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Studies in previous decades have shown that patterns of intergenerational coresidence in China have been diminishing. However, few studies have documented the level of intergenerational coresidence for a wide range of ages. Furthermore, most studies on the topic are based on data collected more than 10 years ago. In this study, we document the intergenerational coresidence patterns of a wide range of ages, from 25 to 60, in urban China. We employ updated national data collected in 2013 that covers 2,585 counties in China. We conducted three sets of analysis. The first set includes all cases. For the second set, we kept cases with at least one parent living in the same city and conducted the same analysis as in the first set. The dependent variable of these two sets of analysis is whether the adult child coresides with at least one parent. The third set includes only those adult children who do not live with their parents. We explore the probability of adult children at different ages living in the same city as their parents. There is a U-shaped relationship between the age of adult children and the predicted probability of coresidence with parents. The predicted probability of intergenerational coresidence is higher among younger and older adult children, although it remains low at all ages. More importantly, among those living separately, we found a positive linear relationship between the age of the adult child and the predicted probability of living in the same city.

This study offers a descriptive overview of changes in fertility plans during the COVID-19 crisis in a sample of the young population (18-34) in Italy, Germany, France, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The data were collected between 27 March and 7 April 2020. Our results show that fertility plans have been negatively revised in all countries, but not in the same way. In Germany and France fertility plans changed moderately, with many people still planning or postponing their decision to have a child. In Italy, however, the proportion of abandoners is much higher than in the other countries, and the proportion of those deciding to postpone their plans is lower. Moreover, across countries the demographic characteristics of individuals appear to be associated with fertility plans in different ways. In Italy, abandoners are common among individuals younger than 30 and those without a tertiary education. In Germany, abandoners are slightly more prevalent in the regions most affected by COVID-19. In the United Kingdom, the individuals that most frequently abandoned their fertility plans are those who expect the crisis to have a dramatic negative effect on their future income. Finally, in France and Spain we do not observe a clear pattern of revision of fertility plans.

A great deal of research has focused on employment and educational reasons for migration. Recent research has also begun to explore social motives. However, we still know very little about the role of nonresident family for moving, especially over long distances. We examine (1) the prevalence of nonresident family as a primary motive versus a secondary and location-based motive for migration, (2) moving away from family versus moving toward family, (3) how individuals' reported family motives correspond to their actual migration toward family members, and (4) the sociodemographic characteristics of individuals who report family as a motive for migration. The data were derived from the Swedish Motives for Moving survey, which is based on an analytic sample of 4,601 Swedish respondents who migrated at least 20 km in 2007. We present descriptive statistics and quotes to illustrate respondents' reports of their migration motives. As a tool for sophisticated description, we also provide the results of logistic and ordered logistic regression models of mentioning nonresident family as a motive for moving.

First evidence shows that lockdown and confinement measures were associated with a more egalitarian gender division of housework in the United Kingdom. However, we know little about how the gender division of housework adjusted in different phases of the pandemic. We ask: (1) How did the gender division of housework change with the first national lockdown in March 2020? (2) Did observed changes persist when the lockdown measures were lifted or did couples revert to the gender division of housework observed before lockdown? We describe changes in the share of housework done by women before, during, and after the first lockdown using data from the Understanding Society COVID-19 study and employing fixed effects regression for couples with pre-school or school age children and couples without children living at home. The lockdown measures affected the gender division of housework with differential effects by the age of the youngest child in the household. After the initial shock, couples with younger children and couples with school-age children reverted to their pre-pandemic gender division of housework. However, couples without children living at home sustained a more equal share of housework. Like other shocks to the division of labor, couples tend to adapt to new circumstances, sustaining previous patterns of within household inequality. Initial signs of increasing gender equality at the start of the pandemic had already started to vanish for some by September 2020.

The percentage of older adults in the United States reporting being in good health has increased since the 1980s. This study tries to explain long-term trends in self-rated health in the United States. We used 47 years of repeated cross-sectional data from the National Health Interview Survey to estimate regression models that predict trends in self-rated health. Our results show that the improvement in self-rated health of men as well as women aged 50-84 is largely explained by gains in educational attainment. Self-rated health has slightly improved among those with post-secondary education, while it did not improve among those without post-secondary education.

In Korea, where marriage and childbirth are inextricably linked, the number of childless women is rising. Aside from the increase in permanent unmarried women, the prevalence of late marriage limits a woman's reproductive period, raises the risk of infertility, and can lead to childlessness. As Korea experienced the universalisation of higher education, the prolongation of education may have affected the timing of marriage. Examining women's marital status, age at first marriage, and educational background, this research explores how increasing age at marriage and extending educational periods are related and how they affect childlessness. Based on 2005 and 2020 Korean census data, this study examines unmarried and married women aged 40. Descriptive statistics describe the trend of childlessness, and the effects of marital status, age at marriage, and educational background on childlessness are analysed by the decomposition technique. The number of Korean women who postpone and forgo marriage and childbirth is rising across all educational levels. Women with lower education marry earlier but are more likely to remain childless. Among recent birth cohorts, women tend to stay childless/child-free longer after marriage, regardless of education. More of them ultimately remain childless. An increase in permanently unmarried women, delayed childbirth after marriage, and marital childlessness has resulted in a significant rise in childlessness regardless of the education of women.

In 2020, as the SARS-CoV-2 virus spread globally, many countries around the world experienced substantial increases in mortality, including in Latin America. In that year, many non-pharmaceutical measures were implemented in Uruguay. The first COVID-19 vaccines were administered in February 2021. Uruguay has various characteristics that were pointed out as risk factors in the course of the pandemic, mainly an old population, high urbanization levels, and socioeconomic inequalities. We estimate the annual and monthly excess deaths and P-scores for 2020, 2021, and 2022. We also compute the sex-specific life expectancy gap between each one of those years and 2019, and we decompose the observed changes into the contributions from COVID-19 at different ages. In contrast to what was observed in neighboring countries, Uruguay experienced a life-expectancy increase in 2020 as compared to 2019. However, life expectancy declined substantially in the country in 2021 and 2022. While most of the decline in 2021 is attributable to COVID-19, the cause-of-death profile of the losses in 2022 is more complex. Although both sexes were affected, women experienced a larger life-expectancy loss in 2022.

The relationship between income and fertility appears to be changing across rich societies at the national and regional levels. However, less is known about how the individual-level relationship between income and fertility has changed over time. To examine how the relationship between income and fertility changed between 2008 and 2022 in the Netherlands, and how this trend differs by gender and parity. Using register data on the full population, I link income quintiles in year t-2 to births in year t. Separate logistic regression models are estimated for each gender and year. Over the 2008-2022 period, income became increasingly positively associated with fertility. Although income effects are stronger for men than for women, the intensifying of the income effect over time is evident for both genders. These results are driven by first births. For higher-order births, income effects are much weaker and did not change over the study period. Earning a high income constitutes an increasingly strong prerequisite for the transition to parenthood in the Netherlands. This likely contributes to the postponement of parenthood and the decline of fertility and suggests that low-income groups may increasingly be unable to fulfill their fertility desires.

Family in China has experienced drastic changes in the past decades. Yet we have limited knowledge of the trends and patterns of the Chinese family in transition. This study provides a systematic documentation of the Chinese family in transition by estimating a variety of indicators of marital and fertility behaviors in China, including the singlehood rate, first marriage age, cohabitation rate, divorce rate, and nonmarital childbirth rate. We analyze data from the 1990, 2000, and 2010 China Censuses, the 2005 1% China Population Inter-Census Surveys, and the 2010-2016 China Family Panel Studies. The results indicate trends of delays in first marriage age and increases in premarital cohabitation in China. Despite below-replacement fertility, childlessness remains rare among married Chinese couples. In addition, almost all children are born and raised within marriage, with a virtual absence of nonmarital childbearing in China. Although we observe a slight increase in divorce across cohorts, the divorce rate within 10 years in China was much lower than in other East Asian societies. Our research suggests both continuity and changes in marital and childbearing behaviors in China. The trajectory of family changes in China has not followed those in Western countries.