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Paradigmatic uses of negative existentials such as ‘Vulcan does not exist’ are problematic because they present the interpreter with a pragmatic paradox: a speaker who uses such a sentence seems to be asserting something that is incompatible with what she presupposes. An adequate solution must therefore explain why we interpret paradigmatic uses of negative existentials as saying something true, even though such uses present us with a pragmatic paradox. I provide such an explanation by analyzing paradigmatic uses of negative existentials as corrections of previous assertions that are judged to suffer from referential presupposition failure. I present the explanation within the framework of a simple version of segmented discourse representation theory.

Strawson (in Mind 59:320–344, 1950; Theoria 30(2):96–118, 1964) argued that definite NPs trigger presuppositions as an aspect of their conventional meanings, and this semantic conception of presupposition triggers is incorporated into the binding theory of presuppositions (van der Sandt, in J Semant 9:333–377, 1992 and Geurts, in Presupposition and pronouns, 1999). The phenomenon of presupposition denials, however, presents a problem for the semantic conception of presupposition triggers, for in such denials the alleged semantic presuppositions seem to be \"cancelled\" by a negation operator. Geurts (in Language 74(2):274–307, 1998; Presupposition and pronouns, 1999) attempts to solve this problem by utilizing the binding theory's allowance for local accommodation. Geurts' proposal, however, is inadequate, primarily because Geurts formulates the binding theory within discourse representation theory (DRT), which makes no allowance for the illocutionary force of denial. Asher and Lascarides' (in J Semant 15:239–299, 1998a; J Semant 15:83–113, 1998b; The logics of conversation, 2003) segmented discourse representation theory (SDRT), however, has the resources to account for the illocutionary force of denial. Utilizing a version of SDRT I demonstrate that the \"cancelling\" of a presupposition by echoic negation in presupposition denials crucially depends upon the denial of information that is pragmatically communicated by accommodation.

This paper proposes that a core semantic property of temporal locating adverbs is the ability (or the lack thereof) to introduce a new time discourse referent. The core data comes from that same day in narrative discourse. I argue that unlike other previously studied temporal locating adverbs—which introduce a new time discourse referent and relate it to the speech time or a salient time introduced into the discourse context—that same day is ‘twice anaphoric’, i.e. it retrieves two salient times from the input context without introducing one of its own. Moreover, I argue that the adverb currently is like that same day in not introducing a new time discourse referent. Unlike that same day, however, currently has both a deictic and an anaphoric usage analogous to on Sunday. The analysis that I propose is implemented within Compositional Discourse Representation Theory. It illustrates how adverbial meaning can be integrated within a more general theory of temporal interpretation.

Recent advances in the Super Linguistics of pictures have laid the Super Semantic foundation for modelling the phenomena of narrative sequencing and co-reference in pictorial and mixed linguistic-pictorial discourses. We take up the question of how one arrives at the pragmatic interpretations of such discourses. In particular, we offer an analysis of: (i) the discourse composition problem: how to represent the joint meaning of a multi-picture discourse, (ii) observed differences in narrative sequencing in prima facie equivalent linguistic vs pictorial discourses, and (iii) the phenomenon of co-referencing across pictures. We extend Segmented Discourse Representation Theory to spell out a formal Super Pragmatics that applies to linguistic, pictorial and mixed discourses, while respecting the particular ‘genius’ of either medium and computing their distinctive pragmatic interpretations.

Background (1) Investigate the effects of age [Younger (YA) vs. Older (OA) Adults] and framing (Risk of Loss vs. Reward) on a cognitive effort‐based decision‐making task (CEDT) in which participants can choose to expend greater effort (i.e., working memory) to maximize their earnings, and (2) Examine the construct validity of this task in relation to self‐report symptom inventories. Based on the developmental course of cognitive control systems and the Socioemotional Selectivity Theory of Aging, we hypothesized that (1) YAs would choose to expend more effort [DV=Hard Task Selection Frequency (HTSF)] in pursuit of rewards, (2) OAs would choose to expend more effort to avoid loss, and (3) lower effort expenditure (HTSF) would be more strongly related to self‐reported symptoms of amotivation than mood. Method Ninety‐seven (YA=52, OA=45) cognitively normal adults completed the CEDT and questionnaires assessing mood (PANAS: Positive and Negative Affect Schedule) and motivation (DAS: Dimensional Apathy Scale). Result Overall, YAs exhibited greater effort expenditure (HTSF: YA=59%, OA=49%), but this difference did not reach statistical significance (p = 0.08). On risk trials, YAs had significantly faster decision reaction times (DRT: p <0.001), but did not differ significantly from OAs in accuracy (YA=51%, OA=51%) or effort expenditure (HTSF: YA=42%, OA=45%; Eta2<0.01). On reward trials, all between‐group comparisons were statistically significant (p <0.001), with YAs making faster decisions (DRT: Eta2 = 0.13), exhibiting greater effort (HTSF: YA=77%, OA=52%; Eta2 = 0.14), and maintaining a higher accuracy rate (YA=76%, OA=56%; Eta2 = 0.14) than their OA counterparts. Effort expenditure on risk trials was not significantly correlated with self‐report measures, while greater effort expenditure on reward trials was significantly (p ≤ 0.01) correlated with lower positive affect (R2 = 0.10), higher negative affect (R2 = 0.07), and greater executive apathy (R2 = 0.09). Conclusion Obtained findings were partially consistent with our hypotheses as both age groups exhibited greater cognitive effort in pursuit of rewards and risk aversion was only slightly higher in OAs vs. YAs, while greater effort expenditure (on reward trials only) was counterintuitively related to greater self‐reported symptoms of mental effort avoidance and mood. While the concept of decisional inertia may help to contextualize our findings, such potential confounds will need to be explored in our future work.

Background (1) Analyze the effects of age [Younger (YA) vs. Older (OA) Adults] and framing (Risk vs. Reward) on effort‐based decision‐making using a modified version of the Effort Expenditure for Rewards Task (M‐EEfRT), in which participants can choose to exert greater physical effort (i.e., finger tapping) to either gain or avoid losing rewards, and (2) Investigate the relationship between M‐EEfRT performance parameters and self‐reported symptoms of mood and motivation. Based on previous research, we hypothesized that (1) YAs would expend more effort [DV=Hard Task Selection Frequency (HTSF)] to gain rewards, while OAs would expend more effort to prevent losing rewards already acquired, and (2) effort expenditure on both trial types would be more strongly related to self‐reported symptoms of motivation than mood. Method A cognitively normal sample of 52 YAs (ages 18‐30) and 45 OAs (ages 60‐80) completed the M‐EEfRT and self‐report questionnaires assessing mood (PANAS: Positive and Negative Affect Schedule) and motivation (DAS: Dimensional Apathy Scale). Result Overall, there were no significant between‐group differences in effort expenditure (HTSF: YA=56%, OA=61%, Eta2 = 0.01). On risk trials, YAs had significantly faster decision reaction times (DRT) and lower effort expenditure (HTSF: YA=34%, OA=55%, Eta2 = 0.07) than OAs despite no significant differences in successful trial completion (STC). On reward trials, YAs had significantly higher STC (YA=89%, OA=77%, Eta2 = 0.05) and faster DRT than OAs, while only a statistical trend (p = 0.06) was found for greater effort expenditure in YA vs. OA groups (HTSF: YA=78%, OA=66%, Eta2 = 0.04). Although DRT was correlated with mood, effort expenditure was not significantly associated with either self‐report questionnaire. Conclusion The results of this study were partially consistent with our hypotheses, as the effect of framing on effort expenditure varied by age group. However, performance parameters were not significantly correlated with self‐report questionnaires. Given that a similar lack of correspondence between subjective self‐report and objective behavioral performance is often found in the literature, we plan to explore alternative methods of task validation (e.g., activity trackers, sociodemographic equivalence, etc.) in our future work.

This paper proposes a semantics of anaphora in attitude contexts within the framework of Discourse Representation Theory (DRT). The paper first focuses on intentional identity, a special kind of cross-attitudinal anaphora. Based on the DRT semantics of attitude reports summarized by Kamp et al. (in: D. Gabbay and F. Guenthner (Eds.), Handbook of philosophical logic, 2011), the author proposes a semantics of intentional identity that implements the following two ideas: (1) indefinites and pronouns appearing in attitude contexts introduce metadiscourse referents, which represent one’s mental files and record appearances of discourse referents in attitude contexts; and (2) what underlies the relevant kind of anaphoric links between indefinites and pronouns across attitude contexts is the coordination relation between mental files, which is represented by using metadiscourse referents. Next, the paper expands the semantics to cover de re anaphora, in which an anaphoric pronoun in an attitude context takes as its antecedent an expression appearing outside any attitude context.

This article approaches the construction of reported thought in everyday conversation by analysing instances of direct reported thought (DRT), taken from storytelling sequences. It is argued that DRT is used by narrators as a device to portray, in a dynamic sense, the ways in which they experience the story world in their mind, as discursive processes and reactions around an external event that clash with their expectations or initial perception of the situation. More specifically, the analysis shows that DRT is employed to stage a ‘first wrong thought’ (Jefferson 2004) that is shaped in a range of ways, as a process of worrying, deliberating, lamenting, and blaming or accusing someone in the situation, as well as shocked and indignant reactions that are constructed as exclamations and a process of reproaching and planning a future revenge action. (Direct reported thought, conversational storytelling, mental discursive processes, mental reactions, first wrong thought, silent shock, inner experience, direct reported speech)

INTRODUCTION Diet‐induced inflammation may influence cognitive health in older adults, yet sex‐specific associations across distinct cognitive domains remain unclear. METHODS Using weighted multivariable regression, weighted restricted cubic splines, and weighted risk group analyses (energy‐adjusted Dietary Inflammatory Index [E‐DII] lowest quartiles), we assessed E‐DII associations with four cognitive tests (Animal Fluency Test [AFT], Digit Symbol Substitution Test [DSST], Delayed Recall Test [DRT], and Immediate Recall Test [IRT]) in older adults. All analyses included sex stratification or sex interaction. Weighted mediation analysis by 15 blood biochemical markers was explored. RESULTS In older males, higher ln(E‐DII) was linked to poorer AFT and DSST performance and increased low cognition risk in AFT, DSST, and DRT; no associations were found in older females. Gamma‐glutamyl transferase mediated the ln(E‐DII)‐DSST association in older males. DISCUSSION These sex‐specific links highlight the need for personalized dietary strategies to protect cognitive health in aging populations. Highlights E‐DII exhibits sex‐specific associations with multiple cognitive domains in older adults. Higher ln(E‐DII) is linked to poorer verbal fluency (AFT), processing speed (DSST), and increased low cognition risk (AFT, DSST, and DRT) in older males, but not in older females. Gamma‐glutamyl transferase mediates the association between ln(E‐DII) and DSST performance specifically in older males. Findings support the development of personalized, sex‐specific dietary strategies to preserve cognitive health in aging populations.

I argue that alternative-denoting expressions interact with their semantic context by taking scope. With an empirical focus on indefinites in English, I show how this approach improves on standard alternative-semantic architectures that use point-wise composition to subvert islands, as well as on in situ approaches to indefinites more generally. Unlike grammars based on point-wise composition, scope-based alternative management is thoroughly categorematic, doesn’t under-generate readings when multiple sources of alternatives occur on an island, and is compatible with standard treatments of binding. Unlike all in situ (pseudo-scope) treatments of indefinites, relying on a true scope mechanism prevents over-generation when an operator binds into an indefinite. My account relies only on function application, some mechanism for scope-taking, and two freely-applying type-shifters: the first is Karttunen’s (Linguist Philos 1(1):3–44, 1977 . https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00351935 ) proto-question operator, aka Partee’s (in: Groenendijk, de Jongh, Stokhof (eds) Studies in discourse representation theory and the theory of generalized quantifiers, Foris, Dordrecht, 1986 ) IDENT, and the second can be factored out of extant approaches to the semantics of questions in the tradition of Karttunen ( 1977 ). These type-shifters form a decomposition of LIFT, the familiar function mapping values into scope-takers. Exceptional scope of alternative-generating expressions arises via (snowballing) scopal pied-piping: indefinites take scope over their island, which then itself takes scope.