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Cryptic Concrete explores bunkered sites in Cold War Germany in order to understand the inner workings of the Cold War state. * A scholarly work that suggests a reassessment of the history of geo- and bio-politics * Attempts to understand the material architecture that was designed to protect and take life in nuclear war * Zooms in on two types of structures - the nuclear bunker and the atomic missile silo * Analyzes a broad range of sources through the lens of critical theory and argues for an appreciation of the two subterranean structures' complementary nature

This volume analyses key features of recent and ongoing transformations of defence issues, from four key perspectives. These are defence economics, the spatial footprint of defence, human resources management by the armed forces and the international landscape of defence.

Paul Dibb AM has had an extraordinary career. He enjoys an international scholarly reputation of the highest order, while at the same time he has done much distinguished public service. He was a pioneer in moving back and forth between posts in government departments, notably the Department of Defence, and academia. He began as a student of Soviet economic geography, and then spent nearly two decades in Australian Defence intelligence, including service as Head of the National Assessments Staff (NAS) in the Joint Intelligence Organisation (JIO) from 1974 to 1978, Deputy Director of JIO in 1978–80, Director of JIO in 1986–88, and Deputy Secretary of Defence (Strategy and Intelligence) in 1988–91, before becoming a Professor in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (SDSC) at The Australian National University (where he is now an Emeritus Professor). He has been quite happy to engage in vigorous public debate about important and controversial strategic and defence issues, giving him a high public profile. The contributors include two former Chancellors of ANU, one a former Minister of Defence, and the other a former Secretary of the Department of Defence, a former Chief of the Defence Force (CDF), and other former senior officials, as well as academic specialists in geography, international relations, and strategic and defence studies. ‘This would be a high-quality set of essays for any edited volume, but for a festschrift – a genre that sometimes generates uneven collections – this is an exceptional assembly. The individual pieces are very good; together, they have coherence and power.’ – Professor Ian Hall, Professor of International Relations, Griffith University

The provision of advanced Russian military technology has been critical for the development of China's anti-access/area-denial (A2AD) capability. This study focuses on one aspect of the relationship, namely Russia's contribution to the PLA Navy's surface and anti-surface warfare capabilities. Following a discussion of the role of the fleet in China's A2AD strategy, the author examines in depth the specific warships, anti-ship missile systems, and air defense systems that Russia has been providing. Next, he considers specifically how Russian technology has translated into new military capability for China's maritime forces. Finally, he offers a projection of the likely future direction of Russian assistance in this area. While China has made enormous progress in developing its indigenous defense production capability, this report makes the case that Russian defense assistance has been, is, and will likely continue to be important for the development of China's surface warfare capabilities and its A2AD project more broadly.

This is the first book to examine of the concept of anti-access and area denial warfare. This type of strategy which is also referred to by acronym \"A2/AD,\" has been identified in American strategic planning as the most likely strategies to be deployed by the People's Republic of China and the Islamic Republic of Iran in any future conflict with the United States. It advances the understanding of sea power by identifying the naval roots of the development of the concept of anti-access while previous studies of the subject have emphasised the effects on the joint force and, particularly, air forces. While the book describes the subject from a joint perspective, it focuses on the dominant maritime nature of such conflicts.

Antiaccess strategies could allow China to reach its military and political objectives while keeping the United States from doing so. There are a number of actions the United States can take to counter such strategies. U.S. strategists have become increasingly concerned that an adversary might use “antiaccess” strategies to interfere with our ability to deploy or operate military forces overseas. The authors analyzed Chinese military-doctrinal publications to see what strategies China might employ in the event of a conflict with the United States. They then assessed how these strategies might affect U.S. military operations and identified ways to reduce these effects. It appears possible that China could use antiaccess strategies to defeat the United States in a conflict — not in the sense of destroying the U.S. military but in the sense of accomplishing China’s military and political objectives while preventing the United States from accomplishing all or some of its own. The United States can, however, take steps to counter such threats, including strengthening active and passive defenses at theater air bases, diversifying basing options for aircraft, and strengthening defenses against covert operative attack. In addition, the U.S. military needs to acquire or improve its capabilities in a number of areas, including ballistic and cruise missile defense, antisubmarine warfare, and minesweeping.

Despite the rising salience of missile threats, current air and missile defense forces are far too susceptible to suppression. Today’s U.S. air and missile defense (AMD) force lacks the depth, capacity, and operational flexibility to simultaneously perform both missions. Discussions about improving AMD usually revolve around improvements to the capability and capacity of interceptors or sensors. Rather than simply doing more of the same, the joint integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) efforts might be well served by new or reinvigorated operational concepts, here discussed collectively as “Distributed Defense.” By leveraging networked integration, Distributed Defense envisions a more flexible and more dispersible air and missile defense force capable of imposing costs and dilemmas on an adversary, complicating the suppression of U.S. air and missile defenses. Although capability and capacity improvements remain essential to the high-end threats, the Distributed Defense concept focuses on creating a new architecture for today’s fielded or soon-to-be fielded IAMD force to boost flexibility and resilience.

This is the first book to examine the concept of anti-access and area denial warfare, providing a definitive introduction to both conceptual theories and historical examples of this strategy. Also referred to by the acronym \"A2/AD,\" anti-access warfare has been identified in American strategic planning as the most likely strategy to be employed by the People's Republic of China or by the Islamic Republic of Iran in any future conflict with the United States.

Winner of the 2009 Distinguished Book Award of the Society for Military History Vauban under Siege is the first systematic comparison of the theory of Vaubanian siegecraft with its reality, contrasting military engineering's pursuit of the efficient siege with generals' contradictory search for rapid conquest, purchased at the cost of additional lives.