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With the establishment of U.S. Cyber Command, the cyber force is gaining visibility and authority, but challenges remain, particularly in the areas of acquisition and personnel recruitment and career progression. A review of commonalities, similarities, and differences between the still-nascent U.S. cyber force and early U.S. special operations forces, conducted in 2010, offers salient lessons for the future direction of U.S. cyber forces.

The Routledge Handbook of International Cybersecurity examines the development and use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) from the perspective of international peace and security. Acknowledging that the very notion of peace and security has become more complex, the volume seeks to determine which questions of cybersecurity are indeed of relevance for international peace and security and which, while requiring international attention, are simply issues of contemporary governance or development. The Handbook offers a variety of thematic, regional and disciplinary perspectives on the question of international cybersecurity, and the chapters contextualize cybersecurity in the broader contestation over the world order, international law, conflict, human rights, governance and development. The volume is split into four thematic sections: Concepts and frameworks; Challenges to secure and peaceful cyberspace; National and regional perspectives on cybersecurity; Global approaches to cybersecurity. This book will be of much interest to students of cybersecurity, computer science, sociology, international law, defence studies and International Relations in general.

The remarkable development of the Internet has made our lives very convenient, such as through the ability to instantaneously transmit individual pictures. As a result, cyber-attacks are also being developed and increasing, and the computer/mobile devices we use can become infected with viruses in an instant. Rapid cyber situational awareness is essential to prepare for such cyber-attacks. Accelerating cyber situational awareness requires Cyber Common Operational Pictures, which integrate and contextualize numerous data streams and data points. Therefore, we propose a Cyber Common Operational Pictures framework and criteria for rapid cyber situation awareness. First, the system reaction speed based on the user’s request and the standard for easily recognizing the object shown on the screen are presented. Second, standards and frameworks for five types of visualization screens that can directly recognize and respond to cyber-attacks are presented. Third, we show how a system was constructed based on the proposed framework, as well as the results of an experiment on the response time of each visualization screen. As a result of the experiment, the response speed of the 5 visualization screens was about 0.11 s on average for inquiry (simple) and 1.07 s on average for inquiry (complex). This is consistent with the typical response times of the studies investigated in this paper. If CyCOP is developed in compliance with the framework items (UI, object symbol, object size, response speed) presented in this paper, rapid situational awareness is possible. This research can be used in cyber-attack and defense training in the military field. In the private sector, it can be used in cyber and network control.

The USA is in the midst of its most resounding policy shift on cyber conflict with profound implications for national security and the future of the Internet. The US Department of Defense (DoD) cyber strategy concludes that since US cyber forces are in “persistent engagement” with adversaries, then it is an imperative for them to “defend forward” to “continuously contest” them. The implicit prediction is that adversaries will become less effective, forced to expend more resources on defense and rebuild capabilities and infrastructure. John Bolton, the national security advisor, has boasted of a new policy to use offensive cyber operations to impose costs on adversaries and create the frameworks of deterrence. Over time, proponents suggest, these policies will be stabilizing as adversaries engage over repeated engagements in “tacit bargaining” of what is and is not acceptable leading to “more stable expectations of acceptable and unacceptable behavior”. This article advances existing research by including a deeper discussion the academic and policy background on active defense and cyber deterrence, discussing the implied causal chain of “persistent- engagement stability theory,” and analyzing potential risks, especially specific feedback loops which may amplify or dampen cyber conflict. It concludes with specific policy solutions to help mitigate these risks and a suggestion for a broader theory, “stability-enhancing engagement theory.”

From the beginning of the computer age in 1936, information and communication technology (ICT) has been a force for good. Business capacities were increased. Networks allowed the multinational enterprise to operate globally. The Internet improved scientific collaboration, fueled e-commerce, and connected seven billion persons around the world with Massive Online Open Courses (MOOC) and gaming. But there is a dark side to ICT. Employment is destroyed. Artificial intelligence (AI) is replacing humans in white collar jobs and being deployed in warfare. The \"Dark Web\" is facilitating criminal syndicates and terrorism. Privacy and individual autonomy has been lost forever. An accelerating cyber arms race threatens transportation, finance, electricity, and communication infrastructures. Further growth of ICT will not stop. We will see both good and bad consequences downstream.

What explains the variation in implementation dynamics for cyber forces across militaries? In other words, as cyber forces emerge in states across the international system, why do some militaries undertake wide-ranging implementation efforts with few alterations to cyber force structure, while implementation in other militaries is characterized by a drawn-out, incremental process entailing several changes in cyber force structure?Militaries have been building cyber capabilities since the late 1980s; however, formalized military cyber organizations for these capabilities have only recently emerged. These cyber forces—active-duty military organizations that possess the capability and authority to direct and control computer network operations (CNOs) for strategic ends—have received little attention from scholars. Despite the potential impacts cyber forces might hold for international security dynamics, there exists no comprehensive overview of cyber forces and no analysis on the various ways they have been implemented across militaries. Moreover, current explanations drawn from the diffusion of military innovations remain incomplete in explaining the ways in which cyber force structure change over the course of the implementation process.In this dissertation, I examine the diffusion and implementation of cyber forces and advance a theory of organizational size to account for the varying implementation dynamics across militaries. My dissertation makes two important contributions to the growing literature on cyber conflict. First, I offer a novel typology for categorizing cyber forces and the respective force structures. By classifying cyber forces according to organizational model and scale of command, I identify nine distinct cyber force structures: Subordinated Branch, Subordinated Service, Subordinated Joint, Sub-Unified Branch, Sub-Unified Service, Sub-Unified Joint, Unified Branch, Unified Service, and Unified Joint. The second contribution is empirical: I create the first comprehensive database to catalogue the diffusion of cyber forces and evolution of cyber force structures across state—the Dataset on Cyber Force Structures.This dissertation also makes three broader contributions to the study of the diffusion of military innovations. First, I show how organizational characteristics mitigate diffusion pressures by constraining or enabling innovation and implementation. This dissertation moves past debates that portray militaries as either change-resistant or innovation-seeking organizations by providing a more nuanced claim: organizational characteristics—such as size—can predispose militaries to pursue certain types of changes while creating resistance to others. As such, this dissertation sheds important light on the ways in which the military organizational factors can shape the agency and decisions of those implementing an innovation principle.Second, I advance a stage-based conception of implementation for diffusion frameworks comprised of five stages: pre-adoption, introduction, modification, expansion, and full implementation. This framework can account for both partial and full adoption and provides a way to assess intermediate changes to an innovation prior to its full institutionalization. As a result, I use this framework to showcase the value of stage-based theorizing.Third, this dissertation introduces new methodological tools for testing stage-based hypotheses about adoption and implementation. In conjunction with qualitative analysis, this dissertation utilizes multistate survival modeling to assess variable effects at each stage of the implementation process. Traditional modeling techniques in the military diffusion literature—such as logistic regressions and basic survival modeling—prove both cumbersome and inadequate for assessing stage-based processes. In using multistate survival modeling, I emphasize the importance of matching methods to conceptual and theoretical assumptions.

This article addresses the question 'what considerations should be taken by cyber commands when designing attack infrastructure for offensive operations?'. Nation-states are investing in equipping units tasked to conduct offensive cyberspace operations. Generating 'deny, degrade, disrupt, destroy or deceive' effects on adversary targets requires to move from own ('green'), through neutral ('grey'), to adversary ('red') cyberspace. The movement is supported by attack infrastructure for offensive cyberspace operations. In this paper, we review the professional and scientific literature identifying the requirements for designing an attack infrastructure. Next, we develop and define the concepts for attack infrastructure. Finally, we explain and describe the considerations for designing attack infrastructure. The research question is answered by proposing a framework for designing attack infrastructure. This framework is vital for military and civilian commands designing attack infrastructure for offensive cyberspace operations.

This chapter deals with a discussion of ways in which the Security Council could become involved in matters of cybersecurity, briefly discussing likely applicable factors of limited operability. The United Nations Security Council is the executive decision-making arena of the United Nations and the world’s most important international decision-making body with the primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security. After the Cold War, new kinds of conflicts and broader security concerns were increasingly included on the Security Council agenda, many of them without immediate peace and security implications. Estonia, one of the newest additions to the Council, has flagged the question of cybersecurity as part of their candidacy campaign. The Security Council is testament to the international community living a relatively comfortable life, while rogue actors and muscle states operate just shy of the thresholds for the use of force.

The Internet was never designed to be secure. Nonetheless, a growing array of critical infrastructures operated by both the public and private sectors, from financial networks to power grids and healthcare systems, are either reliant on or connected to the Internet. This makes these infrastructures vulnerable to cyber attacks, and, hence, makes security of critical infrastructure from cyber threats a vital issue for homeland security writ large. This chapter provides an introduction to notable past attacks on critical infrastructure and the state of cybersecurity legislation in the United States.