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This book presents a fresh view of Russian political change in the Gorbachev and early post-Soviet periods not by examiningperestroikaandglasnostin and of themselves, but by investigating the autonomous political organizations that responded to liberalization. Extensive study of these political groups, in Moscow and several provincial cities, has led M. Steven Fish to conclude that they were shaped to a far greater degree by the nature of the Soviet state than by socioeconomic modernization, political culture, native psychology, or Russian historical tradition. Fish's statist theory of societal change in Russia yields a powerful explanation of why Russia's new political society differs radically not only from the \"totalized,\" sub-jugated country of the pre-1985 period but also from the \"civil societies\" found in the West and in many developing countries. In addition, the author shows how the legacy of the Soviet experience continues to influence the development--arguably the underdevelopment--of representative political institutions in post-Soviet Russia, making the establishment of stable democracy unlikely in the near term. This book proposes a novel and theoretically sophisticated way to study Russian politics. It offers a rigorous approach to understanding social movements, political party formation, regime change, and democratization in general. While focusing primarily on a single country, it is vigorously comparative at the same time.

This is the first work to set one of the great bloodless revolutions of the twentieth century in its proper historical context. John Dunlop pays particular attention to Yeltsin's role in opposing the covert resurgence of Communist interests in post-coup Russia, and faces the possibility that new institutions may not survive long enough to sink roots in a traditionally undemocratic culture.

Several observers consider the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia and a Just Russia to be \"loyal opposition parties\" with the purpose of capturing and neutralizing protest votes. A study of how branches of these parties operate in Tomsk (western Siberia) qualifies this interpretation. In the Russian political system with its tight restrictions on the opposition, the flexible structure of the \"franchise model\" of organization in these two parties along with their strategy of so-called constructive opposition allows leeway for regional party officials to practice a selective opposition to local authorities. Adapted from the source document.

A controversial model of emerging regionalism has been developing since the election of Evgenii Mikhailov in the gubernatorial elections of 1996-1997 in Pskov oblast', the only region to return a candidate of Vladimir Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, LDPR. Discusses the politics of LDPR rule - leading cadres, local government, the press and law enforcement - economic policy in Pskov and centre-oblast' relations. Shows that while many individual elements of the Pskov model may be found in other Russian provinces, several elements distinguish the Mikhailov approach, which duplicates how a criminal mafia uses its 'muscle' to control a region or economic sector: the use of force and intimidation to squeeze out competitors to establish and maintain a strict monopoly over the most profitable activities. The legislature elected in 1998 is potentially an obstacle to the governor's almost unchallenged power but there is little indication that the new assembly will be an effective counterweight to the LDPR administration. The ability of local authorities to create their own political-economic arrangements and violate federal laws and presidential decrees with impunity is not new to Russia, but it was previously only found in republics; this weakening of central authority has turned a nascent federalism into what might be called 'dysfunctional federalism'. The Pskov model shows how political decentralisation and the introduction of elections, instead of facilitating democratisation and a market economy, can have the opposite effect. (Quotes from original text)

The performance of liberal parties was poor. Unlike their counterparts in many Central and East European countries, their core goals and aspirations had not been appropriated by their opponents. Addresses why just four years after the events which swept away the communist regime, the agents of the ideals which inspired and guided the revolution found themselves unequal to electoral competition. Rejecting the idea that the Russian electorate is peculiarly hostile to liberalism, and other possible causes such as the effects of electoral institutions, liberal disunity, inadequate resources and a deficit of appealing personalities, argues that liberal failure resulted from factors which relate specifically to liberals themselves, their own political actions and organisation: the size and strength of liberal parties; the quality of their electoral campaigns; the behaviour of liberal politicians in power.

Analyzes results of the Dec. 1999-Mar. 2000 parliamentary and presidential elections; discusses attitudes of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia.

Twice in the winter of 1999-2000, citizens of the Russian Federation flocked to their neighborhood voting stations and scratched their ballots in an atmosphere of uncertainty, rancor, and fear. This book is a tale of these two elections -one for the 450-seat Duma, the other for President. Despite financial crisis, a national security emergency in Chechnya, and cabinet instability, Russian voters unexpectedly supported the status quo. The elected lawmakers prepared to cooperate with the executive branch, a gift that had eluded President Boris Yeltsin since he imposed a post-Soviet constitution by referendum in 1993. When Yeltsin retired six months in advance of schedule, the presidential mantle went to Vladimir Putin -a career KGB officer who fused new and old ways of doing politics. Putin was easily elected President in his own right. This book demonstrates key trends in an extinct superpower, a troubled country in whose stability, modernization, and openness to the international community the West still has a huge stake.

Why did the members of the Russian Armed Forces support the Ultranationalist Liberal Democratic Party of Vladimir Zhirinovsky in the December 1993 Russian elections, abandoning Boris Yeltsin at the polls and confounding observers who had until then assumed that the army was under firm political control? This article examines the depth of military support for Zhirinovsky, and explains that support as (1) a result of residual \"Sovietism\" in the military that resulted in strong affinity for Zhirinovsky's calls for a Soviet/Imperial restoration; (2) a reaction against being used by Yeltsin against the Parliament in October 1993; and (3) general military agreement with the tone and substance of Zhirinovsky's attacks on the Russian political establishment. The article suggests that the Russian military has already emerged as an independent political force, and there is little hope in the near future that Yeltsin will be able to reestablish full political control.

The popularity of radical Vladimir Zhirinovsky, leader of Russia's Liberal Democratic Party, has troubled many in both Russia and the international community. As the 1996 presidential election draws near, Zhirinovsky has been pledging to protect the rights of ethnic Russians through extreme measures. Zhirinovsky's racist attitude and aggressive manner have inspired comparisons to such demagogues as Hitler and David Duke. This article briefly recounts Zhirinovsky's political rise, and recommends that the United States and its allies take a more active role in providing economic aid to Russia in order to ensure the survival of democracy in that country and diminish the power of Zhirinovsky.