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Constituye el objeto principal de este trabajo el análisis de una institución regulada en la partida III del título II de la ley XLVI, la denominada acción de jactancia, hoy día vigente, a pesar de las disposiciones derogatorias de los códigos de finales del siglo XIX, gracias al reconocimiento otorgado por la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Supremo, que ha ido perfilando y adaptando sus características hasta nuestros días. La actualidad de la acción provocatoria constituye un hecho excepcional sin parangón en nuestro derecho. Se estudia el contenido de la ley XLVI, sus antecedentes, su naturaleza y su relación con otras instituciones jurídicas. Se analizan cronológicamente todas las sentencias del Tribunal Supremo que aplican la acción de jactancia y las distintas y enfrentadas aportaciones doctrinales. Se recogen algunas sentencias de las Audiencias Provinciales que aplican la acción provocatoria, así como otras que la inadmiten, calificándola como una antigualla jurídica. Se examina la nominada por un sector de la doctrina «acción de jactancia laboral», al defender una similitud de la acción con lo dispuesto en el artículo 124 de la Ley 36/2011. De igual forma, se considera la posible relación de la acción de jactancia con las acciones contempladas en los derechos de la propiedad intelectual e industrial, con la acción negatoria del artículo 121 de la ley de patentes, de aplicación también para las marcas, y finalmente, la acción meramente declarativa del artículo 32 de la Ley de Competencia Desleal. Hay razones fundadas para sostener que la vigencia otorgada a la acción provocatoria por nuestro Tribunal Supremo no responde a una añoranza histórica, sino a que la acción puede ser hoy día de utilidad, después de más de 750 años. Así, se concluye este trabajo, con una apuesta clara por una necesaria regulación normativa de la acción que excluya cualquier atisbo de duda respecto a su puesta en valor. Se propone un proyecto de ley que normativice la acción de jactancia dentro de la Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil, no ya por una mera añoranza del pasado, sino porque la acción –hoy día– puede dar respuesta a diferentes supuestos de hecho muy actuales.Lisardo García Rodulfo (Terque, Almeria, 1961) Licenciado en Derecho por la Universidad de Granada. MBA por la Escuela de Negocios de Andalucía. Doctor en Derecho por la Universidad de Jaén. Autor de numerosas publicaciones entre las que destacan: El Principio de no discriminación en el derecho comunitario. Comentario a la Sentencia del Tribunal de Justicia de las Comunidades Europeas en los asuntos 250/86 -11/87. Editorial CISS. La Sociedad Anónima Europea. Editorial Aranzadi. La acción de jactancia: estado de la cuestión y propuesta de recuperación normativa de una acción procesal civil. Revista de Estudios Jurídicos. Abogado en ejercicio desde 1986, socio fundador de la firma Maat Abogados & Asociados. Ha participado como ponente en numerosos cursos, seminarios y congresos sobre derecho civil y procesal.

When plaintiffs want prospective relief, they usually request an injunction, a declaratory judgment, or both. The fact that plaintiffs often choose between these remedies, or seek them together, raises an obvious question: How are they different? The standard answer is that the declaratory judgment is milder and the injunction is stronger. This mildness thesis has been endorsed by the Supreme Court, the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, and many legal scholars. Three rationales have been given for why the declaratory judgment is milder, each focused on something the declaratory judgment is said to lack: a command to the parties, a sanction for disobedience, and full issue-preclusive effect. This Article critiques the rationales for the mildness thesis, demonstrating that they cannot be squared with the way the declaratory judgment and the injunction are actually used. This Article also offers an alternative account of the choice between these remedies. In many contexts they are substitutes, but not always perfect substitutes. This Article therefore explores the conditions under which each remedy has a comparative advantage when used prospectively. Central to this account is judicial management. The injunction has—and the declaratory judgment lacks—a number of features that allow a court to effectively manage the parties. There is also a difference in timing, because the declaratory judgment is sometimes available at an earlier stage of a dispute. This account clarifies the choice between these remedies, and it has implications for the doctrine of ripeness.

The Eleventh Amendment casts a long and familiar shadow over the law of state government accountability. Nominally aimed at curtailing the judicial power of the United States over \"suits in law or equity\" brought against the states by two disfavored plaintiffs, the Eleventh Amendment has been read to exclude a much broader array of claims from federal cognizance. What is more, the principle of state immunity that has been said to animate the Eleventh Amendment now operates as a bar to the assertion of federal question claims in both state courts and federal administrative agencies. These developments, carefully analyzed in a stream of scholarship that shows no signs of abating, imposewell-known limits both on the power of the courts and on the power of Congress to bring states fully within certain federal regulatory programs. Thus, while Congress can subject states to suit in legislation adopted pursuant to constitutional powers enumerated after the Civil War, much regulation of the national economy occurs under earlier grants of Article I authority (over interstate commerce, say, or intellectual property) that do not support such \"abrogation\" of state immunity.

[...]the court ruled in Thirty-One's favor that the use of the easement to allow the commercial hunting outfitter access to the Richeau Property exceeded the scope of the easement. Testolin and Karlberg appealed to the state supreme court the ruling that access to the hunting outfitter was an impermissible use of the easement. In light of the easement's language, supported by the actual use of the easement, the court concluded that the district court erred in finding the easement was limited.

Declaratory judgment allows a court, in cases of actual controversy, to make binding declarations of rights having the force of final judgments. [...]Travelers could not show that there was an actual controversy between the parties, because once Travelers denied Cedar Ridge's appraisal request, there was no longer an actual controversy regarding the applicability of the appraisal provision. [...]Travelers could not fulfill the requirements necessary for a declaratory judgment. [...]the appellate court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Traveler's declaratory judgment complaint.

In 1880, the federal government conveyed to the State of Florida (State) a tract of land (Parent Tract) along the South Fork of New River, the legal description of which included uplands and submerged lands to the center of the river as well as riparian rights along the entire riverfront. Nothing in the record showed LBY's parcel extended to the boundary with Parcel 108, and because Choate was not a party to the trial, there was no evidence of what property interests he intended to convey. [...]because Choate was not a party, it was improper for the trial court to declare an implied easement over submerged land in which Choate may still have an interest. [...]the court reversed the declaratory judgment in favor of LBY and remanded for further proceedings.

The broad application of the regulations defining charitable purpose and related revenue rulings as well as their age makes them a particularly good vehicle for considering the implications of recent tax cases invalidating guidance based on administrative law doctrines. [...]most tax lawyers have at least a passing familiarity with § 501(c)(3), making this approach to recent decisions accessible. [...]it demonstrates the enormous potential harm to the tax system from judicial invalidation of old tax guidance based on flaws in the administrative procedure. An organization challenging denial of exemption in a declaratory judgment action under section 7428 could raise administrative law issues like those in the recent cases discussed in this Article.6 Challenges based on the APA have already occurred in connection with charitable deductions, a tax provision closely related to the definition of charitable purpose.7 The broad application of the Regulations defining charitable purpose and related revenue rulings, as well as their age, makes them a particularly good vehicle for considering the implications of recent tax cases invalidating guidance based on administrative law doctrines. [...]most tax lawyers have at least a passing familiarity with section 501(c)(3), making this approach to recent decisions generally accessible. [...]I urge Congress to codify the approach of a recent district court decision, which applied a six-year statute of limitations, accruing from the date tax guidance is issued, to challenges for noncompliance with the APA.8 Second, application of administrative law doctrine to this body of tax laws exposes flaws regarding guidance not only as to charitable purpose but also to tax guidance more generally. Some make a primarily positive argument, taking the position that various doctrines of administrative law do not apply generally to tax guidance under current law,10 in particular, required notice-and-comment for regulations issued under the general authority of section 7805(a).11 Another strand of this scholarship focuses on the harm to the quality and quantity of tax guidance that strict adherence to the APA would produce.12 That is, this latter category of work argues as a normative matter that various aspects of administrative law should not apply to tax guidance. Because I discuss cases taking the position that a wide variety of Service guidance documents must adhere to administrative law requirements related to notice-and-comment rulemaking, I take that application for granted.

On December 1, 2022, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) rendered its judgment in the Dispute Concerning the Status and Use of the Waters of the Silala (Chile v. Bolivia). There is no basin agreement governing the Silala, and Chile and Bolivia have ratified neither the 1997 Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses nor the 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes. In the absence of a treaty regime applicable to the waters of the Silala River, the Court had the opportunity in this case to consider the legal framework applicable to international watercourses under customary international law.