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3,647 result(s) for "DIPLOMACY AND DIPLOMATS"
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The Politics of Dispute Settlement Design: Explaining Legalism in Regional Trade Pacts
Dispute settlement mechanisms in international trade vary dramatically from one agreement to another. Some mechanisms are highly legalistic, with standing tribunals that resemble national courts in their powers and procedures. Others are diplomatic, requiring only that the disputing countries make a good-faith effort to resolve their differences through consultations. In this article I seek to account for the tremendous variation in institutional design across a set of more than sixty post-1957 regional trade pacts. In contrast to accounts that emphasize the transaction costs of collective action or the functional requirements of deep integration, I find that the level of legalism in each agreement is strongly related to the level of economic asymmetry, in interaction with the proposed depth of liberalization, among member countries.
Munich
\"September 1938. Hitler is determined to invade Czechoslovakia. The British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, is desperate to avoid what would certainly be the war following such a move. The city of Munich, Germany, is to be the site of an eleventh-hour meeting between them--a last desperate effort to preserve an already precarious peace. Aboard the plane flying Chamberlain to the meeting is Hugh Legat, a rising star of the British diplomatic corps, serving at 10 Downing Street as a private secretary to the Prime Minister. Aboard the overnight train bringing Hitler to Munich is Paul von Hartmann, a staff member of the German Foreign Office. Legat and Hartmann were close friends at Oxford in the 1920s, but have not been in contact for six years. Each of them is carrying the weight of a painful, personal secret. Now, as their paths cross in Munich, they will become privy to a state secret--one that could profoundly affect the very future of Europe. And they will be confronted with a dreadful decision: What are they each willing to betray? Friends, family, country, or conscience? Once again, Robert Harris gives us actual events of historical importance--here are Hitler, Chamberlain, Mussolini, and Daladier at the precipice of a second world war--at the heart of an utterly electrifying novel.\" --Dust jacket.
Diversionary Foreign Policy in Democratic Systems
This article examines how reelection incentives influence foreign policy decision making in democratic states. A formal model characterizes how future electoral prospects affect a government's decision to undertake adventurous foreign policies. When governments are assured of reelection, they make unbiased decisions considering only international factors. Decision making is similarly unbiased when governments have no prospects of reelection. When the voters' evaluation of foreign policy outcomes could have an effect on election results then governments are biased towards violent, adventurous foreign policy projects. Institutional constraints are shown to reduce the magnitude of these biases. The bias in foreign policy decisions at the end of the electoral cycle influences decision making in other countries. As a nation approaches the end of its electoral cycle other nations are more conciliatory and less confrontational towards it. With endogenous crisis formation, the model provides an explanation for the empirical phenomenon that democracies are more likely to become involved in war early in their electoral term.
The origin of ping-pong diplomacy : the forgotten architect of Sino-U.S. rapprochement
\"Japan Table Tennis Association President Gotō Kōji (1906-1972), the founder of Meiden High School, nurtured socially viable youth through sports education and used table tennis as a means of promoting international friendship and peace. All the expertise Gotō accumulated through his lifework as an educator and civic leader was culminated in his decision to invite China to the World Table Tennis Championships in Nagoya in 1971. Notwithstanding the stalemate in the negotiations with Chinese officials on the terms of China's participation (China linked its participation to the \"two Chinas\" issue), Gotō's convictions and principles earned Premier Zhou Enlai's respect and made China's participation possible. Were it not for Gotō's initiative, President Richard Nixon would not have visited China in 1972. After four decades of obscurity, it is high time to set the record straight and give Gotō overdue credit\"-- Provided by publisher.
Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games
Domestic politics and international relations are often inextricably entangled, but existing theories (particularly “state-centric” theories) do not adequately account for these linkages. When national leaders must win ratification (formal or informal) from their constituents for an international agreement, their negotiating behavior reflects the simultaneous imperatives of both a domestic political game and an international game. Using illustrations from Western economic summitry, the Panama Canal and Versailles Treaty negotiations, IMF stabilization programs, the European Community, and many other diplomatic contexts, this article offers a theory of ratification. It addresses the role of domestic preferences and coalitions, domestic political institutions and practices, the strategies and tactics of negotiators, uncertainty, the domestic reverberation of international pressures, and the interests of the chief negotiator. This theory of “two-level games” may also be applicable to many other political phenomena, such as dependency, legislative committees, and multiparty coalitions.
Plunging into Haiti
pFor much of the early 1990s, Haiti held the world's attention. A fiery populist priest, Jean Bertrand Aristide, was elected president and deposed a year later in a military coup. Soon thousands of desperately poor Haitians started to arrive in makeshift boats on the shores of Florida. In early 1993, the newly elected Clinton administration pledged to make the restoration of President Aristide one of the cornerstones of its foreign policy. But that fall the U.S. let supporters of Haiti's ruling military junta intimidate America into ordering the USS Harlan County and its cargo of UN peacekeeping troops to scotch plans and return to port. Less than a year later, for the first time in U.S. history, a deposed president of another country prevailed on the United States to use its military might to return him to office. pThese extraordinary events provide the backdrop for iPlunging into Haiti: Clinton, Aristide, and the Defeat of Diplomacy/i—Ralph Pezzullo's detailed account of the international diplomatic effort to resolve the political crisis. Through his father, Lawrence Pezzullo, who served as the U.S. special envoy to Haiti, Ralph Pezzullo gained access to important players on all sides. He tells the story of talented, committed men and women from the United States, France, Argentina, and Haiti who dedicated themselves to creating an outcome that would benefit Haiti and the rest of the world. With the energy of a political thriller, iPlunging into Haiti/i fleshes out the central political struggle with threads of Haitian history and will engage readers with a general interest in Haiti as well as students of foreign policy. Using his unique perspective and access, Ralph Pezzullo covers the aftermath of the Clinton administration's diplomatic maneuvers to show an island still in turmoil. pRalph Pezzullo is an award-winning playwright, screenwriter, novelist, poet, and journalist. He is the author of several books including iJawbreaker/i and iAt the Fall of Somoza/i and has written articles for the iWall Street Journal/i, iNewsweek/i, the iWashington Post/i, iSports Illustrated/i, iConnoisseur/i, iGQ/i, iUSA Weekend/i, the iMiami Herald/i, and other publications.
Why Economic Sanctions Still Do Not Work
Pape replies to Kimberly Elliott's response to his article \"Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work\" and reiterates that there is little empirical support that economic sanctions can achieve ambitious foreign policy goals.
Explaining the resurgence of regionalism in world politics
The past decade has witnessed a resurgence of regionalism in world politics. Old regionalist organizations have been revived, new organizations formed, and regionalism and the call for strengthened regionalist arrangements have been central to many of the debates about the nature of the post-Cold War international order. The number, scope and diversity of regionalist schemes have grown significantly since the last major ‘regionalist wave’ in the 1960s. Writing towards the end of this earlier regionalist wave, Joseph Nye could point to two major classes of regionalist activity: on the one hand, micro-economic organizations involving formal economic integration and characterized by formal institutional structures; and on the other, macro-regional political organizations concerned with controlling conflict. Today, in the political field, regional dinosaurs such as the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Organization of American States (OAS) have re-emerged. They have been joined both by a large number of aspiring micro-regional bodies (such as the Visegrad Pact and the Pentagonale in central Europe; the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in the Middle East; ECOWAS and possibly a revived Southern African Development Community (SADC, formerly SADCC) led by post-apartheid South Africa in Africa), and by loosely institutionalized meso-regional security groupings such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, now OSCE) and more recently the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). In the economic field, micro-regional schemes for economic cooperation or integration (such as the Southern Cone Common Market, Mercosur, the Andean Pact, the Central American Common Market (CACM) and CARICOM in the Americas; the attempts to expand economic integration within ASEAN; and the proliferation of free trade areas throughout the developing world) stand together with arguments for macro-economic or ‘bloc regionalism’ built around the triad of an expanded European Union (EU), the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) and some further development of Asia-Pacific regionalism. The relationship between these regional schemes and between regional and broader global initiatives is central to the politics of contemporary regionalism.