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We study the problem of a monetary authority pursuing an exchange rate policy that is inconsistent with interest rate parity because of a binding zero lower bound constraint. The resulting violation in interest rate parity generates an inflow of capital that the monetary authority needs to absorb by accumulating foreign reserves. We show that these interventions by the monetary authority are costly, and we derive a simple measure of these costs: they are proportional to deviations from the covered interest parity (CIP) condition and the amount of accumulated foreign reserves. Our framework can account for the recent experiences of “safe-haven” currencies and the sign of their observed deviations from CIP.

Debates surrounding the adoption of a common currency have focused on its benefits weighed against the long-term costs of losing monetary independence. These debates have assumed that the penalty for not adopting a common currency is the maintenance of the status quo. This paper uses the Sjaastad model to analyze the price-making power of major currencies with regard to the prices of traded goods in small countries that have not adopted the euro and uses the Bayoumi-Eichengreen OCA index methodology to shed further light on changes in Europe. The empirical evidence suggests that small countries that have not adopted the euro have increasingly seen a change in the determinants of their traded goods prices. This seems to contrast with the experience of small countries that adopted the euro. The results need to be interpreted carefully, given the short time series.

Over the last decade economists have debated whether a country’s exchange rate regime explains how it weathered the Great Recession. As Denmark is the only OECD country with a conventional currency peg, its experience brings unique perspective to the debate. After the collapse of Lehman Brothers in the fall of 2008, the Danish central bank raised the policy rate to defend the euro peg. The spread to the euro area was not normalized until the summer of 2009. Using the synthetic control method, I ask whether Denmark performed worse during 2009-2018 than the synthetic doppelganger, where the doppelganger is made up of comparable OECD countries with flexible exchange rates. I find that Danish real GDP per capita as a percentage of doppelganger ditto has on average been around 95%to98%. Results are consistent across different specifications and samples.

The choice and structure of a country's exchange rate regime has wide implications for the effectiveness and flexibility of monetary policy tools, as well as for economic and financial stability. We examine 21 instances where exchange rate pegs have been abandoned in the past, to gauge the potential economic damage associated with pegs failing. The sample includes major exchange rate shifts over the past thirty years, spanning from the Latin America currency crises of the 1990s to the peg abandonment in Egypt in 2016. Given the close interconnection of banks to the sovereign and the real economy, risks often flow through to, and can also be magnified by, the banking system. We therefore examine the interaction of currency peg abandonment with the occurrence of a banking crisis to investigate the different circumstances and impacts of exchange rate pegs failing. We have found that countries that simultaneously suffered a systemic banking crisis during the period of exchange rate regime shift also experienced significantly greater economic and financial damage following the adoption of a freely floating exchange rate. Nevertheless, regardless of whether there was a banking crisis, countries start showing signs of recovery after the same amount of time once the currency floated.

This research detects the existence of monetary policy transmission mechanisms in Lebanon through which the actions of the central bank propagate. By adopting co-integration analysis and VECM frameworks, and by exploiting monthly data between January 1994 and December 2016, the research revealed the existence of a long-run interest rate channel, affecting both resident private sector deposits and credit to the private sector. Another short-run capital channel was revealed, affecting total credit provided by the banking sector. Additionally, the empirical results show that (1) deposit inflows are not attracted by high interest rates, but stimulated by confidence provided by large foreign currency reserves held by the central banks; (2) non-residents deposit inflows could represent a substitute for local credit; (3) banks pass-through any increase in funding cost to borrowers; and (4) an increase in external interest rates may trigger deposit outflows.

What determines the currency to which countries peg or \"anchor\" their exchange rate? Data for over 100 countries between 1980 and 1998 reveal that trade network externalities are a key determinant. This implies that anchor currency choice may well be suboptimal in that certain currencies, e.g., the U.S. dollar, could be oversubscribed. It also implies that changes in anchor choices by a small number of countries can have large and rapid effects on the international monetary system. Other factors found to be related to anchor choice include the symmetry of output shocks and the currency denomination of liabilities.

Defending a government's exchange-rate commitment with active interest rate policy is not an option in the Krugman-Flood-Garber (KFG) model of speculative attacks. In that model, the interest rate is the passive reflection of currency-depreciation expectations. In this paper we show how to adapt the KFG model to allow for an interest rate defense. It is shown that increasing the domestic-currency interest rate makes domestic assets more attractive according to an asset substitution effect, but weakens the domestic currency by increasing the government's fiscal liabilities. As a result, raising the interest rate hastens the speculative attack when speculation is motivated by underlying fiscal fragility.

Since 1998, the staff of the International Monetary Fund has published a classification of countries' de facto exchange rate arrangements. Experience in operating this classification system has highlighted a need for changes. The present paper provides information on revisions to the system in early 2009. The changes are expected to allow for greater consistency and objectivity of classifications across countries, expedite the classification process, conserve resources, and improve transparency.

We investigate monthly bilateral exchange rate volatility for a large sample of currency pairs over the period 1999–2006. Pegs (particularly to the US dollar) and managed floats tend to have lower volatility than independent floats. A deeper investigation shows that the peg effect operates almost entirely through currency networks (i.e. where two currencies are pegged to the same anchor currency), and the lower volatility of US dollar pegs reflects the size of the US dollar network. Managed floats show clear evidence of tracking the US dollar, further increasing the effective size of the US dollar network. Inflation undermines the currency-stabilizing effect of peg networks. Currencies in smaller peg networks have higher unweighted but not trade-weighted exchange rate volatility, which is consistent with anchors being chosen to minimize trade-weighted volatility. The size of the effective US dollar network revealed here is a plausible explanation of the rarity of basket pegs. Volatility also reflects a range of structural factors such as country size, level of development, population density, inflation differentials and business cycle asymmetry.

In recent years, recommendations for countries to unilaterally dollarize/eurorize have become common, particularly when the countries lack economic credibility. After exploring the characteristics of dollarizing/eurorizing economies, we look at the merits and costs of unilateral eurorization for Cape Verde, a highly tourism based economy that has become increasingly integrated into the euro-zone area and that has a strong macroeconomic track record. We illustrate that neither the benefits nor the costs of unilateral eurorization are large and conclude that there is no compelling case to change the current exchange rate arrangement at this point in time. Econometrically, we assess the characteristics of dollarized economies and demonstrate that few of them apply to Cape Verde, further confirming that Cape Verde does not fit the pattern of most dollarizing countries.