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Silicon Valley start-ups and corporate innovation : approaches to resolve the innovator's dilemma
Bernhard Gold answers the question of how larger firms can learn from the successes of Silicon Valley start-ups by means of corporate venturing and by developing the 'Spin-Along Approach' - a method that combines the innovativeness of start-up companies with the capabilities of large corporations to obtain the best of both worlds. Moreover, the author provides an in-depth analysis of the Silicon Valley ecosystem and presents new corporate innovation methods for the digital age, with the aim of providing a final resolution to the 'Innovator's Dilemma'.
Book
The Evolution of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: Experimental Evidence
A usual criticism of the theory of infinitely repeated games is that it does not provide sharp predictions since there may be a multiplicity of equilibria. To address this issue, we present experimental evidence on the evolution of cooperation in infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games as subjects gain experience. We show that cooperation may prevail in infinitely repeated games, but the conditions under which this occurs are more stringent than the subgame perfect conditions usually considered or even a condition based on risk dominance. (JEL C71, C73)
Journal Article
Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: Cooperation in an Uncertain World
We study the experimental play of the repeated prisoner's dilemma when intended actions are implemented with noise. In treatments where cooperation is an equilibrium, subjects cooperate substantially more than in treatments without cooperative equilibria. In all settings there was considerable strategic diversity, indicating that subjects had not fully learned the distribution of play. Furthermore, cooperative strategies yielded higher payoffs than uncooperative strategies in the treatments with cooperative equilibria. In these treatments successful strategies were \"lenient\" in not retaliating for the first defection, and many were \"forgiving\" in trying to return to cooperation after inflicting a punishment.
Journal Article
Situational factors shape moral judgements in the trolley dilemma in Eastern, Southern and Western countries in a culturally diverse sample
The study of moral judgements often centres on moral dilemmas in which options consistent with deontological perspectives (that is, emphasizing rules, individual rights and duties) are in conflict with options consistent with utilitarian judgements (that is, following the greater good based on consequences). Greene et al. (2009) showed that psychological and situational factors (for example, the intent of the agent or the presence of physical contact between the agent and the victim) can play an important role in moral dilemma judgements (for example, the trolley problem). Our knowledge is limited concerning both the universality of these effects outside the United States and the impact of culture on the situational and psychological factors affecting moral judgements. Thus, we empirically tested the universality of the effects of intent and personal force on moral dilemma judgements by replicating the experiments of Greene et al. in 45 countries from all inhabited continents. We found that personal force and its interaction with intention exert influence on moral judgements in the US and Western cultural clusters, replicating and expanding the original findings. Moreover, the personal force effect was present in all cultural clusters, suggesting it is culturally universal. The evidence for the cultural universality of the interaction effect was inconclusive in the Eastern and Southern cultural clusters (depending on exclusion criteria). We found no strong association between collectivism/individualism and moral dilemma judgements.Including participants from 45 countries, Bago et al. find that the situational factors that affect moral reasoning are shared across countries, with diminished observed cultural variation.
Journal Article
Mobility restores the mechanism which supports cooperation in the voluntary prisoner's dilemma game
It is generally believed that in a situation where individual and collective interests are in conflict, the availability of optional participation is a key mechanism to maintain cooperation. Surprisingly, this effect is sensitive to the use of microscopic dynamics and can easily be broken when agents make a fully rational decision during their strategy updates. In the framework of the celebrated prisoner's dilemma game, we show that this discrepancy can be fixed automatically if we leave the strict and frequently artifact condition of a fully occupied interaction graph, and allow agents to change not just their strategies but also their positions according to their success. In this way, a diluted graph where agents may move offers a natural and alternative way to handle artifacts arising from the application of specific and sometimes awkward microscopic rules.
Journal Article
Communicating sentiment and outlook reverses inaction against collective risks
Collective risks permeate society, triggering social dilemmas in which working toward a common goal is impeded by selfish interests. One such dilemma is mitigating runaway climate change. To study the social aspects of climate-change mitigation, we organized an experimental game and asked volunteer groups of three different sizes to invest toward a common mitigation goal. If investments reached a preset target, volunteers would avoid all consequences and convert their remaining capital into monetary payouts. In the opposite case, however, volunteers would lose all their capital with 50% probability. The dilemma was, therefore, whether to invest one’s own capital or wait for others to step in. We find that communicating sentiment and outlook helps to resolve the dilemma by a fundamental shift in investment patterns. Groups in which communication is allowed invest persistently and hardly ever give up, even when their current investment deficits are substantial. The improved investment patterns are robust to group size, although larger groups are harder to coordinate, as evidenced by their overall lower success frequencies. A clustering algorithm reveals three behavioral types and shows that communication reduces the abundance of the free-riding type. Climate-change mitigation, however, is achieved mainly by cooperator and altruist types stepping up and increasing contributions as the failure looms. Meanwhile, contributions from free riders remain flat throughout the game. This reveals that the mechanisms behind avoiding collective risks depend on an interaction between behavioral type, communication, and timing.
Journal Article
Computer anthropomorphisation in a socio-economic dilemma
In the study of human behaviour, non-social targets are often used as a control for human-to-human interactions. However, the concept of anthropomorphisation suggests that human-like qualities can be attributed to non-human objects. This can prove problematic in psychological experiments, as computers are often used as non-social targets. Here, we assessed the degree of computer anthropomorphisation in a sequential and iterated prisoner’s dilemma. Participants (
N
= 41) faced three opponents in the prisoner’s dilemma paradigm—a human, a computer, and a roulette—all represented by images presented at the commencement of each round. Cooperation choice frequencies and transition probabilities were estimated within subjects, in rounds against each opponent. We found that participants anthropomorphised the computer opponent to a high degree, while the same was not found for the roulette (i.e. no cooperation choice difference vs human opponents;
p
= .99). The difference in participants’ behaviour towards the computer vs the roulette was further potentiated by the precedent roulette round, in terms of both cooperation choice (61%,
p =
.007) and cooperation probability after reciprocated defection (79%,
p
= .007). This suggests that there could be a considerable anthropomorphisation bias towards computer opponents in social games, even for those without a human-like appearance. Conversely, a roulette may be a preferable non-social control when the opponent’s abilities are not explicit or familiar.
Journal Article
Neural dynamics of two players when using nonverbal cues to gauge intentions to cooperate during the Prisoner's Dilemma Game
Social interaction is a fundamental part of our daily lives; however, exactly how our brains use social cues to determine whether to cooperate without being exploited remains unclear. In this study, we used an electroencephalography (EEG) hyperscanning approach to investigate the effect of face-to-face contact on the brain mechanisms underlying the decision to cooperate or defect in an iterated version of the Prisoner's Dilemma Game. Participants played the game either in face-to-face or face-blocked conditions. The face-to-face interaction led players to cooperate more often, providing behavioral evidence for the use of these nonverbal cues in their social decision-making. In addition, the EEG hyperscanning identified temporal dynamics and inter-brain synchronization across the cortex, providing evidence for involvement of these regions in the processing of face-to-face cues to read each other's intent to cooperate. Most notably, the power of the alpha frequency band (8–13Hz) in the right temporoparietal region immediately after seeing a round outcome significantly differed between face-to-face and face-blocked conditions and predicted whether an individual would adopt a ‘cooperation’ or ‘defection’ strategy. Moreover, inter-brain synchronies within this time and frequency range reflected the use of these strategies. This study provides evidence for how the cortex uses nonverbal social cues to determine other's intentions, and highlights the significance of power in the alpha band and inter-brain phase synchronizations in high-level socio-cognitive processing.
Journal Article