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\"Although it has often been pointed out that the protagonists of Joseph Conrad's novels frequently fail in what they attempt to achieve, the forces that oppose them have rarely been examined systematically. Furthermore, no sustained attempts have been made to rigorously address the central philosophical issue the characters' predicament raises: that of the freedom-of-the-will. This interdisciplinary study seeks to remedy this neglect by taking recourse not only to the philosophical debate about free will and determinism but also to the relevant historical, economic, scientific, and literary discourses in the Victorian and Early-Modernist periods. Against this background a paradigmatic analysis of three of Conrad's most significant novels - Heart of Darkness, Nostromo, and The Secret Agent - investigates the writer's position in the free will and determinism debate by identifying certain recurring themes in which the freedom-of-the-will problem manifests itself. Light is thereby also thrown on a central Conradian paradox: how Conrad can insist on morality and moral responsibility, which presupposes the existence of free will, in a materialist-deterministic world, which denies it.\"--Jacket.

Most people believe in free will. Whether this belief is warranted or not, free will beliefs (FWB) are foundational for many legal systems and reducing FWB has effects on behavior from the motor to the social level. This raises the important question as to which specific FWB people hold. There are many different ways to conceptualize free will, and some might see physical determinism as a threat that might reduce FWB, while others might not. Here, we investigate lay FWB in a large, representative, replicated online survey study in the US and Singapore (n = 1800), assessing differences in FWB with unprecedented depth within and between cultures. Specifically, we assess the relation of FWB, as measured using the Free Will Inventory, to determinism, dualism and related concepts like libertarianism and compatibilism. We find that libertarian, compatibilist, and dualist, intuitions were related to FWB, but that these intuitions were often logically inconsistent. Importantly, direct comparisons suggest that dualism was more predictive of FWB than other intuitions. Thus, believing in free will goes hand-in-hand with a belief in a non-physical mind. Highlighting the importance of dualism for FWB impacts academic debates on free will, which currently largely focus on its relation to determinism. Our findings also shed light on how recent (neuro)scientific findings might impact FWB. Demonstrating physical determinism in the brain need not have a strong impact on FWB, due to a wide-spread belief in dualism.

The relationship between belief in free will (BFW) and third-party punishment (TPP) of criminal norm violations has been the subject of great debate among philosophers, criminologists and neuroscientists. We combined a TPP task with functional magnetic resonance imaging to investigate how lay people’s BFW might affect their punishment of hypothetical criminal offenses varying in affective content. Our results revealed that people with strong BFW punished more harshly than people with weak BFW, but only in low affective cases, likely driven by a more robust commitment to moral responsibility. This effect was mirrored by a stronger activation in the right temporo-parietal junction, a region presumably involved in attentional selection to salient stimuli and attribution of temporary intentions and beliefs of others. But, for high affective cases, the BFW-based behavioral and neural differences disappeared. Both groups similarly punished high affective cases and showed higher activation in the right insula. The right insula is typically activated during aversive interoceptive-emotional processing for extreme norm violations. Our results demonstrated that the impact of BFW on TPP is context-dependent; perhaps explaining in part why the philosophical debate between free will and determinism is so stubbornly persistent.

Free Will is constituted by a desire to act that is based on practical reasons. Being guided by reasons constitutes (free) human agency. The reasons account, which I will develop in this paper, is libertarian, as it implies that human agency is naturalistically underdetermined. Naturalistic descriptions, referring exclusively to natural causes, are not able to fully describe and explain human agency. On the other hand, there are no scientific arguments for the assumption that the causal impact of reasons interferes with the laws of physics. The physical world can - in principle - be described and explained within the conceptual frame of the natural sciences. The causal impact of reasons does not interfere with the laws of physics. Therefore, my reasons account of Free Will is also compatibilist.

Experimental philosophy is a new movement that seeks to return the discipline of philosophy to a focus on questions about how people actually think and feel. Departing from a long-standing tradition, experimental philosophers go out and conduct systematic experiments to reach a better understanding of people’s ordinary intuitions about philosophically significant questions. Although the movement is only a few years old, it has already sparked an explosion of new research, challenging a number of cherished assumptions in both philosophy and cognitive science. The present volume provides an introduction to the major themes of work in experimental philosophy, bringing together some of the most influential articles in the field along with a collection of new papers that explore the theoretical significance of this new research.

Exploring the Illusion of Free Will and Moral Responsibility investigates the philosophical and scientific arguments for free will skepticism and their implications. Skepticism about free will and moral responsibility has been on the rise in recent years. In fact, a significant number of philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists now either doubt or outright deny the existence of free will and/or moral responsibility—and the list of prominent skeptics appears to grow by the day. Given the profound importance that the concepts of free will and moral responsibility hold in our lives—in understanding ourselves, society, and the law—it is important that we explore what is behind this new wave of skepticism. It is also important that we explore the potential consequences of skepticism for ourselves and society. Edited by Gregg D. Caruso, this collection of new essays brings together an internationally recognized line-up of contributors, most of whom hold skeptical positions of some sort, to display and explore the leading arguments for free will skepticism and to debate their implications.

The article is a critical discussion of the widespread view in Leibniz scholarship, unfortunately held by the great Schepers too, that Leibniz should be understood as an opponent of Spinoza’s fatalism. It is true that Leibniz often expressed himself in this sense, and proposition 29 of the first part of Spinoza’s Ethics seems to suggest this. But Spinoza provides a more precise explanation of the terms ‘necessary’ and ‘contingent’ in Scholium 1 of proposition 33. It is shown that what Spinoza defines there as contingent, as opposed to what is necessary in itself, was discovered with great positive surprise by Leibniz in the spring of 1678, during his study of the Opera posthuma. Leibniz had already made this distinction the basis of his conception of contingency and freedom in his letter to Wedderkopf in 1671 and, more elaborately, in the Confessio philosophi (1673). That is, both philosophers distinguish contingency as a conditional necessity from absolute necessity where the opposite is a contradiction. Similarly, both philosophers reject free will in the sense of liberum arbitrium and conceive of freedom as acting according to reason. Leibniz’s real and permanent criticism of Spinoza was, from 1678 onwards, Spinoza’s denial of the goodness of God, stemming from the latter’s rejection of a personal God. To distance himself from the mal famé philosopher, however, he continued to brand him as a fatalist, even though he knew it better since 1678. L’article est une discussion critique de l’opinion répandue dans la recherche sur Leibniz, malheureusement défendue par Schepers aussi, le grand connaisseur de Leibniz, selon laquelle Leibniz doit être compris comme un adversaire du fatalisme de Spinoza. Certes, Leibniz s’est souvent exprimé en ce sens, et la proposition 29 de la première partie de l’Éthique semble le suggérer. Mais Spinoza fournit une explication plus précise des termes « nécessaire » et « contingent » dans Scholium 1 de la proposition 33. Il est montré que ce que Spinoza y définit comme contingent, par opposition à ce qui est nécessaire par soi-même, a été découvert avec une grande surprise positive par Leibniz au printemps 1678, pendant son étude de l’Opera posthuma. Leibniz avait déjà fait de cette distinction le fondement de sa conception de la contingence et de la liberté dans la lettre à Wedderkopf en 1671 et, de manière plus élaborée, dans la Confessio philosophi en 1673. Les deux philosophes distinguent donc la contingence comme une nécessité conditionnelle de la nécessité absolue. De même, les deux philosophes rejettent le libre volonté au sens du liberum arbitrium et conçoivent la liberté comme une action fondée sur la raison. La critique réelle et permanente de Leibniz à l’égard de Spinoza sera plutôt, à partir de 1678, la négation de la bonté de Dieu par Spinoza, qui découle du son refus d’un Dieu personnel. Mais pour se démarquer du philosophe mal famé, il continuait à l’accuser de fatalisme alors qu’il le savait mieux depuis 1678. Der Beitrag ist eine kritische Diskussion der in der Leibnizforschung verbreiteten und leider auch vom großen Leibnizexperten Schepers vertretenen Auffassung, dass Leibniz als Gegner eines Spinoza’schen Fatalismus zu verstehen sei. Zwar hat sich Leibniz vielfach so geäußert, auch scheint Lehrsatz 29 des ersten Teils der Ethik dies nahezulegen, jedoch liefert Spinoza eine genauere Erklärung der Begriffe „notwendig“ und „kontingent“ schon im Scholium 1 zu Lehrsatz 33. Es wird gezeigt, dass das, was Spinoza dort als kontingent definiert im Unterschied zu dem, was durch sich selbst notwendig ist, von Leibniz im Frühjahr 1678 beim Studium der ihm gerade zugesandten Opera posthuma mit großer, positiver Überraschung entdeckt wurde. Diese Unterscheidung hatte nämlich auch Leibniz bereits im Brief an Wedderkopf (1671) und, mehr ausgearbeitet, in der Confessio philosophi (1673) zur Grundlage seiner Auffassung zur Kontingenz und zur Freiheit gemacht. Beide Philosophen unterscheiden also Kontingenz als eine bedingte Notwendigkeit von der absoluten Notwendigkeit. Auch lehnen beide einen freien Willen im Sinne des liberum arbitrium ab und verstehen Freiheit als Handeln aus Vernunfterkenntnis. Leibniz’ eigentliche und bleibende Kritik an Spinoza wird seit 1678 vielmehr dessen Leugnung der Güte Gottes, die aus der Ablehnung eines persönlichen Gottes folgt. Aber obwohl er es seit 1678 besser wusste, fuhr Leibniz fort, Spinoza Fatalismus vorzuwerfen – um sich von dem verfemten Philosophen zu distanzieren.

The article is a critical discussion of the widespread view in Leibniz scholarship, unfortunately held by the great Schepers too, that Leibniz should be understood as an opponent of Spinoza’s fatalism. It is true that Leibniz often expressed himself in this sense, and proposition 29 of the first part of Spinoza’s Ethics seems to suggest this. But Spinoza provides a more precise explanation of the terms ‘necessary’ and ‘contingent’ in Scholium 1 of proposition 33. It is shown that what Spinoza defines there as contingent, as opposed to what is necessary in itself, was discovered with great positive surprise by Leibniz in the spring of 1678, during his study of the Opera posthuma. Leibniz had already made this distinction the basis of his conception of contingency and freedom in his letter to Wedderkopf in 1671 and, more elaborately, in the Confessio philosophi (1673). That is, both philosophers distinguish contingency as a conditional necessity from absolute necessity where the opposite is a contradiction. Similarly, both philosophers reject free will in the sense of liberum arbitrium and conceive of freedom as acting according to reason. Leibniz’s real and permanent criticism of Spinoza was, from 1678 onwards, Spinoza’s denial of the goodness of God, stemming from the latter’s rejection of a personal God. To distance himself from the mal famé philosopher, however, he continued to brand him as a fatalist, even though he knew it better since 1678. L’article est une discussion critique de l’opinion répandue dans la recherche sur Leibniz, malheureusement défendue par Schepers aussi, le grand connaisseur de Leibniz, selon laquelle Leibniz doit être compris comme un adversaire du fatalisme de Spinoza. Certes, Leibniz s’est souvent exprimé en ce sens, et la proposition 29 de la première partie de l’Éthique semble le suggérer. Mais Spinoza fournit une explication plus précise des termes « nécessaire » et « contingent » dans Scholium 1 de la proposition 33. Il est montré que ce que Spinoza y définit comme contingent, par opposition à ce qui est nécessaire par soi-même, a été découvert avec une grande surprise positive par Leibniz au printemps 1678, pendant son étude de l’Opera posthuma. Leibniz avait déjà fait de cette distinction le fondement de sa conception de la contingence et de la liberté dans la lettre à Wedderkopf en 1671 et, de manière plus élaborée, dans la Confessio philosophi en 1673. Les deux philosophes distinguent donc la contingence comme une nécessité conditionnelle de la nécessité absolue. De même, les deux philosophes rejettent le libre volonté au sens du liberum arbitrium et conçoivent la liberté comme une action fondée sur la raison. La critique réelle et permanente de Leibniz à l’égard de Spinoza sera plutôt, à partir de 1678, la négation de la bonté de Dieu par Spinoza, qui découle du son refus d’un Dieu personnel. Mais pour se démarquer du philosophe mal famé, il continuait à l’accuser de fatalisme alors qu’il le savait mieux depuis 1678. Der Beitrag ist eine kritische Diskussion der in der Leibnizforschung verbreiteten und leider auch vom großen Leibnizexperten Schepers vertretenen Auffassung, dass Leibniz als Gegner eines Spinoza’schen Fatalismus zu verstehen sei. Zwar hat sich Leibniz vielfach so geäußert, auch scheint Lehrsatz 29 des ersten Teils der Ethik dies nahezulegen, jedoch liefert Spinoza eine genauere Erklärung der Begriffe „notwendig“ und „kontingent“ schon im Scholium 1 zu Lehrsatz 33. Es wird gezeigt, dass das, was Spinoza dort als kontingent definiert im Unterschied zu dem, was durch sich selbst notwendig ist, von Leibniz im Frühjahr 1678 beim Studium der ihm gerade zugesandten Opera posthuma mit großer, positiver Überraschung entdeckt wurde. Diese Unterscheidung hatte nämlich auch Leibniz bereits im Brief an Wedderkopf (1671) und, mehr ausgearbeitet, in der Confessio philosophi (1673) zur Grundlage seiner Auffassung zur Kontingenz und zur Freiheit gemacht. Beide Philosophen unterscheiden also Kontingenz als eine bedingte Notwendigkeit von der absoluten Notwendigkeit. Auch lehnen beide einen freien Willen im Sinne des liberum arbitrium ab und verstehen Freiheit als Handeln aus Vernunfterkenntnis. Leibniz’ eigentliche und bleibende Kritik an Spinoza wird seit 1678 vielmehr dessen Leugnung der Güte Gottes, die aus der Ablehnung eines persönlichen Gottes folgt. Aber obwohl er es seit 1678 besser wusste, fuhr Leibniz fort, Spinoza Fatalismus vorzuwerfen – um sich von dem verfemten Philosophen zu distanzieren.

Free Will is constituted by a desire to act that is based on practical reasons. Being guided by reasons constitutes (free) human agency. The reasons account, which I will develop in this paper, is libertarian, as it implies that human agency is naturalistically underdetermined. Naturalistic descriptions, referring exclusively to natural causes, are not able to fully describe and explain human agency. On the other hand, there are no scientific arguments for the assumption that the causal impact of reasons interferes with the laws of physics. The physical world can - in principle - be described and explained within the conceptual frame of the natural sciences. The causal impact of reasons does not interfere with the laws of physics. Therefore, my reasons account of Free Will is also compatibilist.