Explore the vast range of titles available.

China’s deposit insurance scheme was established in 2015 and was first tested in 2019 when Baoshang Bank was formally declared insolvent. This article provides the first analysis to scrutinise both the legal framework and the operation of the deposit insurance scheme in China. Specifically, the article examines the implementation of China’s deposit insurance scheme in two recent events, the insolvency of Baoshang Bank and the collective bank runs taking place in Henan and Anhui provinces, which have not been extensively covered by existing literature. The findings of this article affirm that the current deposit insurance scheme does provide a fundamental level of protection to depositors. However, many uncertainties and weaknesses remain, particularly regarding the difficulty of initiating depositor compensation, the uncertain function of deposit insurance funds, the vague rights and responsibilities of the Chinese Deposit Insurance Fund Management Corporation, and the maximum level of payment. Moreover, there are two barriers pinpointed which may substantially hinder the development of the Chinese deposit insurance scheme. First, traditional beliefs in state guarantees for banks and policies aimed at maintaining social stability create an environment where banks in China may rely on implicit state support. Second, the unsound bank insolvency mechanism complicates the depositor compensation process and undermines depositor confidence in China’s deposit insurance scheme.

This study investigates the impact of Deposit Insurance Systems (DISs) structure on deposit growth across 40 major global economies. Using panel data regression and an instrumental variable model, we find that government-administered DISs significantly reduce deposit growth, particularly in developed economies where private administration is preferred. A key contribution is the identification of DIS implementation timelines as a critical determinant of deposit dynamics. Countries introducing DISs post-2005 experience stronger deposit growth, while earlier adopters show mixed outcomes. The study also uncovers economic-size-specific heterogeneity, revealing that developed nations favor private DISs frameworks, whereas emerging economies lean towards government-backed models. This research provides novel insights into how the DIS administration influences depositor confidence and financial stability. The findings highlight the need for policymakers to tailor their DIS frameworks to national economic structures, ensuring an optimal balance between depositor protection, financial resilience, and systemic risk mitigation. This study offers a rigorous empirical examination of how the administrative structure of Deposit Insurance Systems (DIS) - specifically, the public-private dichotomy- influences deposit growth across 40 major economies over a 23-year period. Employing fixed-effects panel regression and instrumental variable (2SLS) techniques, the paper addresses endogeneity by instrumenting DIS type with system mandate, premium structure, and regulatory scope. Findings reveal a significant negative association between government-administered DIS and deposit-to-GDP ratios, robust across alternative specifications and deposit measures. The research introduces a novel temporal framework, demonstrating that post-2005 DIS implementations exhibit stronger depositor responsiveness, indicating evolving confidence dynamics. Additionally, the study uncovers structural heterogeneity based on economic size and OECD membership, showing divergent deposit behaviors under different DIS types. This work advances the literature by linking DIS architecture to deposit-credit transmission mechanisms and systemic liquidity conditions. The results offer critical implications for macroprudential policy design, emphasizing the need for context-specific DIS frameworks that balance depositor protection with financial stability objectives.

The recent financial crisis highlights the importance of both regulatory and market discipline. Government reactions to the crisis included expanding deposit insurance coverage and rescuing troubled institutions, including some institutions that might not otherwise be considered too important to fail. These actions may have the unintended consequence of a reduction in market discipline that might otherwise penalize banks for risk-taking behavior. Alternatively, market discipline may have increased during the crisis due to heightened awareness of the risks of bank failures. To address these issues, we first test for the presence of depositor discipline effects in the period leading up to the financial crisis in both the US and the EU. Second, we test whether depositor discipline decreased or increased during the crisis. We find significant depositor discipline prior to the crisis in both the US and EU, but this varies between the US and the EU as well as with banking organization size and with listed versus unlisted status. We also find that depositor discipline mostly decreased during the crisis, except for the case of small US banks.

PurposeThis research aims to investigate the disciplinary functions of depositors and subordinated debt holders within Indonesia's dual banking system, examining the impact of regulatory changes on market discipline.Design/methodology/approachThe study employs a comprehensive analysis of the dual banking system in Indonesia over 15 years. Utilizing a non-public dataset from the Financial Services Authority and the Indonesia Deposit Insurance Corporation, the study employs propensity score matching and difference-in-differences analysis.FindingsThe findings reveal distinct patterns in the exercise of market discipline by depositors over different regulatory regimes. During the blanket guarantee regime (2002–2005), depositors lacked the incentive to monitor banks but resumed their disciplinary role under the limited guarantee regime (2005–2017). Islamic banks faced simultaneous market and regulatory discipline, with market discipline prevailing.Originality/valueThis study contributes to the literature by providing novel insights into the interplay between regulatory changes, market discipline and depositor behavior within Indonesia's dual banking system. The utilization of a comprehensive non-public dataset from regulatory authorities adds to the originality of the research.

Considering consumer health, consistency in processes, and developing trust among the public, food manufacturing facilities are expected to adhere to strict regulatory policies. Along with these expectations, machinery capabilities, especially considering reliability, maintainability, and hygienic designs, would play a significant role in delivering quality products and developing efficient processes. This paper focuses on a belt-style depositor machine, whose primary purpose is to deposit product pieces onto product passing below it. First, the key issues with the current machine are pinpointed. Next, alternative designs are provided aimed at testing, evaluating, and building belt-driven depositing machines. The original design experienced persistent belt tracking issues, frequent maintenance interruptions, and sanitation concerns due to its complex, heavy components. The project applied the Define, Measure, Analyze, Design, and Verify (DMADV) framework to test alternative belt configurations and implement improvements that significantly reduced maintenance time, improved tracking reliability, and enhanced hygienic design. Lab and real-world tests compared three prototypes, namely the V-Rib, Crowned Roller, and Pin Drive. The prototypes were compared against defined performance targets. The final system, built around a self-tracking V-Rib belt with modular components and reduced tool disassembly, demonstrated a 75% reduction in belt change time, and improved product consistency and compliance with sanitation standards. This redesign offers a replicable model for upgrading depositor systems across production lines.

Although it has been intensively claimed that Islamic banks are subject to more market discipline, the empirical literature is surprisingly mute on this topic. To fill this gap and to verify the conjecture that Islamic bank depositors are indeed able to monitor and discipline their banks, we use Turkey as a test setting. The theory of market discipline predicts that when excessive risk taking occurs, depositors will ask higher returns on their deposits or withdraw their funds. We look at the effect of the deposit insurance reform in which the dual deposit insurance was revised and all banks were put under the same deposit insurance company in December 2005. This gives us a natural experiment in which the effect of the reform can be compared for the treatment group (i.e., Islamic banks) and control group (i.e., conventional banks). We find that the deposit insurance reform has increased the market discipline in the Turkish Islamic banking sector. This reform may have upset the sensitivities of the religiously inspired depositors, and perhaps more importantly it might have terminated the existing mutual supervision and support among Islamic banks.

The religious principles that characterize the Islamic bank have direct consequences on the models of Corporate Governance which, at the same time, must be in accordance with national and international regulations and best practices. The aim of this paper is to analyze the role of the participatory depositor in the Corporate Governance Models of the Islamic Bank, a special category of stakeholder that entrusts their savings to the Islamic Bank on the basis of the Profit and Loss Sharing principle. In the present study the models of Corporate Governance of the Islamic Bank, with regard to the protection of the interests of the participatory depositor, are analyzed through a comparative analysis of the regulations of the following Countries, Malaysia and Morocco. The objective is to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the protection of the interests of affected stakeholders in order to verify the presence of a sustainable model of Corporate Governance, namely if the participatory depositor needs more guarantees than other categories of stakeholders.

Purpose This study aims to assess the effectiveness of the banking market discipline in relation to the development of Financial Technology (FinTech) startups. Design/methodology/approach Using panel data collected from 144 banks in Indonesia from 2004 to 2018, this study’s regression models were estimated using fixed effects with robust standard errors. Findings This study finds that FinTech startups disturb bank deposits. Meanwhile, market discipline exists in Indonesian banks, as indicated by depositors’ behavior with higher credit and liquidity risks. However, market discipline does not exist for bank insolvency risk, which is indicated by a significant and positive relationship with the dependent variable. Therefore, the higher the number of FinTech startups, the more effective the market discipline. Empirical findings also revealed that the joint impact between FinTech startups and bank risk is also important in explaining the difference in the effectiveness of banking market discipline. Practical implications This study has policy implications for banks in mitigating risk associated with market discipline and instability of financial intermediation. Originality/value This study offers a significant contribution to the empirical literature because it specifically explores the effectiveness of the banking market discipline by focusing on the joint impact of FinTech startups and bank risk on deposits. Furthermore, this study contributes to providing empirical evidence that links between FinTech startups and bank risk affect depositor behavior at government-owned, private, large and small, as well as nonmobile and mobile adoption banks.

We examine market movement and depositors’ reaction following the announcement of enforcement actions (EAs) on US banks over the period 2004 to 2015. Using an extensive dataset of manually collected EAs, employing event study and multivariate analyses, we investigate the impact of EAs on key bank stakeholders, i.e. shareholders and depositors. Our findings suggest that equity market and depositors are able to discriminate EAs based on their severity. Market reacts negatively following severe EAs (cease and desist) while weak reaction is noted for other EA types (civil money penalty and formal agreements). Demand depositors exhibit some level of depositor disciplining mechanism following cease and desist announcements, while core depositors seem to reward sanctioned banks for a higher return. A positive effect is found following formal agreement announcements that seem to be perceived as a corrective mechanism. We validate these findings across the sanctioned (treatment) and comparable non-sanctioned (control) banks, using propensity score matching methodology. These findings have important policy implications and expand the existing knowledge on the consequences of banking supervision to guide banks’ behaviour, drive policy interventions and contribute to enhance supervisory effectiveness.