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Measuring the extent to which a firm is financially constrained is critical in assessing capital structure. Extant measures of financial constraints focus on macro firm characteristics such as age and size, variables highly correlated with other firm attributes. We parse 10-K disclosures filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) using a unique lexicon based on constraining words. We find that the frequency of constraining words exhibits very low correlation with traditional measures of financial constraints and predicts subsequent liquidity events, such as dividend omissions or increases, equity recycling, and underfunded pensions, better than widely used financial constraint indexes.

This paper provides the first empirical assessment of the impact of life expectancy assumptions on the liabilities of private U.S. defined benefit (DB) pension plans. Using detailed actuarial and financial information provided by the U.S. Department of Labor, we construct a longevity variable for each pension plan and then measure the impact of varying life expectancy assumptions across plans and over time on pension plan liabilities. The results indicate that each additional year of life expectancy increases pension liabilities by about 3 to 4 percent. This effect is not only statistically highly significant but also economically: each year of additional life expectancy would increase private U.S. DB pension plan liabilities by as much as 84 billion.

As of December 2008, state governments had approximately$1.94 trillion set aside in pension funds for their employees. How does the value of these assets compare to the present value of states' pension liabilities? Just as future Social Security and Medicare liabilities do not appear in the headline numbers of the U.S. federal debt, the financial liability from underfunded public pensions does not appear in the headline numbers of state debt. If pensions are underfunded, then the gap between pension assets and liabilities is off-balance-sheet government debt. We show that government accounting standards require states to use procedures that severely understate their liabilities. We then discuss the true economic funding of state public pension plans. Using market-based discount rates that reflect the risk profile of the pension liabilities, we calculate that the present value of the already-promised pension liabilities of the 50 U.S. states amount to $ 5.17 trillion, assuming that states cannot default on pension benefits that workers have already earned. Net of the$1.94 trillion in assets, these pensions are underfunded by $ 3.23 trillion. This “pension debt” dwarfs the states' publicly traded debt of $0.94 trillion. And we show that even before the market collapse of 2008, the system was economically severely underfunded, though public actuarial reports presented the plans' funding status in a more favorable light.

Nearly all state and local pension defined benefit pensions plans compute the present value of their future liabilities using the expected return on the assets held in the pension trust. This practice contrasts sharply with finance theory, which is unambiguous that the appropriate discount rate is one that reflects the riskiness of the liabilities, not the assets. This paper notes that the strong constitutional and other legal benefit protections make many defined benefit pension obligations virtually risk free. Were governments to discount liabilities in this way, it would reveal that state and local pensions are more underfunded than is generally reported.

This article assesses the impact of a dramatic reform of the Dutch pension system on the mental health of workers nearing retirement age. The reform means that public sector workers born on 1 January 1950 or later face a substantial reduction in their pension rights while, for workers born before 1950 nothing changes. We employ a unique-matched survey and administrative dataset comprising male public sector workers born in 1949 and 1950 and find a strong deterioration in mental health for workers affected by the reform. These effects are stronger for married workers whose partner has no pension income.

This article examines the capital structure implications of defined benefit corporate pension plans. The magnitude of the liabilities arising from these pension plans is substantial. We show that leverage ratios for firms with pension plans are about 35% higher when pension assets and liabilities are incorporated into the capital structure. We estimate that the tax shields from pension contributions are about a third of those from interest payments. Pension contributions have a modest effect in lowering firms' marginal corporate tax rates. Once pensions are considered, firms are less conservative in their choice of leverage than has been previously thought. We show that firms incorporate the magnitude of their pension assets and liabilities into their capital structure decisions.

Though widely used in executive compensation, inside debt has been almost entirely overlooked by prior work. We initiate this research by studying CEO pension arrangements in 237 large capitalization firms. Among our findings are that CEO compensation exhibits a balance between debt and equity incentives; the balance shifts systematically away from equity and toward debt as CEOs grow older; annual increases in pension entitlements represent about 10% of overall CEO compensation, and about 13% for CEOs aged 61-65; CEOs with high debt incentives manage their firms conservatively; and pension compensation influences patterns of CEO turnover and cash compensation.

This study examines whether institutional ownership and analyst following affect the value relevance of disclosed versus recognized pension liabilities. Using a sample of firms with pension liabilities that were disclosed under SFAS No. 87 and subsequently recognized under SFAS No. 158 from 1999 to 2007, I find that off-balance-sheet pension liabilities are more value relevant for firms with a higher level of institutional ownership or analyst following in the pre-158 period. More importantly, I find that SFAS No. 158 increases the value relevance of previously disclosed off-balance-sheet pension liabilities for firms with a low level of institutional ownership or analyst following, and that the increase in the value relevance becomes less pronounced for firms with a higher level of institutional ownership or analyst following. Overall, the results are consistent with the view that institutional ownership and analyst following affect the value relevance of disclosed information as well as the valuation difference between disclosed and recognized information. This study also highlights the importance of considering institutional ownership and analyst following in the value-relevance research.

We use historical particularities of pension funding law to investigate whether managers of U.S. corporate defined benefit pension plan sponsors strategically use regulatory freedom to lower the reported value of pension liabilities, and hence required cash contributions. For some years, pension plans were required to estimate two liabilities—one with mandated discount rates and mortality assumptions, and another where these could be chosen freely. Using a sample of 11,963 plans, we find that the regulated liability exceeds the unregulated measure by 10% and the difference further increases for underfunded pension plans. Underfunded plans tend to assume substantially higher discount rates and lower life expectancy. The effect persists both in the cross-section of plans and over time and it serves to reduce cash contributions. We further show that plan sponsor managers use the freed-up cash for corporate investment and that credit risk is unlikely to explain the finding.

This paper provides an answer to an important empirical puzzle in the retirement literature: while most people know little about their own pension plans, retirement behavior is strongly affected by pension incentives. We combine administrative and self-reported pension data to measure the retirement response to actual and perceived financial incentives and document an important role for self-reported pension data in determining retirement behavior. Well-informed individuals are far more responsive to pension incentives than the average individual. Ill-informed individuals seem to respond systematically to their own misperceptions of pension incentives.