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"Development Bank"
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Explaining coherence in international regime complexes: How the World Bank shapes the field of multilateral development finance
by
Schmidtke, Henning
,
Heldt, Eugénia C.
in
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
,
Banking
,
Bretton Woods
2019
The landscape of multilateral development finance has changed dramatically in the past decades. At Bretton Woods, delegates envisioned the World Bank as the focal organization mobilizing financial support for national development strategies. Today, this issue area is populated by no less than 27 multilateral development banks including the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank created under Chinese leadership. This paper shows that, despite this institutional proliferation, the development finance regime remains largely coherent and core governance features designed at Bretton Woods continue to shape the emerging regime complex. We develop a historical institutionalist argument for why newly created institutions are likely to imitate extant institutions. We suggest that states add new institutions not only in response to deficiencies in extant institutions but also to increase their control and reputation. We analyze three causal pathways - path-dependence, orchestration, and independent learning - that contribute to a coherent regime complex. We show that focal international organizations can use their position to prevent incoherence.
Journal Article
Earmarked Funding and the Control–Performance Trade-Off in International Development Organizations
by
Cormier, Ben
,
Heinzel, Mirko
,
Reinsberg, Bernhard
in
Accountability
,
Agricultural development
,
Approved projects
2023
Since the 1990s, the funding of multilateral development assistance has rapidly transformed. Donors increasingly constrain the discretion of international development organizations (IDOs) through earmarked funding, which limits the purposes for which a donor's funds can be used. The consequences of this development for IDOs’ operational performance are insufficiently understood. We hypothesize that increases in administrative burdens due to earmarked funding reduce the performance of IDO projects. The additional reporting required of IDOs by earmarked funds, while designed to enhance accountability, ultimately increases IDOs’ supervision costs and weakens their performance. We first test these hypotheses with data on project costs and performance of World Bank projects using both ordinary-least-squares and instrumental-variable analyses. We then probe the generalizability of those findings to other organizations by extending our analysis to four other IDOs: the African Development Bank (AfDB), Asian Development Bank (ADB), Caribbean Development Bank (CDB), and International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). Using data on the performance of 7,571 projects approved between 1990 and 2020, we find that earmarked funding undermines both cost-effectiveness and project performance across IDOs. Donors seeking value for money may consider allocating more money to core funds rather than to earmarked funds.
Journal Article
Accountability as justice for the Multilateral Development Banks? Borrower opposition and bank avoidance to US power and influence
2017
In 1993, the World Bank created its Inspection Panel, unprecedently opening itself up to being held to account by people negatively affected by its development projects. Within a decade, the other Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) - the Asian, African, Inter-American Development Banks, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the rest of the World Bank Group would too. The creation of these accountability mechanisms embodies a norm of 'accountability as justice' that provides recourse for damaging behaviour through a formal sanctioning process. This article makes two arguments: first, the United States built on its history of using 'accountability as control' to advocate using accountability for justice for the MDBs during debates over maintaining their efficiency and effectiveness. As the predominant MDB shareholder, the United States used its power (of the purse) and influence (through its voice and vote) to garner support for the norm despite opposition from borrowers and the Banks. Second, the United States had to resort to these same levers to demand the MDBs reformulate the mechanisms when borrower resistance and Bank avoidance hindered their effectiveness. The United States successfully created the norm but Bank recalcitrance meant the United States had to use the same levers to ensure its effectiveness. The article concludes that change within the Banks is evident but incremental: the spread of the norm amongst the MDBs has changed their governance to include recourse for project affected people with structures in place to strengthen them over time.
Journal Article
The Latecomer's Rise
2024
In The Latecomer's
Rise , Muyang Chen reveals the nature and
impact of a rapidly growing form of international lending: Chinese
development finance.
Over the past few decades, China has become the world's largest
provider of bilateral development finance. Through its two national
policy banks, the China Development Bank (CDB) and the
Export-Import Bank of China (China Exim), it has funded
infrastructure and industrial projects in numerous emerging markets
and developing countries. Yet this very surge and magnitude of
capital has raised questions about the characteristics of Chinese
bilateral lending and its repercussions on the international
order.
Drawing on a variety of novel Chinese primary sources, including
interviews and official bank documents, Chen pinpoints the
distinctiveness of Chinese bilateral development finance, explains
its origins, and analyzes its effects. She compares Chinese policy
banks with their foreign counterparts to show that the CDB and
China Exim, while state-supported, are in fact also
market-oriented-they are as much government organs as they are
profit-driven financial agencies that serve both state and firms'
interests. This approach, which emerged out of China's particular
economic history, suggests that Chinese overseas lending is not
merely a tool of economic statecraft that challenges Western-led
economic regimes. Instead, China's responses to extant rules,
norms, and practices across given issue areas have varied between
contestation and convergence.
Rich with empirical detail and penetrating insights, The
Latecomer's Rise demystifies the little-known workings of
Chinese development finance to revise our conceptions of China's
role in the international financial system.
The World Bank Group guarantee instruments 1990-2007 : an independent evaluation
Foreign direct investment and private capital flows are highly concentrated geographically, with almost half of them reaching five top destinations. These flows tend to evade many high-risk countries. Regulatory and contractual risks, particularly in infrastructure, have inhibited investments in many parts of the developing world. A core objective of the World Bank Group (WBG) has been to support the flow of private investment for development; guarantees and insurance have been among the instruments that the WBG has used to pursue this objective. This study examines three main questions: • Should the WBG be in the guarantee business? • Have guarantee instruments in the three WBG institutions been used to their potential as reflected in WBG expectations and perceived demand? • Is the WBG appropriately organized to deliver its range of guarantee products in an effective and efficient manner?