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In the Madisonian Constitution, fragmented and overlapping institutions of authority are supposed to manage democracy’s innate rivalry, channeling competition to serve the public interest. This system of safeguards makes democracy more robust: capable of withstanding and, if need be, adapting to challenges posed by a changing problem environment. In this essay, I suggest why affective polarization poses a special threat to democratic robustness. While most scholars hypothesize that polarization’s dangers are that it leads to bimodality and extremism, I highlight a third hypothesized effect: Polarization reduces interest and information diversity in the political system. To be effective, democracy’s safeguards rely upon interest diversity, but Madison took that diversity for granted. Unique among democracy’s safeguards, federalism builds in a repository for diversity; its structure enables differences between national- and state-expressed interests, even within the same party. This diversity can be democracy hindering, as the United States’ history with racially discriminatory politics painfully makes clear, but it can also serve as a reservoir of interest and information dispersion that could protect democracy by restoring the possibility that cross-cutting cleavages emerge.

Abstract The COVID-19 pandemic represents a new and unparalleled stress-test for the already disrupted liberal-representative, democracies. The challenges cluster around three democratic disfigurations: technocracy, populism, and plebiscitarianism—each have the potential to contribute to democratic decay. Still, they can also trigger pushback against illiberalism mobilizing citizens in defense of democracy, toward democratic resilience. This article looks at how the COVID-19 pandemic affects democratic decay and democratic resilience in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). It finds varied responses to the COVID-19 crisis by the CEE populist leaders and identifies two patterns: the rise of autocracy and democratic resilience. First, in Hungary and Poland, the populist leaders instrumentalized the state of emergency to increase executive aggrandizement. Second, in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, democracy proved resilient. The COVID-19 pandemic alone is not fostering the rise of authoritarianism. However, it does accentuate existing democratic disfigurations.

When the European Union was founded, it was assumed that all Member States admitted as consolidated democracies would maintain their constitutional commitments. In recent years, Hungary and Poland have challenged this premise as elected autocratic governments in those countries have captured independent institutions and threatened long-term democracy. The judiciaries of these countries have been hard hit. In this paper, we trace what has happened to the judiciaries in Hungary and Poland, showing how first the constitutional courts and then the ordinary judiciary have been brought under the control of political forces so that there is no longer a separation of law and politics. We also explore why the European Union has so far not been able to stop this process. In the end, the European judiciary, particularly the Court of Justice, is attempting a rescue of national judiciaries, but the results are so far unclear.

The current study examines how hate speech has become more commonplace in Pakistani political discourse, following its development from National Assembly sessions to the Senate and beyond. The media serves as a conduit for this hate speech, amplifying and digitally spreading it throughout the populace. The research highlights important discursive techniques such heterogeneity, fear appeals, religious and ethnic marginalization, and abusive labeling using a strictly qualitative approach that combines critical discourse analysis of parliamentary debates and social media content. The findings also reveal a recurring pattern: political celebrities use hate speech in their speeches to criminalize opponents and to create an atmosphere of excitement, and media outlets further magnify these stories, captivating the public and encouraging them to use the rhetoric in political contexts. The study also points to the normalization of hostility in public encounters and the perilous deterioration of democratic planning. This study is a valuable addition to Pakistan's political literature since it makes recommendations such as the implementation of strong restrictive frameworks, media literacy initiatives, and a collective sincerity from stakeholders to encourage an honorable and thorough discussion of Pakistan's political picture.

Existing research shows that the activity of independent civil society organizations (CSOs) is an important ingredient of democratization and democratic consolidation. Yet, what happens when governments impose restrictions on CSO activity? This manuscript investigates how restrictions on CSOs affect the quality of horizontal accountability institutions like parliaments and courts. CSOs monitor and mobilize against violations of democratic norms. Thus, if governments impose restrictions on CSO activity, they may face fewer barriers (i.e., less scrutiny and criticism) to dismantling horizontal checks and balances. In addition, when restrictions prevent CSOs from supporting horizontal accountability institutions (e.g., with monitoring and expertise), the latter’s ability to control and constrain governments likely declines. Our large- N cross-country analysis supports this argument, suggesting that the imposition of restrictions on CSOs diminishes the quality of horizontal accountability institutions. We examine alternative explanations (i.e., prior autocratization trends and the authoritarian nature of governments) and offer qualitative evidence from Kenya and Turkey to illustrate the expected causal pathways. Our results imply that a crackdown on CSOs serves as a warning sign of deteriorating horizontal oversight.

Purpose: This paper analyses the impact of the state of emergency declared during the Covid-19 pandemic on public administration, specifically focusing on the Czech Republic. It aims to understand the correlation between the rule of law, the legitimacy of measures taken during the pandemic, and the public’s willingness to comply with these measures.Design/Methodology/Approach: The paper employs a comparative study design, examining the consistency of pandemic measures with the core principles of the rule of law – legality, proportionality, and legitimate expectations. The study focuses on measures that restrict rights (e.g., right to education) and those that, conversely, grant rights (e.g., decisions on compensation bonuses). The methodology involves an analysis of the relevant case law, administrative practice, and data from several databases.Findings: The study reveals frequent breaches of legality and proportionality, both in the restriction and granting of rights. Findings indicate that the public’s willingness to comply with measures decreased when these were perceived as illegitimate. This was evident in the Czech Republic where, despite the persistence of most measures, the situation worsened during the autumn 2020 and spring 2021 waves of the pandemic.Practical Implications: The findings of this study have significant implications for public administration and policymaking, especially during times of crisis and declared state of emergency. The results highlight the importance of maintaining the rule of law and ensuring the legitimacy of public compliance measures. The study suggests that disregard for these principles can lead to a decline in public trust and cooperation, exacerbating the crisis.Originality/Value: This paper provides a unique perspective on the management of the Covid-19 pandemic, linking the rule of law with public compliance. It offers valuable insights for governments and policymakers on the importance of maintaining legality and proportionality in their measures, and the potential consequences of their disregard. What sets this study apart is its comprehensive analysis of both cases where rights were reduced (such as limitations of the right to education) and cases where rights were provided (such as the granting of compensation bonuses). This dual-focused approach offers a more holistic view of the impact of governmental measures during the pandemic. The study’s findings contribute to the broader understanding of crisis management and the role of public administration. This comprehensive approach enhances the originality and value of the research, making it a significant contribution to the field. Namen: Prispevek analizira vpliv izrednih razmer, razglašenih med pandemijo covida-19, na javno upravo, zlasti na Češkem. Njegov namen je razumeti povezavo med pravno državo, legitimnostjo ukrepov, sprejetih med pandemijo, in pripravljenostjo javnosti, da te ukrepe spoštuje.Zasnova/metodologija/pristop: Uporabljena je primerjalna študija, ki proučuje skladnost ukrepov ob pandemiji s temeljnimi načeli pravne države – zakonitostjo, sorazmernostjo in legitimnimi pričakovanji. Študija se osredotoča na ukrepe, ki pravice (npr. pravico do izobraževanja) omejujejo, in tiste, ki, nasprotno, pravice dodeljujejo (npr. nadomestila). Metodologija vključuje analizo ustrezne sodne prakse, upravne prakse in podatkov iz več podatkovnih zbirk.Ugotovitve: Študija razkriva pogoste kršitve načel zakonitosti in sorazmernosti, tako pri omejevanju kot pri dodeljevanju pravic. Ugotovitve kažejo, da se je pripravljenost javnosti za upoštevanje ukrepov zmanjšala, če so bili ti zaznani kot protizakoniti. To se je pokazalo tudi na Češkem, kjer so se ob vztrajanju večine ukrepov jeseni 2020 in spomladi 2021 razmere poslabšale.Praktične posledice: Ugotovitve te študije imajo pomembne posledice za javno upravo in oblikovanje politik, zlasti v času krize in razglašenih izrednih razmer. Rezultati poudarjajo pomen ohranjanja pravne države in zagotavljanja legitimnosti ukrepov. Študija nakazuje, da lahko neupoštevanje teh načel povzroči upad javnega zaupanja in sodelovanja, kar krizo še dodatno stopnjuje.Izvirnost/vrednost: Prispevek ponuja edinstven pogled na obvladovanje pandemije covida-19, saj povezuje pravno državo in spoštovanje ukrepov s strani javnosti. Vladam in oblikovalcem politik ponuja dragocen vpogled v pomen ohranjanja zakonitosti in sorazmernosti pri ukrepih ter v morebitne posledice neupoštevanja teh načel. Izvirnost študije se kaže v tem, da celovito analizira tako primere krčenja pravic (npr. omejitev pravice do izobraževanja) kot primere dodeljevanja pravic (npr. nadomestila). Tovrsten pristop omogoča celovitejše razumevanje učinka vladnih ukrepov med pandemijo. Ugotovitve študije prispevajo k širšemu razumevanju kriznega upravljanja in vloge javne uprave.

After almost two decades of praise for Indonesia’s democratic achievements, a scholarly consensus has begun to emerge that Indonesian democracy is in regression. In this article, we consider the sources of that regression. Drawing upon the comparative literature on democratic decline, we propose that Indonesia is an illiberal democracy, and argue that a constellation of structural, agential and popular forces has led to an incremental deterioration in democratic quality. We first reaffirm arguments that trace the origins of contemporary democratic weakness to the nature of Indonesia’s transition, and the incorporation of anti-democratic elites into the governing structures of its democracy. We then show how Indonesia’s two most recent presidents each eroded democratic norms and institutions in pursuit of political security. Finally, we cast a critical eye on the widely shared view that Indonesia’s population is a bulwark of democratic strength. While most Indonesians support democracy as an abstract concept, significant parts of the population show limited support for the protections, checks and freedoms that underpin a liberal democracy. We suggest there is a significant constituency for illiberalism in Indonesia, and point to the presence of a conducive electoral environment for further democratic erosion.

The paper’s key puzzle is the variation in lockdown-related democratic decline in the region of Central and Southeast Europe given the incumbents’ ideological and regime (dis)similarity. Why did similar regimes not respond to the pandemic in the same manner by using the opportunity to grab more executive power and diminish the authority of other institutions? While some argue that a state of emergency provides an ideal opportunity for democratic decline due to reduced costs, others believe that autocratic regimes with a ‘pre-existing condition for autocracy’ are more vulnerable. To contribute to this discussion, I examine three examples from post-communist Central and Southeast Europe (Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia) during the pandemic-related state of emergency and lockdowns of 2020 and 2021. I consider several relevant factors, the most important of which is the prospect of winning the next election. To erode democracy, autocratic incumbents must feel insecure about the outcome of the next election to use the opportunity created by the state of emergency. If they are uncertain of victory, they may prefer to expand their executive powers during the state of emergency, thus undermining democracy.

A devastating wave of COVID-19 infections cast a long shadow over all political and economic developments in Indonesia in 2021. Many of the patterns and trends identified in this journal’s previous year-end analysis intensified in 2021, with a deepening of pandemic-induced crises, immense loss of life, and further erosion of democratic norms and institutions, including unprecedented intervention into a corruption watchdog and a major business association. The administration of president Joko Widodo has focused almost exclusively on economic development and business investment throughout the pandemic; but the spread of the Delta strain forced a shift in the government’s approach to lockdowns, prompting new concerns about rising poverty and inequality.

Democracy in Indonesia exhibits distinctive characteristics, particularly regarding the prevailing influence of Islamism. Islamist movements are frequently portrayed as threats to democracy, often linked with radicalism and intolerance. However, Islamism in Indonesia is not monolithic entity with identical tendencies to political issues in democracy. While some Islamist groups may exhibit anti-democratic tendencies, others are strongly advocate for democracy, human rights, and oppose intolerance. This study examines how individual Islamist attitudes shape support for democracy among Indonesian Muslims. Using original national survey data and multivariate regression analyses, it develops a disaggregated index of political Islam to measure ideological orientations across four categories, Islamists, moderate Islamists, moderate secularists, and secularists. The findings challenge prevailing assumptions by showing that individuals with Islamist orientations, particularly moderate Islamists, demonstrate higher levels of democratic support than some secular respondents, specifically regarding democratic commitment and opposition to intolerant Islamic organizations. These attitudes are grounded in the historical state-Islam relations, rather than liberal-secular ideology. The study also finds lower democratic support among certain secular respondents, suggesting that partisanship and elite alignments may shape democratic attitudes more than ideology alone. This research contributes to the broader literature by shifting focus from elites and organized movements to public opinion, offering a nuanced understanding of how Islam and democracy interact in Indonesia.