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Research Summary How will a chief sustainability officer (CSO) influence corporate social performance? Building upon the upper echelons perspective and the attention‐based view, this study argues that while a CSO helps channel managerial attention to a firm's social domain, managerial attention is more likely to be directed to negative issues than to positive issues. In addition, such relationships are contingent on the focal firm's governance design and its industry culpability. Analysis of a sample of S&P 500 firms for the period of 2005–2014 largely renders support to our predictions. Managerial Summary While more and more firms start to put a chief sustainability officer (CSO) on its top management team (TMT), the implications for corporate social performance of CSO presence remain unclear. With a sample of S&P 500 firms, we find that the presence of a CSO increases the firm's socially responsible activities (CSR) and reduces its socially irresponsible activities (CSiR). Moreover, CSO presence has a greater effect on reducing CSiR than on increasing CSR. These relationships become stronger when the firm has a sustainability committee on the board and is in a culpable industry.

Culpability is not a unitary concept within the criminal law, and it is important to distinguish different culpability concepts and the work they do. Narrow culpability is an ingredient in wrongdoing itself, describing the agent’s elemental mens rea (purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence). Broad culpability is the responsibility condition that makes wrongdoing blameworthy and without which wrongdoing is excused. Inclusive culpability is the combination of wrongdoing and responsibility or broad culpability that functions as the retributivist desert basis for punishment. Each of these kinds of culpability plays an important role in a unified retributive framework for the criminal law. Moreover, the distinction between narrow and broad culpability has significance for understanding and assessing the distinction between attributability and accountability and the nature and permissibility of strict liability crimes.

In Fundamentals of Criminal Law, Andrew Simester offers a limited defence of the use of negli gence in criminal law.1 Simester does not claim that negligence - nor any mens rea element - is inherently culpable. Rather, Simester claims that negligence - with all other mens rea elements - provides evidence from which we may infer culpability. I will retrace Simester's account to consider how (and why) we may infer culpability from mens rea in general (Part 1), then how we may infer culpability from negligence specifically (Part 2), and finally, how we may infer culpability from the underlying traits which cause us to become negligent (Part 3). Ultimately, I think that the evidence of culpability to be derived from negligence is too weak to meet Simester's requirements.

The notion of “responsibility gap” with artificial intelligence (AI) was originally introduced in the philosophical debate to indicate the concern that “learning automata” may make more difficult or impossible to attribute moral culpability to persons for untoward events. Building on literature in moral and legal philosophy, and ethics of technology, the paper proposes a broader and more comprehensive analysis of the responsibility gap. The responsibility gap, it is argued, is not one problem but a set of at least four interconnected problems – gaps in culpability, moral and public accountability, active responsibility—caused by different sources, some technical, other organisational, legal, ethical, and societal. Responsibility gaps may also happen with non-learning systems. The paper clarifies which aspect of AI may cause which gap in which form of responsibility, and why each of these gaps matter. It proposes a critical review of partial and non-satisfactory attempts to address the responsibility gap: those which present it as a new and intractable problem (“fatalism”), those which dismiss it as a false problem (“deflationism”), and those which reduce it to only one of its dimensions or sources and/or present it as a problem that can be solved by simply introducing new technical and/or legal tools (“solutionism”). The paper also outlines a more comprehensive approach to address the responsibility gaps with AI in their entirety, based on the idea of designing socio-technical systems for “meaningful human control\", that is systems aligned with the relevant human reasons and capacities.

A leader's culpability for involving his state in a conflict affects both his war termination calculus and his domestic audience's willingness to punish him if he loses. I define a culpable leader as any leader who either presides over the beginning of a war, or comes to power midwar and shares a political connection with a culpable predecessor. Using a data set created specifically for this study, I find that culpable leaders are more likely than nonculpable ones to achieve favorable war outcomes. I also find that domestic audiences will be willing to punish culpable leaders who lose, yet spare nonculpable leaders who do the same. Taken together, my findings underscore the need to appreciate more fully the role individual leaders play in bringing their states to war.

The enforcement of European Union restrictive measures increasingly relies on criminal law at national level, particularly in response to serious and systematic violations that cannot be effectively addressed through administrative sanctions alone. Directive (EU) 2024/1226 requires Member States to ensure effective, proportionate, and dissuasive criminal penalties for breaches of EU sanctions, including, in defined cases, conduct committed with serious negligence. This article examines the introduction of serious negligence as a new statutory form of culpability in the Slovak Republic, adopted through Act No. 157/2025 Coll. as part of the transposition of Union law. The analysis is based on a doctrinal examination of Slovak criminal law, legislative materials, and relevant EU legal instruments, complemented by a comparative overview of selected Member States. The article demonstrates that the Slovak legislator introduced serious negligence (Slovak: hrubá nedbanlivosť) as a qualified form of negligence in a cautious and narrowly circumscribed manner, limiting its application to a specific offence relating to the breach of a restrictive measure. While this approach strengthens the effectiveness of EU sanction enforcement, it also raises interpretative and practical challenges, particularly in distinguishing serious negligence from ordinary negligence and indirect intent. The article concludes that the Slovak model reflects a balanced attempt to comply with Union obligations while preserving the internal coherence and fundamental principles of national criminal law, with its long-term impact depending on consistent judicial interpretation and restrained application in practice.

In this paper, I offer some thoughts inspired by Andrew Simester's magisterial book, Fundamentals of Criminal Law. The starting point is Simester's account of culpability as grounded in moral vice. The initial parts of the paper examine this account, and the language of \"morality\" and \"vice\" contained within it. Of particular concern is the legitimising role of invocations of morality and the complexities that come with that role. The latter parts of the paper raise two puzzles and examine their implications: the first is when moral judgements and legal judgements of blameworthiness come apart; the second when there is a gap between crime seriousness and individual culpability. Both puzzles allow us to tease out aspects of Simester's theory and their implications for sentencing.

Background Progressive dysregulation of polyunsaturated fatty acids such as docosahexaenoic acid is commonly observed in Alzheimer's disease (AD) and other neurodegenerative diseases. The culpability of dyshomeostasis of lipid metabolism in AD is further supported by the prevalence of lipid binding proteins in genome wide association studies for AD. Method We acquired spatial lipidomic profiles in AD model mouse brain using the rapidly emerging technology, Desorption Electrospray Ionization imaging mass spectrometry (DESI‐IMS). Our studies are the first to identify a spatially distinct accretion of docosahexaenoic acid and eicosapentaenoic acid in the globus pallidus prior to plaque deposition. We found a differential spatial lipid profile during aging of wild type mice which was distinct from spatial lipidomic changes during aging in an AD mouse model. To quantify spatially distinct differences, we developed a novel pipeline specific for IMS spatial data. Result Using spatial lipidomics, we identified the differential accretion of polyunsaturated fatty acids docosahexaenoic acid and eicosapentaenoic acid in the globus pallidus concurrent with soluble amyloid b‐peptide accumulation, but prior to plaque deposition. We further identified families of lipids which similar trajectories during aging in a wild type mouse model which were distinct from the AD mouse model. Conclusion Novel lipid species and metabolic pathways are dysregulated during aging and in a mouse model of AD. Spatial lipidomic studies using DESI‐IMS have the potential to identify novel and regionally specific lipid biomarkers in normal aging and AD.

Armed groups seeking to govern territory require the cooperation of many civilians, who are widely perceived as enemy collaborators after conflict ends. The empirical literature on attitudes toward transitional justice focuses heavily on fighters, overlooking more nuanced understandings of proportional justice for civilian collaborators. Through a survey experiment conducted in an Iraqi city that was controlled by the Islamic State, we find that variations in the type of collaboration an actor engages in strongly determine preferences for punishment and forgiveness. While exposure to violence is associated with a greater desire for revenge, perceived volition behind an act—a relatively unstudied factor—is much more important. This research provides unique empirical data on the microfoundations of enemy collaborator culpability. By widening our analytical lens to consider a more realistically broad spectrum of enemy collaboration, we avoid affirming a false dichotomy between victims and perpetrators that is commonly adopted in postwar settings.

This study investigates how prosecutor gender impacts perceptions of defendant culpability in the criminal court system. While factual guilt and evidence should determine culpability, anecdotal beliefs and research suggest that extra-legal factors, such as attorney gender, may influence legal outcomes. Past studies have shown that female attorneys may face disadvantages in negotiations, but little research has explored whether prosecutor gender affects perceptions of defendants. This issue becomes increasingly relevant as more women enter the legal profession. Using a nationwide sample of 471 American adults, this study explores three key questions: 1) whether a prosecutor’s gender influences perceptions of defendant culpability, 2) how respondent gender affects these perceptions, and 3) whether respondent gender moderates the influence of prosecutor gender. To evaluate the impact of prosecutor gender on defendant culpability, this study uses an experimental vignette design manipulating prosecutor gender. Ordered-logistic analysis shows that cases involving female prosecutors result in higher perceptions of defendant culpability relative to cases with male prosecutors. Notably, female respondents are more likely to attribute higher culpability to defendants when the prosecutor is female or when no prosecutor gender is indicated, compared to male respondents. Policy implications and future directions for research are also discussed.