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This contribution examines the evolution of the Constitutional Court of Benin (CCB) as a critical guardian of constitutionalism, political stability, and human rights in the context of Benin’s democratic transition following the 1990 Constitution. Next to actively defending the constitutional order and being resilient against executive overreach, the CCB also expanded its authority by amending the constitution to address anticipated threats to democratic principles. However, vulnerabilities in its institutional design, particularly concerning the appointment procedure and terms of office, rendered it susceptible to political manipulation. These design flaws were compounded by public mistrust of constitutional reforms, thwarting efforts to rectify these shortcomings. 25 years after its inauguration, the CCB was co-opted by political elites, culminating in its diminished efficacy. Despite this decline, the CCB’s early legacy and its partial safeguards offer valuable lessons for constitutional resistance and resilience.

What explains when and to what extent central governments implement decentralization? By centering on the strategic incentives that follow from the particular configuration of competitiveness and party system coherence , we propose a theory that can begin to explain the divergent outcomes in the many forms of decentralization initiated across Africa. This explanation for the extent to which robust decentralization is implemented over time suggests two counter-intuitive findings. First, authoritarian regimes may decentralize further than democratic ones, given the incentives to the hegemonic party where such reforms are initiated. Second, highly fragmented and deeply localized polities may decentralize most minimally, even where there is a broad consensus about the desirability of such reforms. We provide a first test of the theory through a comparative analysis of over a dozen countries, focusing on process tracing for Ethiopia, Botswana, Ghana, and Benin.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the state of government accounting in Ghana and Benin using neo-patrimonial and organizational façade lenses. Design/methodology/approach The study used two country case studies that engaged with stakeholders including donors, civil society, politicians, and civil servants. Semi-structured interviews were used as the main data collection technique, which were complemented by document analysis. Findings The study finds that government accounting reforms are decoupled and used in both countries as a façade which is caused, to a varying degree, by indigenous neo-patrimonial governance traits of informal institutions, patronage, and clientelism. And despite the relatively superior Ghanaian system, in terms of its functioning, compared to the Beninese, government accounting plays a more symbolic role in the former than in the latter. Originality/value This is one of the very few theoretically informed empirical studies that examine the state of government accounting in the two major African settings – Anglophone and Francophone. The results inform policies more tailored to indigenous governance issues for better outcomes.

Democracy greatly benefits from credible courts. If context conditions make democratic consolidation unlikely, as in many African countries, credible arbitration between political actors can be essential for democracy. This article argues that informal judicial networks can critically affect a court’s credibility. Network analysis of Benin’s Constitutional Court using original data on major politicians and all 25 judges who have served between 1993 and 2018 provides evidence that biased judicial networks can jeopardize the crucial role of courts for democratic consolidation. In Benin, the loss of credibility under the Yayi presidency correlates with a clear political representation bias on the constitutional bench whereas sociocultural representation remained balanced. Since executive and legislative appointment practices account for the network balance or bias, the political creation and privation of informal judicial relations emerges as an interesting avenue for studies of democratic consolidation.

This article integrates the dynamics within authoritarian elites into analysis of democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa. This variable has been excluded from nearly all analysis on the subject. Based on a comparison of three cases, this article concludes that only in cases where popular mobilization was accompanied by deep divisions within the ruling coalition did democratization ensue. The division of the authoritarian coalition in Benin and South Africa created a window of opportunity which enabled pro-democracy forces to push through democratic reforms. Furthermore, only when a majority of the authoritarian elite in South Africa favoured negotiations with the African National Congress and other anti-apartheid political organizations did the transition towards democracy in South Africa make any progress. In contrast, in the Togolese case, a united ruling coalition precluded any reform that would have challenged its political hegemony.

Fiscal sociology has alleged the existence of a mutually reinforcing effect between the emergence of representative government and effective taxation. This paper looks at Benin, a low-income country that successfully democratised in the early 1990s. It finds that Benin appears to have reinforced its extractive capacities since democratisation. However, the effect of democratisation has been indirect, while the influence of the International Financial Institutions (IFI) and the size of the country's informal sector have played a more direct role. Nevertheless, the hypothesis that effective taxation is based on a quasi-consensual relationship between the state and the taxpayers finds some confirmation.

Approaches that treat all countries as fundamentally similar provide only limited insights into the variations in democratic experiences. This article attempts to start filling in this space. In doing so, the approach (following Englebert and Boduszynski and Diamond), is to first classify all sub-Saharan African countries into sets of political regimes by looking at their democratic performance over the 1985-2010 period. The authors then review the degree to which dominant modernization and Modem World System theories account for differences among these categories. The findings of this article suggest that most of the conventional variables, particularly of the modernization type, do not adequately explain the divergent processes of democratic consolidation in each country because they place too much emphasis on internal affairs, societal pressures, and developments within the nation-states themselves. Instead, the degree to which an African country is tied politically, economically, and socially to western countries and western-led multilateral institutions is a crucial factor in explaining democratic success or failure.

This edited volume adds to the growing body of knowledge on democratic and authoritarian regimes in sub-Saharan Africa, expanding the analysis to countries that have, to date, received scant attention. The authors examine democratic contestation in six countries as well as explanations for their trajectories.

The Republic of Benin has often been cited as a model democracy in the African context. After years of pressure from bilateral aid donors, particularly France and Germany, municipal elections were held in 2002. This article addresses three related questions. How have free presidential and parliamentary elections affected political dynamics at the local level, especially in the rural areas where most people live? What do rural people think about the change of national regime? How will decentralisation affect local government? Based on empirical research in rural Benin, it shows that démocratisation means more of the same hybrid and composite form of local government. The boundaries between the state and private organisations (including Northern NGOs), and between the national and local levels, remain blurred. Local political arenas are more fragmented than ever, and informal politics flourish. This not only dilutes power at the local level, as different veto powers block one another, it entails constant negotiation between those involved, making political processes less predictable and local political institutions less accountable. Decentralisation is only making matters worse. La République du Bénin est souvent citée comme un modèle de démocratie dans le contexte africain. Après des années de pression exercée par les bailleurs de fonds bilatéraux, particulièrement la France et l'Allemagne, des élections municipales ont eu lieu en 2002. Cet article aborde trois questions connexes. Comment les élections présidentielles et parlementaires libres ont-elles affecté la dynamique politique au niveau local, notamment dans les zones rurales où vit la majorité de la population? Que pense la population rurale du changement de régime national? Comment la décentralisation va-t-elle affecter l'administration locale? L'article montre, en se basant sur des travaux de recherche empirique menés en zone rurale au Bénin, que la démocratisation se traduit par plus d'administration locale de même forme hybride et composite. La limite entre organisation publique et organisation privée (y compris les ONG du Nord), et entre niveau national et niveau local, demeure floue. L'échiquier politique local n'a jamais été aussi fragmenté et la politique informelle prospère. Ceci non seulement dilue le pouvoir au niveau local, différents pouvoirs de veto se bloquant mutuellement, mais engendre aussi une négociation constante entre les parties prenantes, rendant ainsi le processus politique plus imprévisible et les institutions politiques locales moins comptables de leurs actes. La décentralisation ne fait qu'aggraver la situation.