Explore the vast range of titles available.

Concerns about reducing the rate of growth of health expenditures have reignited interest in medical liability reforms and their potential to save money by reducing the practice of defensive medicine. It is not easy to estimate the costs of the medical liability system, however. This article identifies the various components of liability system costs, generates national estimates for each component, and discusses the level of evidence available to support the estimates. Overall annual medical liability system costs, including defensive medicine, are estimated to be $55.6 billion in 2008 dollars, or 2.4 percent of total health care spending.

The role of defensive medicine in driving up health care costs is hotly contended. Physicians and health policy experts in particular tend to have sharply divergent views on the subject. Physicians argue that defensive medicine is a significant driver of health care cost inflation. Policy analysts, on the other hand, observe that malpractice reform, by itself, will probably not do much to reduce costs. We argue that both answers are incomplete. Ultimately, malpractice reform is a necessary but insufficient component of medical cost containment. The evidence suggests that defensive medicine accounts for a small but non-negligible fraction of health care costs. Yet the traditional medical malpractice reforms that many physicians desire will not assuage the various pressures that lead providers to overprescribe and overtreat. These reforms may, nevertheless, be necessary to persuade physicians to accept necessary changes in their practice patterns as part of the larger changes to the health care payment and delivery systems that cost containment requires.

The U.S. medical malpractice liability system has two principal objectives: to compensate patients who are injured through the negligence of healthcare providers and to deter providers from practicing negligently. In practice, however, the system is slow and costly to administer. It both fails to compensate patients who have suffered from bad medical care and compensates those who haven't. According to opinion surveys of physicians, the system creates incentives to undertake cost-ineffective treatments based on fear of legal liability—to practice “defensive medicine.” The failures of the liability system and the high cost of health care in the United States have led to an important debate over tort policy. How well does malpractice law achieve its intended goals? How large of a problem is defensive medicine and can reforms to malpractice law reduce its impact on healthcare spending? The flaws of the existing system have led a number of states to change their laws in a way that would reduce malpractice liability—to adopt “tort reforms.” Evidence from several studies suggests that wisely chosen reforms have the potential to reduce healthcare spending significantly with no adverse impact on patient health outcomes.

This Health Policy Report describes the malpractice system in the United States, examines its shortcomings, and analyzes the forces that have led to past and current malpractice crises. The authors review options for reform of the U.S. malpractice system. Conventional tort reforms include caps on damages, limits on attorneys' fees, and shortening of the statute of limitations. Experts have also proposed major system reforms, such as enterprise liability or administrative compensation. Options for reform of the American malpractice system. Few issues in health care spark as much ire and angst as medical-malpractice litigation. Physicians revile malpractice claims as random events that visit unwarranted expense and emotional pain on competent, hardworking practitioners. Commentators lament the “lawsuit lottery,” which provides windfalls for some patients, but no compensation for the vast majority of patients injured by medical care. 1 , 2 Within the health care industry, there is a nearly universal belief that malpractice litigation has long since surpassed sensible levels and that major tort reform is overdue. Yet the drive to litigate continues. Plaintiffs' attorneys and some consumer groups interpret providers' grievances as . . .

ObjectivesThis study investigated whether the attitudes of physicians towards justified and unjustified litigation, and their perception of patient pressure in demanding care, influence their use of defensive medical behaviours.DesignCross-sectional survey using exploratory factor analysis was conducted to determine litigation attitude and perceived patient pressure factors. Regression analyses were used to regress these factors on to the ordering of extra tests or procedures (defensive assurance behaviour) or the avoidance of high-risk patients or procedures (defensive avoidance behaviour).SettingData were collected from eight Dutch hospitals.ParticipantsRespondents were 160 physicians and 54 residents (response rate 25%) of the hospital departments of (1) anaesthesiology, (2) colon, stomach and liver diseases, (3) gynaecology, (4) internal medicine, (5) neurology and (6) surgery.Primary outcome measuresRespondents’ application of defensive assurance and avoidance behaviours.Results‘Disapproval of justified litigation’ and ‘Concerns about unjustified litigation’ were positively related to both assurance (β=0.21, p<0.01, and β=0.28, p<0.001, respectively) and avoidance (β=0.16, p<0.05, and β=0.18, p<0.05, respectively) behaviours. ‘Self-blame for justified litigation’ was not significantly related to both defensive behaviours. Perceived patient pressures to refer (β=0.18, p<0.05) and to prescribe medicine (β=0.23, p<0.01) had direct positive relationships with assurance behaviour, whereas perceived patient pressure to prescribe medicine was also positively related to avoidance behaviour (β=0.14, p<0.05). No difference was found between physicians and residents in their defensive medical behaviour.ConclusionsPhysicians adopted more defensive medical behaviours if they had stronger thoughts and emotions towards (un)justified litigation. Further, physicians should be aware that perceived patient pressure for care can lead to them adopting defensive behaviours that negatively affects the quality and safety of patient care.

To describe the daily work practice under the threat of defensive medicine among obstetricians and gynecologists. A prospective cross-sectional survey of obstetricians and gynecologists working at tertiary medical centers in Israel. Among the 117 obstetricians and gynecologists who participated in the survey, representing 10% of the obstetricians and gynecologists registered by the Israel Medical Association, 113 (97%) felt that their daily work practice is influenced by concern about being sued for medical negligence and not only by genuine medical considerations. As a result, 102 (87%) physicians are more likely to offer the cesarean section option, even in the absence of a clear medical indication, 70 (60%) follow court rulings concerning medical practices, and 85 (73%) physicians mentioned that discussions about medical negligence court rulings are included in their departments' meetings. Defensive medicine is a well-embedded phenomenon affecting the medical decision process of obstetricians and gynecologists.

In this paper we present the costs of defensive medicine in thirty-five clinical specialties to determine whether malpractice liability reforms would greatly reduce health care costs. Defensive medicine includes tests and procedures ordered by physicians principally to reduce perceived threats of medical malpractice liability. The practice is commonly assumed to increase health care costs. The results of studies of the costs of defensive medicine have been inconsistent. We found that estimated savings resulting from a 10 percent decline in medical malpractice premiums would be less than 1 percent of total medical care costs in every specialty. These savings are lower than most previous estimates, and they suggest that the presumed impact of tort reform on health care costs may be overstated. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]