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8,125 result(s) for "Criminal responsibility"
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Objection : disgust, morality, and the law
\" Why do we consider incest wrong, even when it occurs between consenting adults unable to have children? Why are words that gross us out more likely to be deemed \"obscene\" and denied the protection of the First Amendment? In a world where a gruesome photograph can decisively influence a jury and homosexual behavior is still condemned by some as \"unnatural,\" it is worth asking: is our legal system really governed by the power of reason? Or do we allow a primitive human emotion, disgust, to guide us in our lawmaking? In Objection, psychologists Debra Lieberman and Carlton Patrick examine disgust and its impact on the legal system to show why the things that we find stomach-turning so often become the things that we render unlawful. Shedding light on the evolutionary and psychological origins of disgust, the authors reveal how ancient human intuitions about what is safe to eat or touch, or who would make an advantageous mate, have become co-opted by moral systems designed to condemn behavior and identify groups of people ripe for marginalization. Over time these moral stances have made their way into legal codes, and disgust has thereby served as the impetus for laws against behaviors almost universally held to be \"disgusting\" (corpse desecration, bestiality) - and as the implicit justification for more controversial prohibitions (homosexuality, use of pornography). Written with a critical eye on current events, Lieberman and Patrick build a case for a more reasoned approach to lawmaking in a system that often confuses \"gross\" with \"wrong.\" \"-- Provided by publisher.
Children's Rights and the Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility
This work is the first global analysis of national minimum ages of criminal responsibility, the international legal obligations that surround them and the principal considerations for establishing and implementing respective age limits.
Remorse
Remorse is a powerful, important and yet academically neglected emotion. This book, one of the very few extended examinations of remorse, draws on psychology, law and philosophy to present a unique interdisciplinary study of this intriguing emotion. The psychological chapters examine the fundamental nature of remorse, its interpersonal effects, and its relationship with regret, guilt and shame. A practical focus is also provided in an examination of the place of remorse in psychotherapeutic interventions with criminal offenders. The book's jurisprudential chapters explore the problem of how offender remorse is proved in court and the contentious issues concerning the effect that remorse - and its absence - should have on sentencing criminal offenders. The legal and psychological perspectives are then interwoven in a discussion of the role of remorse in restorative justice. In Remorse: Psychological and Jurisprudential Perspectives, Proeve and Tudor bring together insights of neighbouring disciplines to advance our understanding of remorse. It will be of interest to theoreticians in psychology, law and philosophy, and will be of benefit to practising psychologists and lawyers.
AGGRESSION AND STATE RESPONSIBILITY AT THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
The definition of the crime of aggression in Article 8 bis of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) stipulates that a State act of aggression is a material element of the crime, suggesting an intrinsic link between individual criminal responsibility and State responsibility for aggression. This article argues that the Rome Statute provides a legal basis for the International Criminal Court (ICC) to determine State responsibility for aggression when considering the material elements of the crime of aggression, which has important practical and conceptual implications for the law of international responsibility. Although the content of State responsibility flows automatically from the breach of the obligation, it is argued that a finding of aggression pursuant to Article 8 bis of the Rome Statute may be considered as a form of satisfaction for the purposes of Article 37 of the 2001 ILC Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001 ILC Articles). Furthermore, the material element of the crime in Article 8 bis of the Rome Statute requires the act of aggression by its character, gravity, and scale to constitute a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations, in line with the nomenclature used within the 2001 ILC Articles regarding serious breaches of obligations arising from peremptory norms of general international law (jus cogens). The article considers the important role that the ICC may play in relation to serious breaches of the jus cogens obligation to refrain from an act of aggression.
The Criminal Responsibility of Senior Political and Military Leaders as Principals to International Crimes
As shown by the trials of Slobodan Milosevic, Charles Taylor and Saddam Hussein, the large-scale and systematic commission of international crimes is usually planned and set in motion by senior political and military leaders. Nevertheless, the application of traditional forms of criminal liability leads to the conclusion that they are mere accessories to such crimes. This does not reflect their central role and often results in a punishment which is inappropriately low in view of the impact of their actions and omissions. For these reasons, international criminal law has placed special emphasis on the development of concepts, such as control of the crime and joint criminal enterprise (also known as the common purpose doctrine), which aim at reflecting better the central role played by senior political and military leaders in campaigns of large scale and systematic commission of international crimes. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the case law of the ICTY and the ICTR have, in recent years, played a unique role in the achievement of this goal.
The Right Not to be Criminalized
This book presents arguments and proposals for constraining criminalization, with a focus on the legal limits of the criminal law. The book approaches the issue by showing how the moral criteria for constraining unjust criminalization can and has been incorporated into constitutional human rights and thus provides a legal right not to be unfairly criminalized. The book sets out the constitutional limits of the substantive criminal law. As far as specific constitutional rights operate to protect specific freedoms, for example, free speech, freedom of religion, privacy, etc, the right not to be criminalized has proved to be a rather powerful justice constraint in the U.S. Yet the general right not to be criminalized has not been fully embraced in either the U.S. or Europe, although it does exist. This volume lays out the legal foundations of that right and the criteria for determining when the state might override it. The book will be of interest to researchers in the areas of legal philosophy, criminal law, constitutional law, and criminology.
Answering for Crime
In this long-awaited book, Antony Duff offers a new perspective on the structures of criminal law and criminal liability. His starting point is a distinction between responsibility (understood as answerability) and liability, and a conception of responsibility as relational and practice-based. This focus on responsibility, as a matter of being answerable to those who have the standing to call one to account, throws new light on a range of questions in criminal law theory: on the question of criminalisation, which can now be cast as the question of what we should have to answer for, and to whom, under the threat of criminal conviction and punishment; on questions about the criminal trial, as a process through which defendants are called to answer, and about the conditions (bars to trial) given which a trial would be illegitimate; on questions about the structure of offences, the distinction between offences and defences, and the phenomena of strict liability and strict responsibility; and on questions about the structures of criminal defences. The net result is not a theory of criminal law; but it is an account of the structure of criminal law as an institution through which a liberal polity defines a realm of public wrongdoing, and calls those who perpetrate (or are accused of perpetrating) such wrongs to account.
Prisoners with reduced criminal responsibility stand out based on their rates of hospitalisation during their sentences
PurposeGlobally, health problems are very common among prisoners. A mental state examination aims to help in recognising psychiatric problems among offenders and the possible association of these psychiatric issues with their committed crime. The legal-medical term “reduced criminal responsibility” refers to a weakened sense of reality and the ability to control one’s behaviour because of compromised mental health and without an evaluated need for forensic psychiatric hospitalisation. However, little is known about the actual need for the health care of prisoners with reduced criminal responsibility (PRCR). The purpose of this study was to explore treatment-related visits to prison by PRCR in Finland.Design/methodology/approachThe research data comprise information on PRCR’s treatment-related visits and that of a matched control group (n = 222). Descriptive cross-tabulation with X²- and nonparametric Mann–Whitney U-tests and Cox regression analyses are applied.FindingsThe results show that almost every PRCR had at least one treatment-related visit during their sentences. Visits to a psychiatric hospital for prisoners, to the prison hospital and especially to a civil hospital are more common among PRCR. The need for treatment appears significantly earlier in their sentences.Originality/valueThese findings demonstrate the PRCR’s greater need for access to health services and the need for further development between the Health Care Services for Prisoners, Prison and Probation Service of Finland and public health and social services in Finland. More exploration of the medical reasons and locational distribution of the vast amount of civil hospitalisation is needed.
Social Death
Winner of the 2013 John Hope Franklin Book Prize presented by the American Studies AssociationSocial Death tackles one of the core paradoxes of social justice struggles and scholarship - that the battle to end oppression shares the moral grammar that structures exploitation and sanctions state violence. Lisa Marie Cacho forcefully argues that the demands for personhood for those who, in the eyes of society, have little value, depend on capitalist and heteropatriarchal measures of worth.With poignant case studies, Cacho illustrates that our very understanding of personhood is premised upon the unchallenged devaluation of criminalized populations of color. Hence, the reliance of rights-based politics on notions of who is and is not a deserving member of society inadvertently replicates the logic that creates and normalizes states of social and literal death. Her understanding of inalienable rights and personhood provides us the much-needed comparative analytical and ethical tools to understand the racialized and nationalized tensions between racial groups. Driven by a radical, relentless critique, Social Death challenges us to imagine a heretofore unthinkable politics and ethics that do not rest on neoliberal arguments about worth, but rather emerge from the insurgent experiences of those negated persons who do not live by the norms that determine the productive, patriotic, law abiding, and family-oriented subject.
Prior Probabilities and the Age Threshold Problem: First and Second Molar Development
Dental development has been used to assess whether an individual may be below or above an age that serves as a legal threshold. This study used development of the first and second mandibular molars from a large sample of individuals (N = 2,676) to examine the age threshold for minimum age of criminal responsibility. A bivariate ordered probit model was applied to dental scores following the Moorrees et al. (1963) system, with the addition of a crypt-absent/present stage. Then a 10-fold cross-validation within each of the sexes showed that the bivariate models produce unbiased estimates of age but are heteroskedastic (with increasing spread of the estimates against actual age). To address the age threshold problem, a normal prior centered on the threshold is assumed, and the product of the prior and the likelihood is integrated up to the age threshold and again starting at the age threshold. The ratio of these two integrals is a Bayes factor, which because the prior is symmetric around the threshold, can also be interpreted as the posterior odds that an individual is over versus under the age threshold. It was necessary to assume an unreasonably high standard deviation of age in the prior to achieve posterior odds that were well above “evens.” These results indicate that dental developmental evidence from the first and second molars is of limited use in examining the question of whether an individual is below or over the minimum age of criminal responsibility. As the third molar is more variable in its development than the first two molars, the question of dental evidence regarding the age of majority (generally 18 years) remains problematic.