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Action research (AR) is often used when doing research about social phenomena in the real-world, when change is part of the researcher’s intention. The researcher participates in the research environment with the intention of improving the social phenomenon of learning to program, and to learn from it. AR typically follows an iterative process of five phases, namely diagnosis; action planning; action taking; evaluation and specifying learning. Although the incorporation of the work of critical thinkers is promoted, to guide the intervention, linking the methodology itself to Kantian thinking is uncommon. This paper demonstrates how the three questions from Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason: What can I know? What can I do? and finally, What can I hope? may guide the AR method. We show how these can be utilized within the phases of AR to deepen understanding of the social phenomenon of learning to program. By focusing on a Kantian systems approach, as discussed by Werner Ulrich in his introduction of Critical Systems Heuristics, various conditioned realities can be considered within a real-world situation. The paper presents an AR study which focused on improving the programming skills of students, demonstrating the incorporation of the Kantian focal points into the AR cycle. It demonstrates that Kant’s respect for the humanity of others and the resulting hope in justice can guide the AR practitioner to effect improvement. By making a conscious effort to listen to the affected and to incorporate as many conditioned realities as possible, we were able to improve student engagement and interest in the programming module.

There is no consensus concerning how to understand the ‘two-step proof structure’ (§§15–20, 21–7) of the Transcendental Deduction in the B-edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. This disagreement invites a closer examination of what Kant might have meant by a ‘transcendental deduction’. I argue that the transcendental deduction consists of three tasks that parallel Kant’s broader project of a ‘critique’ of pure reason; first, an origin task to justify reason’s authority to use them; second, an analytical task that determines the conditions under which this authority can be legitimately exercised; and third, a dialectical task to determine the conditions under which this authority cannot be legitimately exercised. So long as we continue to read the B-Deduction solely in terms of its two-step proof structure, we overlook how Kant’s notion of ‘critique’ constitutes the real grounds for his argumentative strategy there.

In an intriguing but neglected passage in the Transcendental Deduction, Kant appears to link the synthetic activity of the understanding in experience with the phenomenon of attention (B156-7n). In this paper, we take up this hint, and draw upon Kant's remarks about attention in the Anthropology to shed light on the vexed question of what, exactly, the understanding's role in experience is for Kant. We argue that reading Kant's claims about synthesis in this light alhws us to combine two aspects of Kant's views that many commentators have thought are in tension with one another: on the one hand, Kant's apparent commitment to naïve realism about perception and, on the other, his apparent commitment to the necessity of synthetic activity by the understanding for any kind of cognitive contact with external objects.

After providing a brief overview of Marcus Willaschek's Kant on the Sources of Metaphysics , I critically reconstruct his account of ‘transcendental realism’ and the role that it plays in the dramatic narrative of the Critique of Pure Reason . I then lay out in detail how Willaschek generates and evaluates various versions of transcendental realism and raise some concerns about each. Next, I look at precisely how Willaschek's Kant thinks we can avoid applying the ‘supreme’ dialectical principle (for every conditioned there is a totality of conditions which is unconditioned) to the domain of appearances. Finally, I call into question Willaschek's efforts to appropriate the lessons of the Transcendental Dialectic without following Kant into transcendental idealism.

This is an encyclopedic dictionary of close to 400 important philosophical, literary, and political terms and concepts that defy easy--or any--translation from one language and culture to another. Drawn from more than a dozen languages, terms such asDasein(German),pravda(Russian),saudade(Portuguese), andstato(Italian) are thoroughly examined in all their cross-linguistic and cross-cultural complexities. Spanning the classical, medieval, early modern, modern, and contemporary periods, these are terms that influence thinking across the humanities. The entries, written by more than 150 distinguished scholars, describe the origins and meanings of each term, the history and context of its usage, its translations into other languages, and its use in notable texts. The dictionary also includes essays on the special characteristics of particular languages--English, French, German, Greek, Italian, Portuguese, Russian, and Spanish. Originally published in French, this one-of-a-kind reference work is now available in English for the first time, with new contributions from Judith Butler, Daniel Heller-Roazen, Ben Kafka, Kevin McLaughlin, Kenneth Reinhard, Stella Sandford, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Jane Tylus, Anthony Vidler, Susan Wolfson, Robert J. C. Young, and many more.The result is an invaluable reference for students, scholars, and general readers interested in the multilingual lives of some of our most influential words and ideas. Covers close to 400 important philosophical, literary, and political terms that defy easy translation between languages and culturesIncludes terms from more than a dozen languagesEntries written by more than 150 distinguished thinkersAvailable in English for the first time, with new contributions by Judith Butler, Daniel Heller-Roazen, Ben Kafka, Kevin McLaughlin, Kenneth Reinhard, Stella Sandford, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Jane Tylus, Anthony Vidler, Susan Wolfson, Robert J. C. Young, and many moreContains extensive cross-references and bibliographiesAn invaluable resource for students and scholars across the humanities

Both Rousseau and Kant wrote their works with the intention of contributing to the well-being of humans. The ways in which Kant followed Rousseau to achieve this aim were many and go beyond those easily recognized. This article presents evidence for Rousseau’s influence in the Discipline of Pure Reason chapter of the Doctrine of Method in the First Critique. Both Rousseau and Kant emphasized discipline as a necessary part of a proper education that leads to a well-ordered life. Kant’s form of discipline is modeled on the education given to Emile. This approach to the Discipline chapter also affords an enlightening view of Kant’s position in Dreams of a Spirit-Seer.

Challenging the common view that categories are prior to schemata, I argue that Kant considers transcendental schemata and categories to represent different guises of the a priori rules that allow the mind to unify a manifold. Since only transcendental schemata present these rules as ways of unifying successive representations, they can be said to constitute the sensible condition of any a priori cognition of objects. I take Kant to argue, on this basis, that Wolffian metaphysics abstracted from this condition, thus unwarrantedly using categories to obtain a priori knowledge of the soul, the world as such and God.

In this paper, I analyse Kant’s derivation of ideas in the Introduction and the First Book of the Transcendental Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason. Despite the increasing interest in the First Book of the Transcendental Dialectic, Kant’s crucial differentiation between the logical and the real or rather transcendental use of reason remains unconsidered or even misinterpreted. To expose the logical structure of Kant’s argumentation, I provide firstly a precise analysis and offer a reconstruction of his derivation in five steps. Based on this investigation, I will secondly show that the logical structure used by Kant has its roots in the early modern period, and became canonical in the Port-Royal Logic. This perspective in turn allows a critical discussion of the basic problems of the Transcendental Dialectics.

In the late eighteenth century, an array of European political thinkers attacked the very foundations of imperialism, arguing passionately that empire-building was not only unworkable, costly, and dangerous, but manifestly unjust.Enlightenment against Empireis the first book devoted to the anti-imperialist political philosophies of an age often regarded as affirming imperial ambitions. Sankar Muthu argues that thinkers such as Denis Diderot, Immanuel Kant, and Johann Gottfried Herder developed an understanding of humans as inherently cultural agents and therefore necessarily diverse. These thinkers rejected the conception of a culture-free \"natural man.\" They held that moral judgments of superiority or inferiority could be made neither about entire peoples nor about many distinctive cultural institutions and practices. Muthu shows how such arguments enabled the era's anti-imperialists to defend the freedom of non-European peoples to order their own societies. In contrast to those who praise \"the Enlightenment\" as the triumph of a universal morality and critics who view it as an imperializing ideology that denigrated cultural pluralism, Muthu argues instead that eighteenth-century political thought included multiple Enlightenments. He reveals a distinctive and underappreciated strand of Enlightenment thinking that interweaves commitments to universal moral principles and incommensurable ways of life, and that links the concept of a shared human nature with the idea that humans are fundamentally diverse. Such an intellectual temperament, Muthu contends, can broaden our own perspectives about international justice and the relationship between human unity and diversity.

The debate about the «thing in itself» in the Aetas Kantiana and its significance for the genesis of J.G. Fichte's The Science of Knowledge. Although it is often seen as obsolete, the post-Kantian debate about the thing in itself has great theoretical and historical relevance, since it shows the continuity of the process leading to Fichte's reinterpretation of critical philosophy as «science of knowledge». After highlighting Kant's hesitation between a realistic-transcendent meaning of the concept (it plays no role in his «refutation of idealism») and a truly transcendental one, with regard to the a priori distinction between sensibility and understanding, the Author shows first how the former led most contemporaries to conceive of the Critique of Pure Reason as subjectivism and then the ways in which the latter was restored by Beck, Maimon and Fichte.The widespread thesis of an \"elimination\" of the thing in itself had accordingly to be revised: while refusing to assign to the dogmatic idea of an \"absolute object\" any relevance within the critical system, Maimon and Fichte maintain the thing in itself, properly understood, as a fundamental component of finite reason. [Publishers' text].