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A usual criticism of the theory of infinitely repeated games is that it does not provide sharp predictions since there may be a multiplicity of equilibria. To address this issue, we present experimental evidence on the evolution of cooperation in infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games as subjects gain experience. We show that cooperation may prevail in infinitely repeated games, but the conditions under which this occurs are more stringent than the subgame perfect conditions usually considered or even a condition based on risk dominance. (JEL C71, C73)

At the moment at Medical Faculty, University of Sarajevo, simultaneously exist two systems of teaching process, the old (pre-Bologna) and Bologna process. To show efficiency and justification of use of Bologna process at Medical Faculty, University of Sarajevo, through the prism of actual beneficiaries of this process, students, assessment of quality of medical education, and comparison of results of the teaching process evaluation between students studying according to the Bologna process and the old system. The study included period from 2012 to 2014, and had prospective character. Students of final (sixth) year were included, the last three generations of pre-Bologna, and three generations of the Bologna process, which completed their studies successfully. The study included 365 students (177 under the old system and 188 under the Bologna process), who had answered prepared questionnaire. The presence of large number of female students, in both systems is significant. There were significant differences in opinion of students regarding the quality of space for administration and labor administration, informatization of the teaching process, the opinion of the objectivity of teachers in the assessment of the examination, and on-line access to their content. (p <0.05). The Bologna process, with all its guidelines, was never to the maximum implemented in the teaching faculties, mostly because of the lack of funds and infrastructure that couldn't fully comply with all the privileges of the Bologna process. Bologna process on this principle, has brought mediocrity, of which we have tried to escape. New school year, brings, and the new Bologna process, a new curriculum, a large number of new classes, systematization of the material, with simultaneous correction necessary in one hand in teaching, and in other hand in students themselves.

The study of moral judgements often centres on moral dilemmas in which options consistent with deontological perspectives (that is, emphasizing rules, individual rights and duties) are in conflict with options consistent with utilitarian judgements (that is, following the greater good based on consequences). Greene et al. (2009) showed that psychological and situational factors (for example, the intent of the agent or the presence of physical contact between the agent and the victim) can play an important role in moral dilemma judgements (for example, the trolley problem). Our knowledge is limited concerning both the universality of these effects outside the United States and the impact of culture on the situational and psychological factors affecting moral judgements. Thus, we empirically tested the universality of the effects of intent and personal force on moral dilemma judgements by replicating the experiments of Greene et al. in 45 countries from all inhabited continents. We found that personal force and its interaction with intention exert influence on moral judgements in the US and Western cultural clusters, replicating and expanding the original findings. Moreover, the personal force effect was present in all cultural clusters, suggesting it is culturally universal. The evidence for the cultural universality of the interaction effect was inconclusive in the Eastern and Southern cultural clusters (depending on exclusion criteria). We found no strong association between collectivism/individualism and moral dilemma judgements.Including participants from 45 countries, Bago et al. find that the situational factors that affect moral reasoning are shared across countries, with diminished observed cultural variation.

We study the experimental play of the repeated prisoner's dilemma when intended actions are implemented with noise. In treatments where cooperation is an equilibrium, subjects cooperate substantially more than in treatments without cooperative equilibria. In all settings there was considerable strategic diversity, indicating that subjects had not fully learned the distribution of play. Furthermore, cooperative strategies yielded higher payoffs than uncooperative strategies in the treatments with cooperative equilibria. In these treatments successful strategies were \"lenient\" in not retaliating for the first defection, and many were \"forgiving\" in trying to return to cooperation after inflicting a punishment.

Originally developed to explain cultural variation in moral judgments, moral foundations theory (MFT) has become widely adopted as a theory of political ideology. MFT posits that political attitudes are rooted in instinctual evaluations generated by innate psychological modules evolved to solve social dilemmas. If this is correct, moral foundations must be relatively stable dispositional traits, changes in moral foundations should systematically predict consequent changes in political orientations, and, at least in part, moral foundations must be heritable. We test these hypotheses and find substantial variability in individual-level moral foundations across time, and little evidence that these changes account for changes in political attitudes. We also find little evidence that moral foundations are heritable. These findings raise questions about the future of MFT as a theory of ideology.

Research on moral reasoning calls into question self-control, which encompasses impulsivity, compulsivity, and inhibitory control. However, a thorough investigation exploring how these three dimensions can affect moral reasoning in response to different scenarios is unavailable. We addressed this topic by testing the predictive role of these three dimensions of self-control on appraisals for ethical violations related with different types of scenarios. Overall, our results suggest that all three dimensions of self-control are involved in moral reasoning, depending on the type of appraisal and provided moral scenarios.

Cardiac vagal modulation indicates the self-regulatory activity of the autonomic nervous system and can thus be used to assess an individual’s ability to integrate physiological, cognitive, and emotional responses in the decision-making process. In this paper, cardiac vagal modulation, quantified by heart rate variability (HRV), was used to predict decision-making in two types of moral dilemmas: First, sacrificial dilemmas which create a moral conflict between utilitarian (acting to maximise aggregate well-being by sacrifice) and deontological (rejecting the sacrifice) alternatives; second, everyday dilemmas which create a conflict between altruistic (acting non-selfish) and egoistic (acting self-centered) alternatives. HRV was analysed in 112 healthy participants before, during, and after decision-making, allowing to assess not only self-regulatory ability (resting HRV) but also self-regulatory capacities (HRV during and after decision-making). HRV predicted concrete decisions, but effects were only found in women. In sacrificial dilemmas, deontological women showed a stronger vagal withdrawal but also a faster cardiac vagal recovery compared to high utilitarian women. In everyday moral dilemmas, altruism was associated with reduced vagal outflow and increased sympathetic activity. Findings suggest differences in the acquisition of self-regulatory capacities between decision-makers in both types of moral dilemmas, which can be measured by HRV.

Social behavior in human and animal populations can be studied as an evolutionary process. Individuals often make decisions between different strategies, and those strategies that yield a fitness advantage tend to spread. Traditionally, much work in evolutionary game theory considers symmetric games: individuals are assumed to have access to the same set of strategies, and they experience the same payoff consequences. As a result, they can learn more profitable strategies by imitation. However, interactions are oftentimes asymmetric. In that case, imitation may be infeasible (because individuals differ in the strategies they are able to use), or it may be undesirable (because individuals differ in their incentives to use a strategy). Here, we consider an alternative learning process which applies to arbitrary asymmetric games, introspection dynamics . According to this dynamics, individuals regularly compare their present strategy to a randomly chosen alternative strategy. If the alternative strategy yields a payoff advantage, it is more likely adopted. In this work, we formalize introspection dynamics for pairwise games. We derive simple and explicit formulas for the abundance of each strategy over time and apply these results to several well-known social dilemmas. In particular, for the volunteer’s timing dilemma, we show that the player with the lowest cooperation cost learns to cooperate without delay.

In the repeated prisoner's dilemma, predictions are notoriously difficult. Recently, however, Blonski, Ockenfels, and Spagnolo (2011)—henceforth, BOS—showed that experimental subjects predictably cooperate when the discount factor exceeds a particular threshold. I analyze individual strategies in four recent experiments to examine whether strategies are predictable, too. Behavior is well summarized by \"Semi-Grim\" strategies: cooperate after mutual cooperation, defect after mutual defection, randomize otherwise. This holds both in aggregate and individually, and it explains the BOS-threshold: Semi-Grim equilibria appear as the discount factor crosses this threshold, and then, subjects start cooperating in round 1 and switch to Semi-Grim in continuation play.