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28 result(s) for "Devlin, Lord"
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Punishment in Tort: The Context of Ideas in Rookes v. Barnard
Modern corrective justice theorists of tort law remain critical of the Anglo-American common law doctrine that allows a plaintiff to be awarded damages beyond compensation, and for the distinct purpose of punishing a defendant in a civil tort action. From the corrective justice standpoint, punishment is an illegitimate remedial purpose of the law of tort. So much so, that the historical doctrine of civil damages that continues to allow for it – exemplary (or punitive) damages – should be totally abolished. This article revisits a historical tort case that modern corrective justice tort theorists have praised for very nearly abolishing the exemplary damages doctrine in one leading common law jurisdiction: it critically explores the 1964 decision of the Appellate Committee of the United Kingdom House of Lords in . In doing so, it strives to set this theoretically significant reform of the English law of civil tortious recovery more vividly in the historical context in which it was undertaken. It contends that a deeper appreciation of ’ theoretical significance requires taking fuller account of the context of ideas in which Lord Devlin – the Law Lord to whom the House’s decision on damages is ascribed – undertook it.
Taking Law Seriously: Starting Points of the Hart/Devlin Debate
The famous mid-20th century debate between Patrick Devlin and Herbert Hart about the relationship between law and morality addressed the limits of the criminal law in the context of a proposal by the Wolfenden Committee to decriminalize male homosexual activity in private. The original exchanges and subsequent contributions to the debate have been significantly constrained by the terms in which the debate was framed: a focus on criminal law in general and sexual offences in particular; a preoccupation with the so-called \"harm principle,\" a sharp delineation of the realms of law and morality, and a static conception of the relationship between them. This article explores the limitations imposed by these various starting-points and argues for a holistic and symbiotic understanding of the relationship between law and morality.
British Privacy Debate Swayed U.S. Decisions
Lord [Patrick Devlin], in a 1958 lecture to the British Academy, criticized the Wolfenden Report and its premise that the law had no business enforcing moral judgments shared by reasonable people; \"reasonable\" people being exemplified -- in a characterization of the ordinary Englishman as \"the man in the Clapham omnibus.\"
Lord Devlin, 86, a British Judge Who Became Critic of the System
In 1960, he was promoted to Lord Justice in the appeals courts. A year later he was given a life peerage and took his place in the House of Lords, where he served as a Law Lord. The Law Lords is the final appellate body in Britain. 'So Utterly Boring' \"Lord Devlin was one of the few judges willing to face up to the possibility that the legal system to which he had devoted his life was capable of making serious mistakes,\" said Chris Mullin, a lawmaker who also campaigned for the Guildford Four. \"I have always said there must be an equal deal for both,\" he said in 1986. \"If the peremptory challenge is removed, the Crown must give up the right.\"