock-full of fraudulent claims has dominated public discussion and prompted lawmakers to ever-more-creatively curtail individuals' incentives and opportunities to seek redress. Unsatisfied with these conventional efforts, in recent years, at least a dozen corporate defendants have \"discovered\" a new fraud-fighting tool. They've started filing retaliatory RICO suits against plaintiffs and their lawyers and experts, alleging that the initiation of certain nonmeritorious litigation constitutes racketeering activity—while tort reform advocates have applauded these efforts and exhorted more \"courageous\" companies to follow suit. Curiously, though, all of this has taken place against a virtual empirical void. Is the tort liability system actually brimming with fraudulent claims? No one knows. There has been no serious attempt to analyze when, how often, or under what conditions fraudulent claiming proliferates. Similarly, tort reformers support RICO's use because, they say, conventional mechanisms to deter fraud fall short. But are conventional mechanisms insufficient? Hard to say, as there is no comprehensive inventory of the myriad formal and informal mechanisms already in use; nor do we have even a vague sense of how those mechanisms actually operate. Further, though courts have started to green-light retaliatory RICO actions, no one has carefully analyzed whether these suits are, on balance, beneficial. Indeed, few have so much as surfaced relevant risks. Addressing these questions, this Article attempts to bring overdue attention to a problem central to the tort system's operation and integrity.

This study experimentally tests whether the techniques of neutralisation as identified in the criminal justice literature influence graduate student willingness to engage in questionable research practices (QRPs). Our results indicate that US-born graduate students are more willing to add an undeserved coauthor if the person who requests it is a faculty member in the student's department as opposed to a fellow student. Students are most likely to add an undeserving author if a faculty member is also their advisor. In addition, four techniques of neutralisation, ‘diffusion of responsibility’, ‘defence of necessity’, ‘advantageous comparison’ and ‘euphemistic labelling’, are associated with student willingness to act unethically. Participants who had received responsible conduct of research training were no less likely to commit the violation than those who had not. Knowledge of these influencing factors for QRPs will provide for opportunities to improve research ethics education strategies and materials.

The Gulf oil spill was the worst environmental disaster in U.S. history, and will be the most significant criminal case ever prosecuted under U.S. environmental laws. The Justice Department is likely to prosecute BP, Transocean, and Halliburton for criminal violations of the Clean Water Act and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, which will result in the largest fines ever imposed in the United States for any form of corporate crime. The Justice Department also may decide to pursue charges for manslaughter, false statements, and obstruction of justice. The prosecution will shape public perceptions about environmental crime, for reasons that are understandable given the notoriety of the spill and the penalties at stake. In some respects, the Gulf oil spill is similar to other environmental crimes, most notably because it involves large corporations that committed serious violations because they put profits before environmental compliance and worker safety. Yet the spill's most distinctive qualities make it an anomalous environmental crime: the conduct was not as egregious, the harm was far worse, and the penalties bear no relation to norms for environmental crime. The Justice Department should bring criminal charges based on the Gulf oil spill, because a criminal prosecution will deter future spills better than civil penalties alone and will express societal condemnation of the negligence that caused the spill in ways that civil enforcement cannot. But criminal prosecution of the Gulf oil spill may raise questions about the role of criminal enforcement under the environmental laws, including whether ordinary negligence should result in criminal liability as well as what the proper normative relationship should be between culpable conduct and environmental harm. Nor can criminal prosecution, without more, prevent future spills; for that to occur, we must demand greater attention to safety and more rigorously enforce our drilling laws.

Whenever health care reform is debated, the state of the medical professional liability (MPL) system (i.e., medical malpractice system) in the United States re-emerges as an issue of importance. What exactly is broken with the MPL system and what the implications are is a point of contention among different stakeholder groups. Recent data demonstrate that medical liability premiums have been improving in recent years and the majority of premiums remained flat in 2010. General agreement still exists, however, that medical professional liability insurance premiums have become unaffordable for many physicians, and coverage has become less available, especially for certain medical specialties and in specific areas of the country.Multiple factors go into the determination of medical professional liability insurance premiums including return on investments, reinsurance costs, claims frequency, average amount paid out on malpractice claims, defense expenses, and administrative costs such as underwriting expense.