Explore the vast range of titles available.

This study explores the semiotic construction of meaning in contemporary smartphone advertisements using Roland Barthes’ four-level model: denotation, connotation, myth and ideology. Focusing on two YouTube ads—Apple’s iPhone 15 and Samsung’s Galaxy S24—the research applies a qualitative descriptive approach to examine how visual and linguistic elements convey layered meanings. Through segmentation, coding, and interpretation of scenes, the study reveals how each brand constructs cultural narratives and embeds ideological values. The iPhone 15 ad emphasizes themes of strength, resilience, and technological reliability, while the Galaxy S24 ad promotes ideals of global connectivity and language empowerment. Both advertisements utilize myth to naturalize consumerism, technological determinism, and aspirational individualism. The findings highlight the role of digital advertising in shaping contemporary myths and reinforce the critical importance of semiotic analysis in decoding multimodal promotional media.

In this article, it was determined that the worldview fragments of the ethnos code in mind are stored through non-linguistic information in the content of the concept and toponyms. From this point of view, in addition to the language usages in the works of Seydimbck, the cognitive toponyms themselves have their own characteristics, which are hidden from the history and culture of our people. It was mentioned that the model structure of the \"field concept\" in the Saryarka plain includes various associations and a set of indigenous knowledge. The richness of the Saryarka toponym reflects not only the physical attributes of the region but also the deep-seated cultural and spiritual connections of the Kazakh people to their environment. The main purpose of the study was to show concepts in the toponymie space of Seydimbek's works in a set of various associations and background knowledge to the model structure of the concept of \"Uly Dala\" in the Saryarka plain.

Many scientific models are representations. Building on Goodman and Elgin’s notion of representation-as we analyse what this claim involves by providing a general definition of what makes something a scientific model and formulating a novel account of how models represent. We call the result the DEKI account of representation, which offers a complex kind of representation involving an interplay of denotation, exemplification, keying up of properties, and imputation. Throughout we focus on material models, and we illustrate our claims with the Phillips-Newlyn machine. In the conclusion we suggest that, mutatis mutandis, the DEKI account can be carried over to other kinds of models, notably fictional and mathematical models.

An equivalence class can contain nominally meaningless stimuli that become related to each other by training and testing. It can also contain at least one meaningful stimulus. The likelihood of equivalence class formation is enhanced by the inclusion of a meaningful stimulus as a class member. It is traditional for stimulus meaningfulness to be characterized by its hedonic, denotative, and connotative properties. Thus, class enhancement can be attributed to these properties. In addition, the hedonic and connotative properties of the meaningful class member generalize to the other class members and is determined by the nodal structure of the class. Apart from hedonic, denotative, and connotative content of a meaningful stimulus, that stimulus also generates responses that are respondent and vary in topography, or are operants that are under discriminative or conditionally discriminative control. When one of these functions is acquired by a meaningless stimulus and it is then included as a member of a to-be-formed equivalence class, its inclusion also enhances likelihood of class formation, sometimes to the same degree as the inclusion of a meaningful stimulus. Thus, class enhancement typically attributed to the hedonic and connotative properties of a meaningful stimulus can be accounted for by the stimulus control functions served by that stimulus instead of their hedonic and connotative properties. Finally, denotation is considered last in the relative absence of empirical findings. In total, then, this article explores meaning from traditional and behavior analytic perspectives.

The origins of proof-theoretic semantics lie in the question of what constitutes the meaning of the logical connectives and its response: the rules of inference that govern the use of the connective. However, what if we go a step further and ask about the meaning of a proof as a whole? In this paper we address this question and lay out a framework to distinguish sense and denotation of proofs. Two questions are central here. First of all, if we have two (syntactically) different derivations, does this always lead to a difference, firstly, in sense, and secondly, in denotation? The other question is about the relation between different kinds of proof systems (here: natural deduction vs. sequent calculi) with respect to this distinction. Do the different forms of representing a proof necessarily correspond to a difference in how the inferential steps are given? In our framework it will be possible to identify denotation as well as sense of proofs not only within one proof system but also between different kinds of proof systems. Thus, we give an account to distinguish a mere syntactic divergence from a divergence in meaning and a divergence in meaning from a divergence of proof objects analogous to Frege's distinction for singular terms and sentences.

This study aims to characterize the whole reaction process of (i) emulsion explosive matrix and sulfide ores, and (ii) ammonium nitrate and pyrite by the thermodynamics analysis method. A series of experiments were carried out at atmospheric pressure from 25 °C to 350 °C at four heating rates (3, 5, 10, and 15 K/min) and the Coats–Redfern method was applied to calculate the apparent activation energy of samples at different heating rates. The results show that the thermogravimetric (TG) curve of sulfide ores and emulsion explosive matrix can be divided into four stages: the water evaporation stage, the dynamic balance stage, the thermal decomposition stage, and the extinguishment stage. However, the thermal decomposition process of ammonium nitrate and pyrite can be divided into the dynamic balance stage, the thermal decomposition stage, and the burnout stage. The ignition temperature (T0) and maximum peak temperature (Tm) of the samples increased with the heating rate, but the shape of the TG/DTG (Derivative Thermogravimetric) curve was not affected. The results show that the reaction process of sulfide ores and emulsion explosive matrix is similar to the reaction process of pyrite and ammonium nitrate. The thermal stability of emulsion explosive matrix decreases when sulfide ores are added. By contrast, when pyrite is added, the thermal stability of the ammonium nitrate decreases more significantly.

We investigate the applicability of the classic eta-conversion in the type-theory of acyclic algorithms. While denotationally valid, classic eta-conversion is not algorithmically valid in the type theory of algorithms, with the exception of few limited cases. The paper shows how the restricted, algorithmic eta-rule can recover algorithmic eta-conversion in the reduction calculi of type-theory of algorithms.

The following well-known problem motivated my handling more general problems. As we surely know, our pupils and even students are confronted with much more trouble when learning mathematics (and even physics) than when they learn ‘empirical’ sciences like biology, mineralogy etc. There are many factors that can at least partially explain this phenomenon. I would however mention one factor that is not too frequently adduced: mathematics, logic, and much of physics use concepts that are abstract while the empirical sciences seem to support understanding by using expressions concerning (denoting? expressing?) concrete objects. Therefore the first topic to be explained (or explicated) is: vs. concrete. The second point will consist of applying the first point to explanation of the trouble with learning mathematics. The third point will ask Logical Analysis of Natural Language how to tell abstract expressions from concrete ones. The fourth point will confront the concept described in the foregoing point with conceptions trying to abandon the distinction between analytic and empirical expressions. Here it will be shown that the empiricism representing this latter conception deprives semantics as applied to Natural language of important features of expressivity.

Standard metasemantic frameworks render word meanings resistant to the control of ordinary speakers, and hinder our ability to exercise sovereignty over the denotations of words. The literature suggests three main responses to the problem: views on which ordinary denotational interventions cannot cause changes to semantic reality, views on which we should drop the metasemantic premises that generate the difficulty, and views on which denotational interventions boil down to operations on a non-recalcitrant region of the semantic spectrum. I review these responses and argue that they face difficulties. Then, I draw on linguistic work on variation to make an alternative proposal. I suggest that part of the problem hinges on a tendency to think about standing meanings under heavily idealized assumptions of intra-linguistic homogeneity. To amend this, we should consider endorsing a localist ontology for semantic properties that allows individual vocabulary items to bear variable standing meanings at different communities of speakers of a public language. The result, I argue, is a middle-ground framework which accepts the difficulties of wide-scope meaning change while granting speakers semantic self-determination, and strikes an attractive balance between a few central desiderata.

This paper offers a developmental account of Peirce's theory of proper names. It identifies two main dimensions of Peirce's thinking on proper names, a \"taxonomic dimension,\" concerning the place of proper names within the taxonomy of signs, and a \"maturational dimension,\" concerning the different \"stages of maturity\" a proper name goes through when interpreted. These two dimensions also constitute distinct phases of Peirce's (continuously evolving) theory of proper names. The chronological reconstruction offered in the paper is also shown to solve some apparent inconsistencies in what Peirce wrote about proper names.