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7 result(s) for "Diefenbaker, John G., 1895-1979."
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Reassessing the rogue Tory : Canadian foreign relations in the Diefenbaker era
By uncovering new sources of research and applying innovative analysis, Reassessing the Rogue Tory challenges standard interpretations of Canadian foreign policy during the controversial Diefenbaker years.
Essence of Indecision
Tracing Diefenbaker's deliberations over nuclear policy, McMahon shows that Diefenbaker was politically cautious, not indecisive - he wanted to acquire nuclear weapons and understood from public opinion polls that most Canadians supported this position. However, Diefenbaker worried that the growing anti-nuclear movement might sway public opinion sufficiently to undermine his political support. He also feared that Liberal leader Lester Pearson could use the issue for political advantage. As long as Pearson opposed Canada's membership in the nuclear club, he could portray Diefenbaker's government as an irresponsible proponent of nuclear proliferation. Despite these reservations, Diefenbaker was involved in nuclear negotiations with the Americans throughout his tenure as prime minister, and an agreement was within reach on a number of occasions. When, in January 1963, Pearson reversed his position, Diefenbaker felt trapped - in making a clear public statement in favour of nuclear weapons it would appear as though he was merely following his opponent's lead. When Canada acquired nuclear weapons in 1963, it was under the leadership of Pearson, not Diefenbaker.
The strange demise of British Canada : the liberals and Canadian nationalism, 1964-1968
Examining cases such as the introduction of the Maple Leaf to replace the Canadian Red Ensign and Union Jack as the national flag, Champion shows that, despite what he calls Canada's \"crisis of Britishness,\" Pearson and his supporters unwittingly perpetuated a continuing Britishness because they - and their ideals - were the product of a British world. Using a fascinating array of personal papers, memoirs, and contemporary sources, this ground-breaking study demonstrates the ongoing influence of Britishness in Canada and showcases the personalities and views of some of the country's most important political and cultural figures. An important study that provides a better understanding of Canada, The Strange Demise of British Canada also shows the lasting influence Britain has had on its former colonies across the globe.
Fifty years of parliamentary interpretation
January 15, 1959 was a historic day for Parliament. On that date, simultaneous interpretation was introduced in the House of Commons. During the 1958 election campaign, John Diefenbaker had promised Francophone Canadians bilingual cheques and \"instantaneous translation\" of Commons debates. On election day, March 31, 1958, his party received the largest majority in the country's history, winning 208 out of 265 seats, including 50 of Quebec's 75 seats. Since January 15, 1959, every word spoken in the House of Commons is interpreted simultaneously, whatever the political adherence of the person speaking. Unilingual Members can speak freely in their own language, safe in the knowledge that they will be understood by everyone, including visitors and journalists in the galleries. This new service was considered a constitutional necessity that would give tangible rather than merely symbolic support to bilingualism in Parliament, the cornerstone of Canadian institutions. This article highlights the development of simultaneous interpretation in Canada. Adapted from the source document.
Canadian policy toward Khrushchev's Soviet Union
Discusses Soviet-Canadian relations following Stalin's 1953 death under Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent's Liberal government (1948-57) through the fall of John Diefenbaker's Conservative government (1957-63), emphasizing the Liberal strategy of accommodation in contrast to US Cold War policy; includes background on Soviet-Canadian relations (1917-53). Published for the Centre for Security and Foreign Policy Studies and the Teleglobe Raoul-Dandurand Chair of Strategic and Diplomatic Studies at the Université du Québec, Montréal. Argues that the Liberal strategy toward the Soviet Union was ultimately vindicated by the rise of Gorbachev, followed by increased East-West contact, Soviet liberalization, the subsequent Soviet collapse, and the end of the Cold War; based on government documents from the National Archives of Canada and interviews with Canadian diplomatic officials.
Dief and Day: A Cautionary Tale.(Stockwell Day)
He ran out of rope. In early 1965, exasperated by [John Diefenbaker]'s inability to accommodate the new Quebec, MP Leon Balcer asked party president [Dalton Camp] to consider a leadership convention. Because there was no automatic procedure for leadership review, the wily Diefenbaker thwarted that move-and went on to lose the 1965 election. Camp knew that Diefenbaker could hold his by-now largely Prairie-based caucus; instead, he used party executives to plot his coup at the 1966 general meeting.