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result(s) for
"Cuba. Revolutionary Army"
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Cuban Army Order of Battle
1962
Cuba. Ground Forces consist of 75,000 Military personnel in the Cuba. Revolutionary Army with additional numbers in the [Cuba. Revolutionary National Militia; Cuba. Ready Reserve]; Cuba. Ground Forces Military capability is centered in the Cuba. Revolutionary Army whereas the Cuba. Revolutionary National Militia has only limited Combat readiness
Data Set
The Situation and Prospects in Cuba
Cuba Security organizations including [Cuba. Revolutionary Army; Cuba. Directorate of Public Order; Cuba. Revolutionary Air Force; Cuba. Revolutionary Navy; Association of Rebel Youth (Cuba); Cuba. Revolutionary National Militia] are described; Fidel Castro death or Assassination would not cause the collapse of the Cuban Revolution (1959) but could create a struggle for Political power among leaders such as [Ernesto (\"Che\") Guevara; Antonio Nunez Jimenez; Raul Castro] according to the CIA; [Popular Socialist Party (Cuba); 26 of July Movement (Cuba)] merge to create the United Party of Socialist Revolution (Cuba) which is seen as the official Political parties in Cuba according to the CIA; Cuba Economic conditions have been affected by a loss of Management personnel as well as the imposition of a large Bureaucracy and a shift in Trade partnerships
Government Document
CINCLANT Historical Account of Cuban Crisis Includes Letter of Promulgation by Robert L. Dennison
1963
U.S. Army practices airborne training in Exercise Sun Shade from 12 November to 10 December as rehearsal of Operation Plan 316; Cuba. Revolutionary Navy Komar Missile Attack Boats depart Mariel on October 18 for operations at Banes; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command proposed the capture of intact SA-2 Missiles Surface-to-air missile sites as part of [Operation Plan 312; Operation Plan 316]; Commander of the U.S. Navy Naval Base Guantanamo indicated that movement of FROG Missiles into positions threatening Guantanamo Naval Base (U.S. facility in Cuba) should be deemed \"an offensive act unacceptable\" to the U.S. due the missiles capacity to carry Nuclear warheads; Guantanamo Naval Base (U.S. facility in Cuba) reported a marked increase in Cuba harassment in June 1962; Military build-up in Cuba of the Cuba. Revolutionary Navy included the acquisition of [Military training; Komar Missile Attack Boats; Kronshtadt Patrol Boats] from the Soviet Union; Cuba. Revolutionary Air Force Military build-up in Cuba was indicated from 1961 to 1962 by [MiG-15 Aircraft; MiG-17 Aircraft; MiG-19 Aircraft; MiG-21 Aircraft; Helicopters; Light aircraft; Military training] from the Soviet Bloc; Soviet Union Merchant vessels traffic to Cuba increased in July 1962; Cuba. Ground Forces Military equipment includes new shipments of [Tanks; Weapons; Rocket launchers; Artillery; Anti-aircraft weapons; Rifles; Mortars; Machine guns; Amphibious vehicles; Armored personnel carriers]; Intelligence confirms [Surface-to-air missiles; IL-28 Aircraft] Deployment in Cuba and Soviet Submarines in the northwestern Atlantic Ocean region during September to October 1962; Intelligence indicated Soviet combat teams are in control of [FROG Missiles; Snapper Anti-Tank Missiles] at [Artemisa; Santiago de las Vegas; Remedios IRBM Complex (Cuba); Holguin (Cuba)] Military bases; Contingency plans to assure maximum Operational readiness for [Operation Plan 312; Operation Plan 314] were implemented during 1-22 October 1962; Robert S. McNamara informs Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command that Soviet counteractions against Berlin (Federal Republic of Germany) will be considered valid reason for U.S. military intervention in Cuba; Robert S. McNamara directs that evidence of Offensive weapons in Cuba or Attacks by Cuba against Guantanamo Naval Base (U.S. facility in Cuba) will be considered sufficient to warrant U.S. military intervention in Cuba; Robert S. McNamara reports that Cuban intervention in Latin America or indication of support for Cuban anti-Castro groups Attacks will be considered sufficient to warrant U.S. military intervention in Cuba; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command describes problems of U.S. Armed Forces Deployment affecting implementation of Operation Plan 316; U.S. Navy. Atlantic Fleet Submarines operations during the Cuban Crisis; U.S. Navy. Atlantic Fleet service force operations during the Cuban Crisis; U.S. Armed Forces Amphibious operations during the Cuban Crisis; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command describes Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Navy Atlantic Fleet operations in conducting the Naval Quarantine of Cuba (24 October - 20 November 1962); Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Navy Atlantic Fleet count of Soviet missile withdrawal from Cuba does not match with reports from Soviet Ships; U.S. Navy reports minor collisions between its Naval vessels taking part in the Naval quarantine line; U.S. Navy. Atlantic Fleet. Task Force 135 involvement in Cuban Crisis operations; U.S. Navy. Atlantic Fleet. Anti-Submarine Force involvement in the Naval Quarantine of Cuba (24 October - 20 November 1962) operations; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command describes Anti-submarine warfare activities against Soviet Submarines in the Atlantic Ocean; [Anti-submarine warfare; Air defense systems] forced Soviet Submarines to surface prior to implementation of the Naval Quarantine of Cuba (24 October - 20 November 1962); Latin America-U.S. Naval Task Force involvement with the U.S. South Atlantic Force during the Cuban Crisis; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command analysis of U.S. Atlantic Command role in the Cuba Crisis; Cuba Alliances with Soviet Union lead to increased requests for [Economic assistance; Security assistance]; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command estimates numbers of Soviet Bloc Military personnel assigned to assist the [Cuba. Revolutionary Army; Cuba. Revolutionary Navy; Cuba. Revolutionary Air Force]; Soviet Bloc Shipping for [Arms shipments; Trade with Cuba] during period of the Cuban Crisis; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command describes status of and command structures for Contingency plans for military actions against Cuba as specified in [Operation Plan 314-61; Operation Plan 312-62; Operation Plan 316]; [Exercise Blue Water; Exercise Phibriglex-62] are carried on prior to Cuban contingency operations; [U-2 Aircraft; Low altitude reconnaissance flights] received fire only twice over Cuba during Surveillance of Soviet missile bases; U.S. Atlantic Command Communications plans and activities during the Cuban Crisis; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command initial reaction to knowledge of the Cuban Crisis was to improve Operational readiness of U.S. Atlantic Command to be able to execute Operation Plan 312; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff informed Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command of events that may lead to execution of [U.S. military intervention in Cuba; Operation Plan 314]; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command estimates number of Soviet Union. Armed Forces in Cuba and Cuban [Cuba. Revolutionary Air Force; Military personnel] trained in the Soviet Union; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Strike Forces increased Operational readiness and prepositioning of Military personnel for the implementation of Operation Plan 314 prior to the days of the Cuban Crisis; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command developed plans for Military governments to assume control of a zone of Emergency powers in southern Florida to start at the \"commencement of hostilities\"; U.S. Federal Aviation Administration participated in planning for [Military air transit rights; Military aircraft] to assume priority over civilian and non-tactical Air traffic as part of implementation of [Operation Plan 312; Operation Plan 314; Operation Plan 316]; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command estimates of Military personnel staffing requirements for U.S. military intervention in Cuba; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command evaluates problems affecting the implementation of Military actions and operations; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command estimates of expected Casualties of U.S. Armed Forces with implementation of Operation Plan 316; Psychological operations preparations for [Operation Plan 314; Operation Plan 316]; Guantanamo Naval Base (U.S. facility in Cuba) participation in and command structures during the Cuban Crisis; U.S. Marine Corps participation in U.S. Navy. Atlantic Fleet operations during the Cuban Crisis
Government Document
Cuban Capabilities for Attack on the United States Includes Summaries of Cuban Navy, Army, and Air Force Strength
U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency believes that [Komar Missile Attack Boats; MiG-21 Aircraft; IL-28 Aircraft] in Cuba are operated and controlled by Soviet Union. Armed Forces and unlikely to carry Nuclear warheads; U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency assesses capabilities of [Cuba. Revolutionary Navy; Cuba. Revolutionary Army; Cuba. Revolutionary Air Force] [Military equipment; Military personnel] to launch Attacks against the U.S.
Government Document
Summary of Items of Significant Interest Period 300701 - 310700 October 1962
Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command reports announcements by the Cuba. Revolutionary Army that firing practice will be held north of Pinar del Rio Province during 30 October 1962 - 2 November 1962; Cuba. Revolutionary Navy will begin Military exercises off the coast between [Havana; Mariel] during 30 October - 4 November 1962; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command recommends that forces of the [U.S. Air Force; U.S. Army] engaged in operations against Cuba should be equipped with Nuclear weapons; U.S. Marine Corps. 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade is directed to develop a Command and control system for an \"aviation command element\" after arriving at the Panama Canal zone
Government Document
Interim Report by the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee on the Cuban Military Buildup
1963
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee asserts that the Soviet Union. Armed Forces presence in Cuba adversely affects United States \"image and prestige\"; U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee asserts that Soviet Union. Armed Forces Submarine bases could easily be established in Cuba; U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee asserts that Airfields in Cuba could serve as Military bases for Soviet Union. Air Force Air attacks on the U.S.; U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee asserts that Soviet Union. Armed Forces Interdiction of U.S. [Shipping lanes; Air traffic] could be carried out from Cuba; U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee asserts that Cuba could be a base for Military actions against the Panama Canal; U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee asserts that an Electronic warfare Military capability could be established in Cuba; U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee concludes that Cuba is a Military threat to Latin America as a source for [Insurrections; Sabotage; Weapons]; Intelligence agencies do not consider Cuba a Military threat to the [United States; Latin America]; Cuba. Armed Forces Military personnel numbers are the same as before the Cuban Crisis and consist of 75,000 in the Cuba. Revolutionary Army and 10,000 in the Cuba. Revolutionary National Militia and 100,000 in the Civil patrols; Military build-up in Cuba includes [Snapper Anti-Tank Missiles; FROG Missiles] which are among the most modern Soviet tactical Missiles; Soviet Union. Armed Forces in Cuba are equipped with [SA-2 Missiles; Ammunition; Anti-aircraft weapons; Cruise missiles; Komar Missile Attack Boats; Artillery; Tanks; Armored personnel carriers; Missile launchers; Radios]; Submarine bases do not require extensive Military construction and can therefore be provided on short notice; Cuba. Armed Forces are equipped with [Rifles; Machine guns; Mortars; Artillery; Tanks; Armored personnel carriers; Anti-aircraft weapons]; U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee concludes that Intelligence agencies consistently downgraded any Intelligence Report from Cuban refugees; U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee praises Cuban Crisis Intelligence gathering but concludes that Intelligence agencies interpreted the Evidence too optimistically; Aerial reconnaissance was unable to determine the precise number of [Medium-range ballistic missiles; Intermediate-range ballistic missiles] introduced during Soviet missile deployment in Cuba; U.S. Air Force. Strategic Air Command U-2 Flights over Cuba produced Photographic evidence of the San Cristobal MRBM Complex (Cuba) on 14 October 1962; Photographic interpretation identifies IL-28 Aircraft in Cuba on 9 October 1962; Photographic evidence obtained on 5 September 1962 provided Verification of MiG-21 Aircraft Deployment in Cuba; Photographic evidence of Coastal frontier defense systems Missile bases and of Komar Missile Attack Boats was obtained between 29 August and 7 October 1962; U-2 Flights over Cuba from 29 August until 9 October 1962 provided Photographic evidence of SA-2 Missiles Surface-to-air missile sites in Cuba; Intelligence agencies concluded in early 1962 that Cuba would receive IL-28 Aircraft from the Soviet Union; Intelligence agencies collected thousands of Human intelligence reports before 1962; CIA increased the frequency of U-2 Flights over Cuba in early 1962; Intelligence agencies concluded that the Cuba. Revolutionary Air Force had received vast amounts of Soviet Military equipment before July 1962 and that the Cuba. Revolutionary Army was one of the best equipped in Latin America; Cuba. Revolutionary Air Force had acquired [MiG-15 Aircraft; MiG-17 Aircraft; MiG-19 Aircraft] and propeller-driven Aircraft as well as Military training in Soviet Bloc countries by the beginning of 1962; Cuba has thousands of Caves suitable for use as Missile storage sites but Intelligence agencies believe that they are used to store Defensive weapons; U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee rejects allegations of conflict between the [CIA; U.S. Air Force. Strategic Air Command] regarding control of U-2 Flights over Cuba; U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee rejects the charge that an Intelligence gap in Aerial reconnaissance coverage of Cuba existed from 5 September until 14 October 1962; Intelligence agencies underestimated the number of Soviet Union. Armed Forces Military personnel throughout the Cuban Crisis; Intelligence agencies state that the number of Soviet Union. Armed Forces Military personnel in Cuba reached 22,000; Intelligence agencies are criticized for not obtaining Verification of the presence of Soviet combat teams in Cuba until 25 October 1962; U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee praises Intelligence agencies for identifying Offensive weapons in Cuba before they reached Operational readiness; U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee discusses persistent reports that Soviet Missiles are concealed in Cuban Caves and that the number of Soviet Union. Armed Forces Military personnel greatly exceeds estimates by Intelligence agencies; U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee conducts Governmental investigations of the Military build-up in Cuba
Government Document
Summary of Items of Significant Interest Period 250701 - 260700 October 1962
1962
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff orders Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command to proceed with the transfer of the U.S. Marine Corps. 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade to the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command; [Commanding General of the U.S. Navy Atlantic Fleet Marine Force; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command] prepare squadrons for Deployment in the Caribbean Region and the eastern United States; Cuba. Revolutionary Army has not changed its level of Military alert; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command reports that [Naval vessels; Military aircraft] are prepared to support Guantanamo Naval Base (U.S. facility in Cuba); Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command clarifies designations for \"E\" and \"D\" days in [Operation Plan 312-62; Operation Plan 316-61]; U.S. Navy reports Soviet Submarines operating in the Naval quarantine line area near [Puerto Rico; Bahamas]
Government Document
Racism in Prerevolutionary Cuba and Antiracism in the Cuban Celebration of May Day
1999
The author presents an overview of the history of racism in Cuba as it developed under Spanish rule & US imperialist domination, & the ongoing efforts of the present revolutionary government to eradicate racism in Cuba. Commemoration of the contributions made by Afro-Cubans to the revolutionary movement & the nation's cultural heritage has become a feature of May Day celebrations. Solidarity is also voiced at these events with anti-imperialist movements in Africa, Asia, & Latin America, & with the struggle against racial injustice in the US. 18 References. Adapted from the source document.
Journal Article
Epilogue
At first light on June 16, 1722, John, duke of Marlborough, captain general, master of the ordnance, and colonel of the First Guards, died at Windsor Lodge. On July 14, his remains were brought up to Marlborough House to lie in state. Marlborough’s last parade began at 12:30 on August 9. From Marlborough House, west along the mall, north through the royal parks, east down Piccadilly, south to Charing Cross, King Street, and the Abbey, the procession was led by detachments of the Horse Guards and Grenadiers. Their kettledrums were decked with black baize. Their trumpets were wound with cypress
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