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Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SEZ) has been the flagship labouratory of Deng Xiaoping's reform and open-door policy and the forerunner of China's capitalist transformation. The initiation of the Shenzhen SEZ was driven by the imperative of political and economic survival along the state hierarchy and was informed by the international practices of export processing zones (EPZs). Shenzhen's capitalist fundamentals, such as the commodification of land and labour, were largely established through imitating its 'big master' Hong Kong across the border. However, Shenzhen's policy learning style has gradually shifted fromlaissez-faireHong Kong to authoritarian Singapore, propelled by the aspiration, shared among policy-making party élites across China's administrative hierarchy, of perpetuating the single-party rule. Theoretically, this paper demonstrates how policy mobility is shaped path-dependently by the pre-structured institutional/ideological regime, in what ways the idiosyncratic geographical/historical conjuncture matters, and why political representation and participation are crucial to policy selection and mutation.

Decollectivization of China's rural economy in the early 1980s was one of the most significant aspects of the country's transition to a capitalist economy. Deng Xiaoping praised it as an 'innovation,' and its significance to the overall capitalist-oriented 'reform' process surely cannot be overstated. The Chinese government has repeatedly referred to the supposed economic benefits of decollectivization as having 'greatly increased the incentives to millions of peasants.' Nevertheless, the political-economic implications of decollectivization have always been highly ambiguous, and questionable at best. Individual or small groups of peasants were frequently portrayed in mainstream accounts as political stars for initiating the process, but this served to obscure the deep resistance to decollectivization in many locales. Moreover, the deeper causes and consequences of the agrarian reform are downplayed in most writings, leaving the impression that the rural reform was in the main politically neutral. Adapted from the source document.

In the PRC narrative of economic policy during the late 1970s, Hua Guofeng is depicted as advocating a reckless leftist approach to growth with outdated Maoist concepts, while Deng Xiaoping is credited with setting China on its new course of “reform and opening”. The prevailing view in Western literature on China fundamentally accepts this myth of Dengist hagiography, and adds the interpretation that policy developments were part and parcel of a succession struggle between Hua and Deng and their assumed factions or coalitions. In the most incisive statement of this analysis, Joseph Fewsmith argued that “reforms emerged as part of the struggle for power against Hua Guofeng and the wing of the party that he represented” and that Deng and his allies “formulated an approach to the economy as part of the attack on Hua”. In this article, we offer an alternative interpretation of initial post-Mao PRC economic policy, arguing that a power struggle did not influence evolving economic approaches in 1977-78, and that on all key dimensions - the overambitious drive for growth, a newly expansive policy of openness to the outside world, and limited steps toward management reform - Hua and Deng were in basic agreement.

Rather than repudiate Mao’s legacy, the post-revolutionary regime in China has sought to recruit him in support of “reform and opening.” Beginning with Deng Xiaoping after 1978, official2 historiography has drawn a distinction between Mao the Cultural Revolutionary and Mao the architect of “Chinese Marxism” – a Marxism that integrates theory with the circumstances of Chinese society. The essence of the latter is encapsulated in “Mao Zedong Thought,” which is viewed as an expression not just of Mao the individual but of the collective leadership of the Party. In most recent representations, “Chinese Marxism” is viewed as having developed in two phases: New Democracy, which brought the Communist Party to power in 1949, and “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” inaugurated under Deng Xiaoping and developed under his successors, and which represents a further development of Mao Zedong Thought. The Hu Jintao leadership has made an aggressive effort to portray “Chinese Marxism” as the most advanced development of Marxism that might also serve as a model for others. These interpretive operations have salvaged Mao for the national revolution and the legitimacy of the Communist Party. But it also presents a predicament in keeping alive memories of Mao’s policies, which the Party is not always able to control in political memory, as has been illustrated most recently in the Chongqing experiment.

In its foreign policy towards the Iranian nuclear programme, China is unwilling to join the partially harsh anti-Iran rhetoric of the US and the EU3. China has averted the imposition of sanctions and only abstained from its veto power as a permanent UNSC member after considerable diplomatic persuasion by 'the West'. Beijing was cautious not to spoil its image as a 'responsible Great Power', walking a diplomatic tightrope in balancing a pragmatic-commercial approach to business in Iran and mollifying Western security concerns related to the Iranian nuclear programme, following the tradition of Deng Xiaoping's doctrine of 'maintaining a low profile'. Increasingly, however, China is conveying a more assertive foreign policy and is no longer hiding its strategic interests. This paper argues that with the EU3 being at the forefront of nuclear diplomacy with Iran, disagreements with China over the EU's recent sanctions policy against Iran can, but need not, be a step in the direction of EU-China strategic alienation in the search for long-term solutions to the Iranian nuclear stalemate.

Governance, culture, and societal development are intertwined because values that are compatible with and supported by the society and grounded in its culture are an essential aspect of good governance. A key challenge with public sector values in China is that \"good government\" reforms implemented since the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976 have promoted the Western civil service values of merit and transparency while the traditional values of guanxi and a politically-driven bureaucracy have remained in place. Current views about guanxi in the literature are concerned about either individual interest maximization or ethics and etiquette in the superior-subordinate relationship. This essay discusses those perspectives, but also the function of guanxi in the political arena to form a close knit group of people supporting the same ideology. The authors seek to describe how guanxi fits within China and to describe the clash between recently adopted values and this traditional value. They begin with the contrast of the regimes of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. Adapted from the source document.

This book describes and analyzes how politics among the Chinese leadership has operated and evolved from the period of Mao's court up to the present day. Part I explores politics under Mao and Deng. For this section the five leading western analysts of elite Chinese politics -- Lowell Dittmer, Lucian Pye, Frederick Teiwes, Andrew Nathan, and Tsou Tang -- have contributed major papers that measure the empirical evidence against political science theory, recent Chinese history, and Chinese political culture. Part II explores and analyzes the ongoing changes in Chinese politics during Jiang's tenure, and includes analyzes by almost all the leading English-language scholars in the field.

Beijing's policy toward the Middle East has evolved as the People's Republic of China (PRC) has risen in power and as the Middle East and the rest of the world has undergone economic and political change. Through much of the Cold War era, the PRC had few diplomatic partners in the region and was relatively inactive there. Its interests were primarily ideological and its propaganda focused on China's revolutionary credentials, presenting the PRC as the natural ally of the anti-colonial and anti-imperialist Arab states. Beijing's virulent attacks were directed not only at what it considered Western colonial and imperialist control and exploitation, but also at the revisionist Soviet collusion with the United States. From the late 1970s on, Beijing's operations in the Middle East became more pragmatic and pluralistic, transcending ideology. As the PRC grew in economic and diplomatic strength, Beijing became increasingly keen on expanding its influence and asserting its interests in the region, seeking to shape geopolitics in its favor. Since the 1980s, China's burgeoning economy in the wake of Deng Xiaoping's crusade for \"opening and reform\" has generated two additional major policy priorities in the Middle East. One is the development and consolidation of energy resources. The other is the pursuit of investment opportunities and consumer markets for Chinese goods.

This article uses a 1999 six-city survey of Chinese urban residents, along with several earlier public opinion surveys, in order to compare views on regime legitimacy between Deng and post-Deng eras. Posing the broad question of whether China's regime is seen to be in crisis or increasing stability, the author analyses data to measure public opinion in the areas of reform satisfaction, political support and political efficacy. The data reveals elements of both scenarios, possibly suggesting that the leadership was doing a good job at deepening economic reforms while successfully silencing public dissatisfaction at both the pace and content of market reform policies. Unlike in 1989, when urban residents took their issues to the street, in 1999 they became more politically conservative, even when dissatisfied with reform. Together with their heavy-handed control, the post-Deng leaders seemed to be successful in consolidating political power, using nationalism as an appeal while pushing for further market reform.

Discusses the effect of the shift from communism to capitalism under Chairman Deng Xiaoping on public health, using the government's handling of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak as an example.